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 In recent years, researchers have suggested that public corruption has emerged as a 
serious problem in the United States, eroding and violating the public’s trust in our 
government and elected officials. This is attributed to many high-profile cases in which 
prominent elected officials, whether federal, state, county, or local, have been convicted 
and sentenced to federal prison for public corruption offenses.  Several empirical 
analyses have explored corruption in government to determine the factors that contribute 
to the corrupt behavior of elected officials without exploring whether there are 
differences or similarities in what causes a federal, state, county, or local elected official 
to engage in public corruption.  Few studies have extensively explored the factors that 
contribute to the corrupt behavior of county commissioners in county governments.  
 This study will focus, explore, and enhance the research on the causes of public 
corruption among elected county commissioners by examining four domains of 
corruption causality: individual characteristics of elected officials, county government 
characteristics, county government fiscal performance, and community characteristics.  In 
addition, this study will attempt to determine which factors uniquely situated within each 
of the four domains can predict corrupt behavior of elected county officials and 
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convictions for public corruption.  Lastly, this study will attempt to determine if General 
Strain Theory can provide a theoretical framework for understanding the causes of public 
corruption and, if so, to what degree it can predict whether elected county officials will 
engage in corrupt behavior.  
 The quantitative study sample for this research consists of data collected on large 
urban counties in which county officials were convicted or indicted of public corruption 
between the fiscal years of 2000 and 2009.  Additional study samples consist of data 
collected on more than 100 large urban counties with no cases of public corruption.  Both 
categories of data were derived from counties with populations of 300,000 or more in 
which there were indictments, convictions, and no indictments or convictions of county 
officials for the 2000  2009 fiscal years. The unit of analysis consists of county 
commissioners from large urban counties convicted and not convicted of public 
corruption. To determine which factors contribute to the specific research questions and 
related hypotheses, the study will explore 26 explanatory variables within four domains 
contained in the research General Models.  It will use logistic regression procedures and 
analytical prediction of probability tools to discover relationships between the dependent 
and the independent variables. 
 This study attempts to determine the causes of public corruption by examining and 
answering four specific research questions: 
1. Are there specific personal characteristics that encourage or discourage county 
officials to engage in public corruption? 
2. What are the governmental characteristics that contribute to public corruption? 
3. What role does government fiscal stability play in explaining public corruption? 
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 Mary Buckelew was once called the most powerful woman in Jefferson County, 
Alabama. She was the first woman ever elected to the county commission, in November 
1990, and served in the position until 2006.  She even served as president of the Board of 
County Commission from 1990–1998.  Commissioner Buckelew was a savvy political 
operative who developed a reputation for having an uncanny ability to find consensus 
among a bitterly divided board.  To highlight her accomplishments, in 1997 Governing 
Magazine honored her as one of its “Public Officials of the Year.” But Mary Buckelew’s 
power and popularity evaporated when she was forced out of office for public corruption. 
Commissioner Buckelew’s downfall began in 1996 when the Jefferson County 
Commission entered into a court-ordered consent decree that mandated the renovation of 
the county’s sewer system.  To fund the renovation, the County Commission decided to 
participate in several bond offerings and numerous bond swap agreements.  Between 
March 2003 and December 2004, the commission approved five bond offerings and four 
swap agreements worth billions of dollars.  
 Commissioner Buckelew and the Jefferson County finance committee participated in 
the approval of all these transactions.  During the process, Commissioner Buckelew, a 
number of county administrative staff, and an investment banker hired by Jefferson 
County to oversee the bond transactions traveled to New York City on several occasions 
to discuss them with other investment firms and officials.  During one trip to New York, 
Commissioner Buckelew visited a Salvatore Ferragamo store on Fifth Avenue and saw a 
pair of shoes and a purse she admired on sale for about $1,500.  On another trip, 
2 
Commissioner Buckelew admired other items at the same store costing a total of $1,119.  
It was later discovered that the investment banker hired by the county had purchased 
these items for Commissioner Buckelew on both occasions and mailed them to her office 
at the Jefferson County government building.  During a third trip to New York in 2004, 
this banker paid approximately $1,400 for Commissioner Buckelew to spend the day at a 
New York City spa.  In total, Commissioner Buckelew received nearly $5,000 in gifts 
from the investment banker hired by the Jefferson County Commission to oversee and 
manage the bonds allocated to renovate the county’s sewer system.  The investment 
banker and his firm received approximately $7.1 million in brokerage fees.  
 Mary Buckelew would later plead guilty to a charge of obstruction of justice and 
agree to cooperate with the investigators probing public corruption in Jefferson County. 
As part of her plea agreement, Buckelew faced imprisonment for up to 20 years, a fine of 
up to $250,000, or both; supervised release of not more than three years; and a special 
assessment fee of $100 per count.  Buckelew was later sentenced to three years’ 
probation, 200 hours of community service, and a $20,000 fine for lying to a federal 
grand jury during its probe of the county.  In recent months, Jefferson County has 
defaulted on its bond payments and is considering filing for bankruptcy.  
Prologue 
 The corruption of public officials like Mary Buckelew, and public corruption in 
general, are not new problems.  Public corruption has existed for at least 4,000 to 5,000 
years, if not longer, according to Bardhan (1997).1
                                                 
1The fact that corruption is not a modern phenomenon is also emphasized by Vito Tanzi (1998), who stated, “Corruption is not a 
new phenomenon” (p. 559).  Two thousand years ago, Kautilya, the prime minister of an Indian kingdom, had already written a book, 
Arthasastra, discussing it. Seven centuries ago, Dante placed bribers in the deepest part of Hell, reflecting the medieval distaste for 
corrupt behavior. Shakespeare gave corruption a prominent role in some of his plays, and the U.S. Constitution explicitly names 
bribery and treason as two crimes that can justify the impeachment of a president. 
  Explanations of the reasons behind 
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public corruption have been offered for nearly as long.  However, the “study of 
corruption by academics, policy-makers or self-styled analysts is a more recent 
phenomenon” (Mukherjee 2004, p. 1).2
 As early as the 1960s, political scientists, economists, and sociologists focused their 
attention on political corruption in terms of its impact on government policy and the 
economy.  Benson (1978) notes that “Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic book, 
Democracy in America, identifies corruption as a danger of and to democracy, as well as 
a potential component of it” (p. 1).  
  
 This research study will review and identify the impact public corruption has on our 
governmental systems, citizens, and the legitimacy of democracy itself.  The presence of 
corruption in the United States, if unchecked, could undermine the purpose of 
government and the rights and the needs of the governed, and create widespread 
economic problems for both government and the governed.  Indeed, according to Warren 
(2004), “Corruption creates inefficiencies in deliveries of public services, not only in the 
form of a tax on public expenditures, but by shifting public activities towards those 
sectors in which it is possible for those engaged in corrupt exchanges to benefit.”  He 
goes on to point out that “corruption also undermines the culture of democracy [by] 
eroding trust” (p. 328).  Clearly, corruption in the present-day U.S. can compromise the 
purpose of government and ruin the economic, political, and social stability of its people. 
Consequently, it is important to explore those factors that account for public corruption in 
county government.  
                                                 
2
One of the earliest academic works on corruption is The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Banfield 1958).  Other prominent 
works written after World War II include “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption” (Leff 1964); Political 
Corruption: A Handbook (Heidenheimer et al. 1989); Comparative Political Corruption (Scott 1972); Political Order in Changing 
Societies (Huntington 1968); and Corruption in Developing Countries (Wraith and Simkins 1963). 
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 An analysis of public corruption in county government is vital because counties are 
major institutions in our political system.  County governments serve as agents of the 
state, with monies flowing from state government to counties to implement programs and 
services that citizens need.  In many cases, large urban counties have greater authority, 
provide a greater degree of service, and have a greater span of power and influence than 
cities do.  The power, authority, and influence that county government has, as well as its 
overall responsibilities in the delivery of services, justify the need to study public 
corruption in county government.  
 Research has shown the negative impact public corruption can have on government 
(Warren 2004), but that is not the focal point of this research.  Rather, this study seeks to 
understand why public corruption exists in our system of county governments.  It will 
review literature, develop models, and study the cases of various county officials in an 
attempt to understand the elements and factors that contribute to the corruption of public 
officials in county government.  
In a close review of the literature, several theoretical perspectives emerged about 
corruption among county officials.  The rest of this section will discuss the limitations 
and important components necessary to explaining corruption among county officials and 
reveal a platform for selecting the best-suited theory for this research study: General 
Strain Theory (GST). 
Research Study Overview 
 The presence of public corruption in government suggests that corruption has a 
broad effect on people: it creates a system of mistrust among citizens, thereby 
diminishing the importance of government and influencing the rule of law and regulation, 
5 
which in turn inflicts enormous economic, political, and social costs on society.  This 
research study is a comprehensive review designed to examine, explore, and explain 
public corruption among officials in county government utilizing GST.  Agnew (1992) 
described GST as an individual’s “actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively 
valued goals, actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli, and actual or 
anticipated presentation of negative stimuli,” all of which can result in strain (p. 59). 
Strain emerges from negative relationships with others, leading individuals to engage in 
criminal behavior.  This research study will evaluate how GST manifests itself in the day-
to-day activities of county officials in their efforts to carry out their duties as 
representatives of the public. 
 To further understand how the theoretical perspective of GST could explain a county 
official’s decision to engage in public corruption, explanatory variables were developed 
with the intent of examining the relationship between public corruption and the personal 
characteristics of elected officials.  The General Model will also explore the relationship 
between public corruption and county-level characteristics as they may apply to large 
urban counties with cases of public corruption, as well as those counties with no cases of 
public corruption. 
 The application of GST is appealing in this instance because of the limited research 
conducted to understand the effect the theory has on corruption in county government. 
Although recent progress has advanced our understanding of public corruption and 
explored how it affects government, there is little information (and few empirical studies) 
describing specific variables that explain elected county officials’ decisions to engage in 
6 
corrupt behavior.  In fact, GST has limited exposure in the area of public corruption 
hypothesis testing, which creates an opportunity worthy of review.  
 This research study builds on the premise that GST might explain the factors that 
contribute to white-collar crime, including public corruption committed by elected county 
officials.  
Statement of Problem 
 Some county officials choose to engage in public corruption in today’s political 
environment, while others do not.  In the context of this study, the following questions 
merit answers:  
1. What factors explain public corruption in today’s county government?   
2. Will answering the question of public corruption provide insight into what 
may deter, reduce, or minimize corruption in county government?  
 Amundsen (1999) stated, “Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the 
contemporary world.  It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public 
policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the public sector and private sector 
development, and particularly hurts the poor” (p. 1).  The presence of corruption in 
county government and its effects on today’s society create enormous pressures for an 
honest government.  Benson (1978) opined: “The loss of citizens’ confidence in a 
government which citizens know is cheating has a profound effect on the democratic 
process” (p. 51).  Benson also postulated, “Corruption can cost a government, and its 
taxpayers, large sums through both ‘honest’ graft, and the overburdening of the 
government exchequer” (p. 208).  Clearly, the presence of public corruption has a broad 
effect on people and does little to eliminate their mistrust of government and the public 
7 
officials who engage in corruption.  In fact, Musgrave (1959) suggested public corruption 
weakens the purpose and possibility of an effective government by undermining the 
functions of macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, and resource allocation, 
which are the three primary functions of public institutions today.  Moreover, without a 
thorough knowledge of the causes of public corruption, the American public’s distrust of 
public officials and their ability to deliver key public services will continue to grow.  
 The literature review explored the importance of implementing stringent 
anticorruption policies and ethics laws to determine their effectiveness in reducing public 
corruption.  Although little is known about the elements that contribute to public 
corruption in the contemporary U.S., analyzing it with GST will add to the body of 
knowledge in this area of inquiry.  Additionally, exploring the relationship of GST to 
local government and elected officials, and examining its effect on public corruption, are 
both new ideas that should generate further interest.  
Purpose of the Research Study 
 This research study has three objectives.  
 First, it will attempt to use GST to explain public corruption in local government by 
county officials convicted in federal court.  It will study whether GST is a plausible 
model to explain corruption within the four domains of elected officials’ characteristics, 
county government characteristics, governmental fiscal stability, and community 
stability.  
 Second, this study will examine the decisions of two groups of county officials who 
take divergent roads in their political careers to explain public corruption and predict 
what factors could be used to stop officials from engaging in it. 
8 
 Third, this study will examine the 26 variables identified within the four domains 
(Table 1-1) and identify those that best explain the behavior of county elected officials 
indicted on and convicted of public corruption charges. 










Outside employment Office of Inspector General Per capita income Poverty rate 
Age Ethics laws Financial stability Age of community 65 and older 
Gender Structure of government Federal & state aid Crime rate 
Formal education Open meeting laws Auditors Civic involvement 
Religion Employment growth  Community education level 
Marital status   Labor force 
Race   Population growth 
Tenure   County population to overall state population 
   Political party affiliation 
  
 While there are studies that discuss public corruption in state, federal, and local 
government, and the negative impacts it has on government performance, the goal of this 
study is to examine federal public corruption cases in counties, utilizing GST to explain 
the corruption of elected county officials. 
 Figure 1-1 illustrates the relationships and overlapping connections among the four 
domains and their influences on public corruption. 
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Figure 1-1. Modeling of Corruption. 
 Figure 1-1 also illustrates that corruption is influenced by various elements of 
governmental, community, and individual dynamics.  This model represents a possible 
correlation between each of the four domains of public corruption, and it suggests that the 
decisions of elected county officials are influenced by government fiscal performance, 
fiscal stability, government characteristics, and community characteristics.  This analysis 
will be useful in determining and verifying whether there are actual relationships between 
each of these four dynamic domains and public corruption.  
Research Approach 
 This research study will examine and analyze quantitative data pertaining to county 
governments and county elected officials convicted of federal public corruption to 














applicability of GST as the theory best suited to examining public corruption.  The 
research will focus on former elected county officials indicted and convicted of federal 
public corruption charges and their counterparts from the same counties who were not 
indicted or convicted, using data and information from fiscal years 2000 to 2009.  This 
study will analyze the fiscal policies, oversight, and community characteristics of county 
governments that had cases of public corruption, but the primary purpose of this study is 
to determine the impact GST has on governments, communities, and elected county 
officials.  
 Much of the data analyzed was gathered from public information sources.  The study 
is unique in that the public officials who are its subjects were federally indicted or 
convicted; therefore, much of the data was obtained through the Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records system, a database of federally adjudicated court cases.  
 Agnew (1992) suggested that strain does not need to be specifically tied to economic 
status because it is considered a psychological reaction to any perceived negative aspects 
of one’s social environment, or as Agnew further stated, “negative relationships with 
others... in which the individual is not treated as he or she wants to be treated” (p. 48).  
 In summary, this research study postulates that GST will explain the corruption 
offenses of public officials based on each official’s profile characteristics, community 
characteristics, and the influences of county government.  
 The data analysis for this study consisted of a two-step process to test the 
hypotheses.  First, the analysis examined data pertaining to county governments with 
convicted officials and county governments with no convicted officials.  Second, a 
comparative study was conducted of elected county officials from those counties with 
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indicted and convicted public officials and those counties without officials indicted or 
convicted of public corruption.  The results of these analyses will be used in this paper to 
identify the variables that explain why county officials do or do not elect to engage in 
acts of public corruption.  
Significance of the Study 
 Government is the cornerstone of a democracy; therefore, it has a responsibility to 
maintain the highest level of integrity, free of political conflicts and public corruption.  
The primary purpose of elected public officials is to serve and represent the interests of 
the people who elected them, without regard to personal gain.  If corruption invades our 
system of government, how can citizens expect trustworthy and effective government? 
As Benson (1978) stated, “Political corruption has become a serious liability to American 
life” (p. 5).  Whether it surfaces in federal, state, municipal, or county governments, 
corruption deters the formation of honest and effective government. 
 Data from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section (2009) suggest 
that there have been significant increases in corruption within all levels of government in 
the past 20 years.  Figure 1-2 displays the increases in corruption cases in local 
government and in the number of local elected officials charged with corruption over the 
past 10 years.  The data show that local government convictions have increased by 71 
percent and the number of local government officials charged with corruption has 
increased by 78 percent over those same 10 years.  It appears the federal government has 




Note: Local officials, fiscal years 2000 to 2009. 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/). 
 
Figure 1-2.  Trends in Corruption Cases. 
     Public corruption within our system of government has been highlighted recently 
because of highly publicized corruption cases involving high-profile county officials.  
The presence and effects of public corruption have resulted in citizens becoming cynical 
and more inclined to distrust their government (Maxwell 2004; Neckel 2005; Williams 
2006; Warren 2007).           
  If the United States intends to maintain its dominance as a world power, the moral 
character of our political system and public officials must be beyond reproach.  The 
achievement of such a government, free of corrupt activities, begins with the education of 
young people, with a society that stresses the importance of values and ethical decisions, 
and with the eradication of the notion of making political decisions for personal gain.  













the indicators of corruption, and use that information to offer suggestions to reduce 
corruption, thereby restoring public trust in government and in our public officials. 
Limitations of the Study 
  This research study was designed to study cases of public corruption in county 
government; however, a review of the literature showed that the number of federal 
conviction cases for county officials from 2000 to 2009 was smaller than anticipated.  
Therefore, this study focused on the indictments of county elected officials, including 
many that ultimately became convictions.  Further research revealed a smaller number of 
corruption cases than originally anticipated from large urban counties.  All in all, case 
reviews identified approximately 65 federal conviction cases; 12 were excluded from the 
study, however, because they occurred in small counties with populations of less than 
300,000 or took place before 2000.  The expectation was that data prior to 2000 would be 
difficult to obtain from small to mid-sized counties, which indeed turned out to be the 
case; not only was it difficult to collect data prior to 2000, it was difficult to verify its 
accuracy.  Such limitations may have a negative impact on the validity of the study. 
Because of the limited number of public corruption cases, the research pool was 
expanded to include cases in which there were both indictments and convictions, though 
not all indictments ended in convictions.  This study thus included four cases in which 
there were only indictments.  
  
14 
Structure of the Research Study 
 Chapter 1 includes the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, general 
research questions, and a brief overview of the research approach.  
 Chapter 2 provides a review of current literature pertinent to the topic of corruption 
and the research study, theoretical perspectives on public corruption, and a review of 
literature from previous studies identifying the problems that public corruption creates.  
This chapter also explains the variables thought to contribute to public corruption.  It 
provides the framework for the formulation of specific research study questions and for 
the hypotheses to be tested.  
 Chapter 3 presents an overview of the history, background, and origin of federal 
public corruption charges, along with a discussion of various types of public corruption 
cases and a survey of federal laws used to prosecute cases.  It includes a definition of 
corruption for the purposes of this study.  
 Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the theoretical model selected for the 
study, the research design, the model and method of analysis, and specific research 
questions (with related hypotheses) for the General Models.  It also provides a description 
of the research design (e.g., unit of analysis, target population, samples, issues regarding 
validity) and discusses the research model, including data collection, data sources, and 
coding procedures for the dependent variable and covariates. 
 Chapter 5 discusses the results of the analysis.  





REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption 
 As George Bernard Shaw, the British dramatist, wrote, “Power does not corrupt men; 
fools, however, if they get into a position of power, corrupt power.” Americans accept 
and even expect a culture of political corruption in the nations of the developing world; 
we assume corruption is pervasive in the Philippines, Madagascar, Nigeria, 
Bangladesh—the list goes on and on.  We know these countries have long suffered the 
negative effects corruption creates in the economic, social, and diplomatic well-being of 
governments.  We do not, however, expect public corruption in the United States.  But a 
review of the literature uncovers many cases here at home, and the body of evidence 
reveals that public corruption, if not addressed, can threaten our society and destroy the 
functionality of our government (Amundsen 1999; Collier 1999; Johnson 1996; Neckel 
2005; Peter and Welch 1978; Wallis 2005; Warren 2004).  
 This chapter will identify a theory to explain the behavior of elected county officials, 
as well as identify and define the four domains that will be used to explain public 
corruption.  
 The criminal and behavioral theories reviewed in the following sections focus on 
what motivates an individual to become involved in, and ultimately opt to engage in, 
criminal behavior as an elected official.  The principal assumptions and limitations of 




 Wilson (1968) and Arrow (1971) first discussed agency theory as a risk-sharing 
problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different attitudes towards risk.  
Individually, each author believed that agency becomes a problem when “cooperating 
parties have different goals and division of labor” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 58).  In particular, 
agency theory is directed at the relationship in which one party (the principal) delegates 
work to another (the agent), who performs that work.  Agency theory attempts to explain 
this relationship using the metaphor of a contract.  In fact, it was initially developed for 
private purposes, e.g., contractual parties such as owners and managers, and was only 
later used to model bureaucracy and public institutions.  
 The theory purports to resolve two problems that can occur in the agent relationship. 
Eisenhardt (1989) theorizes that the agency dilemma arises when (1) a conflict emerges 
between the principal and the agent regarding the desire or the goals, or (2) verifying 
agents’ work is difficult and/or becomes an expensive endeavor for the principal.  In 
essence, conflict is created when the principal is unable to verify the behavior of the 
agent.  
 Another problem is created from the sharing risk that occurs when the principal and 
agent have opposing approaches towards risk.  When the principal and the agent have 
different risk preferences, they prefer different actions that result in a conflict. 
 Eisenhardt (1989) states that the premise of agency theory is “determining efficiency 
of contracts governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people 
(e.g. self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion)” (p. 5).  Rose-Ackerman (2001) 
introduced the relationship between agency theory and corruption: “Corruption is 
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dishonest behavior that violates the trust placed in a public official (the agent).  It 
involves the use of a public position for private gain” (p. 3).  
 Research shows that a number of economic studies on corruption have employed the 
principal-agent model; in these cases, the principal is the central government and the 
agent is the bureaucrat taking bribes from a private individual interested in some benefit 
from the bureaucrat (Eisenhardt 1989; Hunt 2004; Jang and Johnson 2003; Johnson 
1996).  A possible example of this theory in the context of corruption is the Keating Five 
case, in which five U.S. senators (the agents) used the power of their office to bail out 
Charles Keating, a savings-and-loan financier (principal), for personal gain (reelection).  
The principal, in this case, is considered the public.  Thompson (1993) argued that this 
form of corruption involved using one’s public office for private benefit, thereby 
subverting the democratic process.  Thompson also introduced a new form of corruption, 
“mediated corruption,” which occurs when a public official’s act of corruption is filtered 
through the political process, leading the official to view the corrupt act as legitimate and 
within the function of political responsibility or duties.  Mediated corruption becomes a 
concern when a public official receives a gain, a private citizen receives a benefit, and the 
connection between the gain and the benefit is criminal or improper.  
 Conventional and mediated corruption are substantially different.  Thompson (1993) 
states that mediated corruption arises when “(1) the gain that the politician receives is 
political, not personal and is not illegitimate in itself, as in conventional corruption; 
(2) how the public official provides the benefit is improper, not necessarily the benefit 
itself, or the fact that the particular citizen receives the benefit; (3) the connection 
between the gain and the benefit is improper because it damages the democratic process, 
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not because the public official provides the benefit with corrupt motives” (p. 369).  In 
each of these instances, there is a link to the democratic process that is significantly 
different from conventional corruption, such as bribery, conflict of interest, extortion, and 
other forms of criminal behavior.  In the Keating Five case, the senators attempted to use 
their public office for personal gain, a private citizen received an advantage, and the 
relationship between the two was generally viewed as improper.  Both parties were more 
concerned with their own self-interest than with the interest of the public.  The personal 
gain or self-interest in this case ties it to the principal-agent theory, which Thompson 
points out is sometimes used to analyze corruption. 3
 In the context of this theory, politicians act as the agent for their constituents. 
Problems arise because the principals, i.e., the constituents, cannot control the agent’s 
behavior—in other words, constituents cannot reliably monitor all of their elected 
officials’ actions.  If there are no other constraints, this so-called “slack” allows 
politicians to act in their own interests even when those are contrary to the interests of 
their constituents. “The model could help us see that corruption may be partly the result 
of the structure of incentives in the system: agent-principal slack creates moral hazards 
that permit corruption” (Thompson 1993, p. 372).  
 
 The principal-agent theory treats the difficulties between principal and agent 
differently when difficulties arise between the alignment of interests and risk-sharing, 
which generally occurs when a principal elects/hires an agent.  In these cases, some of the 
methods used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal include 
                                                 
3 A pioneering work that exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach is Rose-
Ackerman   (1978, p. 6-10). 
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bonuses, promotions, re-election, or fear of firing.  The principal-agent dilemma is found 
in most employer-employee relationships, as when elected officials hire top executives.  
 Eisenhardt’s discussions on agency theory point out that the principal-agent literature 
focuses on determining the optimal contract (behavior versus outcome) between the 
principal and the agent.  This model assumes conflict between principal and agent, an 
easily measured outcome, and an agent who is more risk-reluctant than the principal.  
When an agent’s concern is self-interest, then the agent may or may not behave as 
agreed.   According to Jensen (1994), “Agency theory postulates that because people are, 
in the end, self-interested, they will have conflicts of interests over at least some issues 
any time they attempt to engage in cooperative endeavors” (p. 12).  Therefore, if self-
interest is reduced and common interest is amplified, agents will behave as desired. 
However, the data collected for this research study does not provide enough information 
for analysis. 
Game Theory 
 Game theory is another theory used to analyze corruption of public officials.  It is a 
mathematical analysis of any situation where there may be a conflict of interest with the 
intent of indicating the optimal choices that, under given conditions, will lead to a desired 
outcome.  Developed in 1944 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, the theory is now a 
branch of applied mathematics, economics, and social science.  It was intended to study 
human behavior and the strategic decision-making process whereby players choose 
different actions in an attempt to maximize their returns, in some instances at the expense 
of others.  Research indicates that game theory analyzes what decisions rational 
individuals will make when the outcome (payoff) depends on both their own decisions 
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and the choices of other players.  More recently, game theory has been used to predict 
and explain behavior, contributing to the development of theories of ethical behavior. 
 In recent publications, analysts have applied game theory to more serious conflict-
of-interest situations, including some in the field of political science.  When members 
of political parties band together to promote the interests of the party over those of their 
constituencies, they are participating in game theory.  One example comes from the 
House Republicans of the 104th Congress, who united in support of the “Contract with 
America,” backed by then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich.  In doing so, it could be 
said that these members of the Republican Party were more interested in promoting their 
own interests than those of their home districts.  
 Both Von Neumann and Morgenstern believed that game theory was based on the 
premise that no matter what the game, and no matter what the circumstances, there is a 
strategy that will enable the participants to succeed.  To that end, Levine (1999) 
introduced another element to game theory, one that “focuses on how groups of people 
interact.  There are two main branches of game theory: cooperative and non-cooperative 
game theory.  Cooperative game theory is concerned with games where there is 
transferable utility and the characteristic function determines the payoff of each coalition. 
Non-cooperative game theory deals largely with how intelligent individuals interact with 
one another in an effort to achieve their own goals.”   
 Game theory, which is dominated by self-interest, is able to explain the decision-
making process and self-interest of political officials.  Literature shows that game theory 
has been used in previous corruption analyses: for instance, Myerson (1993) developed 
voting games to predict the relative effectiveness of different electoral rules in reducing 
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the corruption of political parties.  Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) analyzed games in 
which the size of legislatures, quality of voter information, and nature of party 
organization explained the frequency and size of bribes paid to legislators.  Finally, Cadot 
(1987) analyzed a game of bureaucratic corruption under different assumptions about the 
information sets of the players (Manion 1996, p. 168).  Although game theory has been 
used to analyze the “game” of corruption and the effect that paying bribes has, it did not 
prove useful for this research study.  The data collected did not provide sufficient 
information to analyze officials’ decision-making processes or their decisions to engage 
in acts of corruption; as a result, the breadth of previous work concerning political 
officials was not sufficient to test the effectiveness of game theory for this study. 
Cognitive Moral Development Theory 
 Cognitive Moral Development Theory (CMD) has evolved over time and was 
eventually used by political scientists, who embraced what some viewed as a more 
complex psychological profile of corruption by government officials.  CMD incorporates 
moral integrity into analyses; the research focuses on “ethical decision-making and moral 
development” (Menzel 2005, p. 148) and the ethical decisions of elected officials.  In the 
realm of government, the ethical and moral decision-making of public officials may 
result in acts of public corruption.  In this regard, CMD could explain the actions of 
officials as they relate to public corruption.  There have been a number of moral 
judgment studies that considered how ethical sensitivity results in more ethical decisions, 
or how workplace settings can play a principal role in ethical decisions.  
 Kohlberg first embarked on a philosophical inquiry into morality with the intent of 
providing an interdisciplinary and comprehensive account of its nature and development. 
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His theory attempted to trace the progression of moral development through various 
levels, ultimately establishing six stages of moral reasoning.  According to Nidich, 
Nidich, and Alexander (2000), “Each higher stage of moral development, following 
Piaget’s cognitive stage theory, is a more integrated, comprehensive, equilibrated and 
thus qualitatively advanced stage of growth” (p. 219).  According to CMD, progression is 
marked via changes in socio-moral perspective Kohlberg himself believed that cognitive 
moral development constitutes “[b]eginning from a self-interested egoistic social 
perspective, leading to one that is consciously shared by other group members or society 
as a whole, and culminating in a universal ethical principles orientation, that explicitly 
defines universal principles of justice that all humanity should follow, irrespective of 
time and place” (Kohlberg 1973a, p. 220 [Table I]).  CMD, as presented in Table 2-1 
below, is a comprehensive detailing of various stages in which individual behavior is 
used to predict moral decision-making.  The table outlines the stages a person goes 
through according to CMD; these six stages, as presented by Kohlberg, delineate the 
expected reactions, behaviors, and rationales that individuals use when presented with 
various situations.  
 Simply stated, research shows that CMD supports the premise that the “development 
of higher states of consciousness results in the actualization of all ‘levels of the mind,’ 
and provides us with the ability to think and act spontaneously in accord with all the laws 
of nature, so that our thoughts and actions are fully life-supporting for society and 
ourselves.  At the highest level of consciousness, unity consciousness, cognitive 
development becomes complete with the ultimate identity of human intelligence with 
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nature’s intelligence, allowing life to be lived in its greatest fulfillment” (Nidich et al. 
2000, p. 224). 






Post-Conventional & Principal 
Stage 1: The Stage of 
Punishment and Obedience.  
This stage takes an egocentric 
point of view.  The individual 
is purely concerned with self 
and the consequence of 
performing in an undesired 
manner.  There is no 
recognition of the points of 
view held by others. 
Stage 3: The Stage of 
Mutual Interpersonal 
Expectations, Relationships, and 
Conformity.  Individuals are 
receptive of approval or 
disapproval from others 
reflective of society's 
concurrence with their position.  
They try to be good boys/girls 
and live up to these expecta-
tions.  A person relates to point 
of view by putting himself or 
herself in another’s shoes. 
Stage 5: The Stage of Prior 
Rights and Social Contract.  This 
stage takes a prior-to-society 
perspective, i.e., that of a rational 
individual aware of values and rights 
prior to social attachments and 
contracts.  The person integrates 
perspectives by formal agreement, 
contract, object impartiality, and due 
process. 
Stage 2: The Stage of 
Individual Instrumental 
Purpose and Exchange.  This 
stage takes a concrete 
individualistic perspective.  
The major concern here is 
“what’s in it for me?” A 
person at this stage separates 
his own interests and points of 
view from those of authorities 
and others. 
Stage 4: The Stage of Social 
System and Conscience 
Maintenance.  This stage 
differentiates societal points of 
view from interpersonal 
agreement or motives.  A person 
at this stage takes the viewpoint 
of the system, which defines 
roles and rules.  He or she 
considers individual relations in 
terms of place within the system. 
Stage 6: The Stage of Universal 
Ethical Principles. 
This stage takes the perspective 
that specific moral decisions are 
guided by universal ethical principles 
of justice: equality of human rights 
and respect for the dignity of human 
beings as individuals.  A stage 6 
person is guided by these principles, 
which can be agreed upon by all 
rational people and can guide the 
choices of any person without 
conflict or inconsistency. 
 
 While Kohlberg’s theory is a valid method of explaining the moral judgment of 
officials, some researchers in the field believe it is only sufficient for studying a narrow 
or single-focus issue, such as ethical decision-making.  This study, however, is not 
limited to the ethical decision-making of officials.  Its intent is to examine factors that 
lead elected public officials to make poor decisions and engage in acts of public 
corruption.   Additionally, Kohlberg’s theory does not place much weight on the 
socioeconomic background of individuals; it is a psychological profile of individuals 
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incorporating moral integrity.  CMD is a moral judgment theory, and traces the 
progression of moral development through various levels.  It is more suited to evaluate 
only the moral judgment and decisions of individuals, and would have required additional 
information to analyze the decisions of elected officials if used in this research study.  
General Theory of Crime 
 Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory, which focused on the failure of self-control 
as the primary cause of crime, eventually developed into the General Theory of Crime.  
This theory identified six distinct elements of self-control.  Research indicated that 
individuals who lacked self-control would have a tendency to be “impulsive, insensitive, 
physical, shortsighted, risk takers with low frustration tolerance” (Baron 2003, p. 403), 
and would therefore tend to engage in criminal acts.  
 Researchers such as Wright (2000) maintained that this is one of the most widely 
cited theories explaining deviant behavior.  Much of the research on General Crime 
Theory emphasizes a linkage between self-control and negative outcomes, but 
uncertainty still exists regarding the impact of self-control on socially acceptable 
behavior.  Research has not been able to establish the extent to which lack of self-control 
can explain various forms of deviant behavior.  
 The research of Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990) generally found that low self-control 
is associated with various criminal and imprudent behaviors, and that this relationship 
appears contingent on criminal opportunities.  The General Theory of Crime focuses on 
the concept that deviance occurs when there is a weak social bond; this weakness, or a 
lack of connection with positive influences, leads to crime and deviant behavior.  The 
theory asserts that a lack of positive parental upbringing and positive influences results in 
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improper socialization and, thus, criminal behavior.  Many studies confirm that 
Gottfredson and Hirchi's findings are valid and that social control can predict offending 
behavior.  In addition, researchers such as Titles et al. (2004), Nagin and Pogarsky 
(2003), and Muraven et al. (2002) concluded that the theory’s prime focus on self-control 
and the lack thereof produced results that were “robust predictors of crime as well as 
analogous behaviors” (Jones and Quisenberry 2004, p. 402).  These findings were 
consistent with the findings of Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990), in which self-control 
predicted criminal behavior.  
 The Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990) empirical study analysis revealed that the General 
Theory of Crime is a predictor not only of crime, but also of deviant behavior.  Other 
researchers have confirmed there is a relationship between self-control, various forms of 
antisocial behavior in academic settings, and academic dishonesty.   Research conducted 
by Evans et al. (1997), Grasmick et al. (1993), Paternoster and Brame (1998), and 
LaGrange and Silverman (1999) confirmed that “individuals low in self-control engage in 
a wide variety of criminal and antisocial deviant (i.e., analogous) behaviors.”  
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) even speculate that crime may be the least important 
consequence of low self-control: “The ‘cost’ of low self-control for the individual may 
far exceed the costs of his criminal acts.  In fact, it appears that crime is often among the 
least serious consequences of a lack of self-control in terms of quality of life of those 
lacking it” (p. 94).  
 While the General Theory of Crime may successfully identify criminal and deviant 
behavior, previous research has raised a number of outstanding questions about the 
relationship between self-control and specific acts of deviant behavior, as well as the 
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overall scope of the theory.  Although there is a rationale for linking self-control to deviant 
acts in a generic approach, the theory cannot explain how, if at all, self-control is related to 
specific acts of deviance (Jones and Quisenberry 2004).  Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990) 
suggest that individuals with low self-control are likely to engage in inappropriate 
behavior, a speculation that has not been empirically confirmed.  
 Many researchers studying the General Theory of Crime have theorized that factors 
such as low self-control, poor socialization, and poor parental guidance result in individual 
criminal behavior, but there is no evidence that suggests these factors would persuade 
elected public officials to engage in corruption.  Little research has been done concerning 
low self-control or the General Theory of Crime in the specific arena of county 
government.  Other studies have failed to explain how low self-control can predict acts of 
crime and deviant behavior, or how this theory might relate to public corruption in county 
government (Jones and Quisenberry 2004; Agnew 1985; Maxwell and Winters 2004; 
Muraven, Collins, and Nienhaus 2002; Welch 1998).  The General Theory of Crime is not 
appropriate for examining public corruption because it fails to identify a connection 
between low self-control, deviant behavior, and public corruption.  
General Strain Theory 
 GST, initially developed by Merton (1938) and Sutherland (1940), has been used in a 
number of empirical studies to explain deviant behavior.  The two researchers’ views of 
GST focused on two separate, distinct classes of individuals: Sutherland concentrated on 
the socially elite and powerful, while Merton and other classical strain theorists (e.g., 
Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955) studied crime and its relationship to the lower 
social classes.  Years later, when Agnew (1992) developed a revised GST, he used it to 
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explain personal experience, individual personal environment, the characteristics that 
influence behavior, and the propensity towards violence and crime.  
 According to Agnew (1992), GST plays an important role in explaining delinquency 
and crime in communities.  His research on GST describes the characteristics of strain, 
related events, and conditions that influence their correlation to crime.  Agnew (1985a), 
Bernard (1987), Elliott et al. (1979), and Greenberg (1977) suggest that GST has broader 
applications to delinquency than originally proposed, and that previous models are 
incomplete at best.  Several researchers believe that GST may have broader applications 
to such factors as stress, equity/justice, aggression, emotion, social environment, and 
participation in the underclass.  
 The original, classic strain theory by Merton (1938), Cohen (1955), and Cloward and 
Ohlin (1960) focused on only one element: negative relationships in which individuals 
were not treated the way they would have preferred, which prevented them from 
achieving their goals.   Agnew (1992), on the other hand, argued that “adolescents are not 
only concerned about the future goals of monetary success/middle-class status, but are 
also concerned about the achievement of more immediate goals”(p. 50).  Agnew (1985a) 
suggested that an individual’s inability to avoid painful situations can in many cases be a 
contributor to crime.  In later research, Agnew concluded that strain is most likely to 
result in crime when “[things] (1) are seen as unjust, (2) are seen as high in magnitude, 
(3) are associated with low social control, and (4) may create some pressure or incentive 
to engage in criminal activities as a coping mechanism” (Agnew 2001, p. 320).  
 Later, Agnew (1992, p. 48) reaffirmed a previous assumption of his that two main 
elements of GST separate it from similar theories: “1) the type of social relationship that 
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leads to delinquency and 2) the motivation for delinquency.”  Reviewing the literature on 
GST points up a focus on negative relationships with others, specifically the fact that the 
actors in the relationship are not treated as they expect to be treated.  Agnew (1992) 
suggested that a revised strain theory should include a “relationship in which others 
present the individual with noxious or negative stimuli” (p. 49).   Agnew (1992), Kemper 
(1978), and Morgan and Heise (1988) postulate that individuals are pressured into 
deviant behavior by negative affective states, negative emotions like anger and 
frustration, and/or negative relationships with others.  These negatives create pressure for 
corrective action, and crime is one possible response.  Agnew (1992) postulated that in 
GST, a negative relationship is a result of pressure.  
 A literature review also shows how Agnew (1984), Elliott and Voss (1974), Elliott et 
al. (1985), Empey (1982), Greenberg (1977), and Quicker (1974) have applied strain 
theory to various situations in an attempt to predict the likelihood that different types of 
strains result in crime and which strains are likely to lead to criminal behavior.  Agnew 
(1992) stipulated that strain refers to “relationships in which others are not treating the 
individual as he or she would like to be treated” (p. 48). 
 Agnew (2001) identified two different strains, “objective” and “subjective.”  He 
characterized “objective” strains as the events and conditions disliked by most members 
of a given group and “subjective” strains as the events and conditions disliked by the 
people who were experiencing or had experienced them.  A person under objective 
strain(s) is likely to feel pressure to behave in ways most consistent with the group or 
culture.  That pressure may even motivate the individual to behave in a manner 
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inconsistent with his or her own moral compass.  Objective rather than subjective strain is 
the focus in this research study.  
 According to the literature, one area of research attempted to examine individual and 
group differences in exposure to external events and conditions likely to cause objective 
strain and the subjective review of those events and conditions.  Exploring the factors that 
influence individual and group differences was vital to the formulation of GST, and is a 
major factor in how GST attempts to explain differences in crime between individuals 
under objective strain and groups under objective strain.    
 Agnew (2001) argued that whether subjective or objective strain resulted in criminal 
activity was largely a function of the characteristics of the individual experiencing the 
strain.  He contended that strain is most likely to lead to crime when individuals lack the 
skills and resources to cope with their strain in a legitimate manner; that such individuals 
tend to have low conventional social support and low social control, and to blame their 
strain on others; and, therefore, that such individuals are disposed to criminal behavior. 
Supporting research and empirical analyses suggest that perceived or actual social 
support from peers, family, and others can reduce negative behavior and assist 
individuals in dealing with negative strain (Aneshensel 1992; Cullen 1994; Mirowsky 
and Ross 1989; Pearlin 1989). 
 Agnew (1992) stated that the key factors of GST are based on the actor’s negative 
relationships with others.  Following this premise, GST contains three types of strains: 
(1) a negative relationship with others (individuals or groups) related to the lack of 
achieving positively valued goals, (2) the removal (or threat of removal) of positive 
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stimuli, and (3) the threat of being presented with negative stimuli (Langton and Piquero 
2007; Agnew 1992).   
 GST is the theory best suited for this study because each strain suggested by Agnew 
(1992) can increase the possibility that “individuals will experience one or more of a 
range of negative emotions” (p. 59).  Such emotions were critical in judging the behavior 
and reactions of elected officials for this study: they include anger, disappointment, 
depression, and fear, and according to Agnew (1992), “anger is the most critical 
emotional reaction for the purpose of the General Strain Theory” (p. 59).  In fact, Agnew 
(1992) concluded, “Anger affects the individual in several ways that are conducive to 
delinquency.  Anger is distinct from many of the other types of negative effects in this 
respect, and this is the reason that anger occupies a special place in the General Strain 
Theory” (p. 60).  Other theorists have supported the role anger plays in GST, and even 
proposed that aggression in response to anger is justified (Averill 1982; Berkowitz 1982; 
Kemper 1978; Kluegel and Heise 1986; Zillman 1979).  Agnew (1992) hypothesized that 
“anger results when individuals blame their adversity on others, and anger is a key 
emotion because it increases the individual’s level of felt injury, creates a desire for  
retaliation/revenge, energizes the individual for actions, and lowers inhibitions”(p. 60).  
 The literature suggests GST is an appropriate theory for testing the hypotheses of this 
research study.  For one thing, it offers a broad view of factors that can explain the 
behavior of elected county officials who opt to engage in public corruption.  These 
factors can also identify officials who would desire political acceptance and be more 
likely to engage in criminal behavior.  According to GST, public officials who lack both 
social and economic status may be more inclined to engage in criminal behavior because 
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their lack of acceptance and legitimacy within an elite group can play a critical role in 
their decision-making processes.  Previous empirical analyses and studies, including 
Agnew (1992), have shown that negative strain increases negative emotions, generating 
not only anger but also other types of negative behaviors that lead to deviant coping 
mechanisms and, possibly, crime.  GST is the most appropriate theory to explain public 
corruption because it concentrates on the most likely factors contributing to corruption 
among elected county officials.  
Subcultural Theory 
 As defined in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, subculture is “an ethnic, 
regional, economic, or social group exhibiting characteristic patterns of behavior 
sufficient to distinguish it from others within an embracing culture or society.”  Though 
subcultures are subordinate to the dominant culture of a society, they sometimes allow 
individuals greater group identification; those who take part in particular sports, e.g., 
racing cyclists and professional football players, are sometimes referred to as a 
subculture.  With this understanding, it is appropriate to suggest that a group of political 
representatives who submit to certain social or professional constructs constitutes a 
subculture. 
 Cohen’s Subcultural Theory of deviant behavior emerged from his work on gangs at 
the Chicago School, which he developed into a set of theories postulating that certain 
groups (or subcultures) in society have preconceived values and feelings that are inclined 
towards crime and violence.  The theory is largely viewed as a companion to Merton’s 
classic strain theory and Cohen himself explained it in similar terms, i.e., as a form of 
rebellion.  Cohen’s focus, however, was on juvenile delinquency.  He and others believed 
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that if the pattern of offenders could be understood and controlled, the cycle of ongoing 
criminal behavior from teenage offender into habitual criminal could be broken.  
 Some researchers suggest that economic needs provoke criminal activity, while 
others hypothesize a social-class rationale for deviance.  When Cohen (1955) first used 
Subcultural Theory to explain deviant behavior, his work concentrated on delinquency 
subculture rather than career criminals.  Cohen hypothesized that youth delinquents 
develop a distinctive culture in response to a perceived lack of economic success and 
social opportunity, and that this “status frustration,” as he labeled it, motivated them 
toward a life of crime (Cohen 1958).  He postulated that the U.S. educational system 
instilled a belief in students that they should strive for social status through academic 
achievement.  If that goal was not attainable for the youth of working-class families, 
educational failure would lead to social failure, causing status frustration.  Cohen opined 
that since working-class youth could not always attain middle-class status, they might 
retaliate towards a system that had failed or let them down.  
 Fischer (1955) concluded that delinquency was not a result of concern for “money 
success,” but instead a result of the pressures of all dominant values.  Cohen (1958) 
suggested that as working-class male adolescents in the inner city fail in school, they 
begin to feel they cannot achieve in society by legitimate means and consequently 
experience a social status frustration.  He argued they form a subculture that “takes its 
norms from the larger culture but turns them upside down” (p. 27). 
 Cohen’s studies validated the hypothesis that lower-class parents instill a different 
(from middle-class) value system in their children, with the most important issues being 
ones of the moment: food, shelter, and so on.  Parents of middle-class youth had 
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significantly different value systems that stressed independence, success, academic 
achievement, control of aggression, and respect for property.  Cohen (1955) proved that 
lower-class youths (and their families) were also more group-oriented and more inclined 
to depend on others who shared their value system; their mentality included a feeling of 
“watching each other’s back.”  The definition of subculture in Fischer (1955)—“a large 
set of people who share a defining trait, associate with one another, are members of 
institutions associated with their defining trait, adhere to a distinct set of values, share a 
set of cultural tools and take part in a common way of life” (p. 544)—best explains 
Cohen’s work on Subcultural Theory. 
 Political figures can exhibit behaviors similar to adolescents; for example, both 
groups tend to congregate around individuals who have positions of grandeur.  It is not 
uncommon for political leaders to engage in social or professional relationships with 
wealthy citizens, industry chiefs, celebrities, and other notable figures.  Using a 
combination of GST and Subcultural Theory, this research study intends to show that 
political leaders often feel pressure to live at a standard consistent with the elite groups 
that, because of their political position, are now their social peers.  When an elected 
official’s socioeconomic background and/or current economic conditions cannot support 
such a living standard, the official may be tempted to act in ways inconsistent with ethical 
expectations as a result of status frustration (negative strain).  
 When a political leader is found guilty of criminal behavior, the offending act is most 
often related to some kind of financial gain.  Achieving financial success can provide the 
means for a politician to gain legitimacy and permanency within the elite group, whereas 
the failure to achieve financial success may result in self-loathing or internal anger.  This 
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anger may make the officials who fail more likely to resort to criminal activities, such as 
bribery and extortion, as a means of generating additional income to improve their 
economic status and acceptance within the elite group.  Huntington (1968) and Johnston 
(1982) both concur, “corruption is caused by poverty and lack of upward mobility 
through legal and socially accepted channels” (Nice 1983, p. 508).  
 This research study will seek to determine the appropriateness of analyzing 
corruption data using the Subcultural Theory, and whether there is a correlation between 
GST and Subcultural Theory.  The two theories share characteristics germane to 
understanding how background, environment, and the desire for social acceptance may 
influence elected officials to commit acts of public corruption.  The literature review 
showed that some researchers assume everyone in a society is initially and consensually 
driven towards economic success, wanting to achieve wealth and financial independence.  
They propose that this desire for economic success drives some political actors to dismiss 
their moral compass, succumb to temptation, and engage in corrupt activities.  However, 
this research study aims to apply components of GST and Subcultural Theory to the 
behavior of elected officials and identify the factors that can induce criminal behavior in 
them.  Subcultural Theory is associated with a group theory in which people are more 
inclined to depend on others who share their value system; while it shares similarities 
with GST (e.g., negative strains), it is not as broad as GST and was not a plausible theory 
for this research study.  
Public Sector Corruption 
 A review of federal data revealed a continuous annual growth pattern in government 
corruption, and insufficient information within the body of literature to explain the 
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increase.  In the past 20 years, federal, state, and local officials, as well as private 
individuals, have been convicted of government corruption in the United States at an 
alarming rate.  Public records show that the number of convictions between 1986 and 
1995 was 11,888; in the following decade that number nearly doubled, to more than 
20,419 convictions.  Two likely factors in this increase were the additional staff and the 
resources the U.S. Department of Justice brought to bear on the fight against public 
corruption in the 1990s.  
 One case that received widespread attention in 1994 was United States of America v. 
McDonough, in which the chairman of the Rensselaer County Democratic Committee 
was convicted of receiving more than $500,000 in kickbacks on insurance commissions.  
With cases like this in the news, it became imperative for the federal government to 
allocate the resources necessary to successfully fight corruption.  As authorities realized 
the damage corruption could create throughout America, the Justice Department “made it 
a priority to target state and local officials for acts of public corruption” (Dreyer 2007, p. 
1).  More recently, law enforcement officials have focused on developing strict federal 
and state laws to fight public corruption.  Empirical research, however, suggests that 
more stringent laws have done little to reduce the number of officials who violate the 
public trust (Maletz 2002; Menzel and Benton 1991). 
 A review of the literature suggested that one facet of government corruption stems 
from the desire of bureaucrats and elected officials for greater social and political 
influence, not just more money; however, research has shown that in some corruption 
cases, low wages paid to public officials were in fact a motive for corruption.  Gould and 
Amaro-Reyes (1983), for example, provided evidence that one of the prime causes of 
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corruption is inadequate wages.  Another study supporting the notion that low wages may 
be an impetus for public corruption was that of Besley and McLaren (1993), who found 
that the incentive to accept bribes increased when individuals’ living standards were 
squeezed.  Given this research, one might conclude that higher salaries would be cost-
effective for government and reduce the potential for public corruption.  One function of 
this study will be to examine the collected data to determine if low wages in government 
jobs can indeed make individuals more prone to corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
2001).  
 Banerjee (1997) suggested that government has the authority to make it illegal for 
bureaucrats to make money using their public position outside of their elected authority.  
In fact, governments often try to thwart corruption by creating laws to ensure the public 
trust is not violated.  Ironically, these laws often create opportunities for corruption by 
imposing convoluted regulations on the public.  Such rules can complicate the ability to 
conduct business quickly and efficiently, and may motivate powerful individuals to 
engage in corrupt behavior.  Research has shown that corruption often occurs when 
elected officials inequitably facilitate the ability to bypass red tape, creating a conflict of 
interest (Banerjee 1997).  
 Overall, the literature review suggested that officials’ corrupt behavior negatively 
affects government operations and undermines government functionality.  The operating 
cost of government is substantially increased and the efficient operation of government is 
weakened.  According to Transparency International (2005), large bidding and 
procurement contracts provide many opportunities to steal money without the public 
knowing, and elected officials generally get involved in corrupt activities to enrich 
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themselves or their families and friends.  In her book Corruption and Government 
Causes, Consequences and Reform, Rose-Ackerman (1999) explored the thesis that there 
are conflicts between self-seeking behavior and the public values of public officials.  She 
argues that self-seeking behavior on the part of government officials compromises their 
responsibilities, jeopardizes the integrity of their office, and betrays the very citizens who 
elect them.  
   According to other research studies, “corruption in the public sector results in 
inefficiencies in the delivery of public services” (Warren 2004, p. 328).  Similar 
sentiments are expressed in della Porta and Vannucci (1999, p. 257) and Rose-Ackerman 
(1999, p. 9).  Corruption provides an unequal playing field to firms who pay bribes to 
receive contracts or licenses, preventing officials from selecting the most qualified and 
capable bidder.  Instead, the firm that offers the highest bribe stands to benefit the most.  
The awarding of contracts to unqualified firms because they offer higher bribes, gifts, or 
incentives can weaken the stabilization role of government (Tanzi 1998a). 
  The adverse effects of such activities are not limited to the economics of 
government, but can also affect the public services provided to citizens and the financial 
strength and stability of government operations.  This study will determine the effect 
public corruption has on county government, community, the fiscal stability of county 
government, and the decisions of public officials.  The literature review found that 
government corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government; weakens 
procedures, rules, and regulations; and siphons off resources that would otherwise be 
used for public services.  Worst of all, it undermines the legitimacy of government and 
erodes public trust.  The damage it creates is the main reason the Department of Justice 
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and other law enforcement agencies are concerned about corruption in government, a 
view shared by the citizenry.   In late 1998, approximately 90 percent of people polled by 
the Gallup International Millennium Survey viewed their government as corrupt and 
unresponsive to their needs.  A government that cannot respond to the needs of its 
citizens is weakened to the point of being incapable of governing. 
  In another research study, Wilson (1960) suggested there might be greater scrutiny of 
local officials as the size of local government shrinks and the population becomes more 
homogeneous.  He argues, “Local voters closely monitor local politicians, because local 
politicians’ actions directly affect local tax rates.  Further, the display of self-
aggrandizing benefits of local corruption may be obvious to local citizens” (p. 4).  
  Where corruption among local officials is widespread and institutionalized, local law 
enforcement agencies are less likely to fight it.  This lack of enforcement amplifies the 
environment of corruption (Cabelkova and Hanousek 2004).  In a different scenario, if 
citizens have adequate proof their officials are engaged in corrupt activities, those 
officials’ reelection prospects are likely to be negatively impacted, and the possibility of 
losing an election or being removed from office then becomes the justification for 
officials to act inappropriately—to seize the opportunity and take advantage of their 
office before losing or being removed from it.  
  The literature suggests that public corruption at the state level, i.e., in the legislative 
process, is more likely and occurs more frequently than at the local level.  The difference 
comes from the differing nature of officials’ political authority and the relationship of the 
rules governing the legislature and legislators’ behavior.  The state legislative process 
“generates incentives for corrupt legislative transactions” (Ackerman 1978, p. 15). 
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Legislators may sell their votes to special interests and lobbyists in exchange for 
campaign contributions or other special favors.  These favors are often illegal and, as 
stated earlier, corrode the public’s faith in political institutions (Lanza 2004).  Corruption 
at the state level is more common because conflict-of-interest rules are not imposed; 
ethics requirements are broad and provide legislators a range of flexibility.  Other factors 
may include the physical location of the legislature and its accessibility (or lack thereof) 
to citizens, a lack of openness and transparency in legislative actions, the access of 
lobbyists and special interest groups to legislators, the legislative committee process, and 
a legislature that fails to impose restrictions, thereby providing greater opportunities for 
corruption.  
  Corruption at the state level has a history of occurring regardless of how 
knowledgeable a constituency is.  An increased number of corruption cases over the years 
have provided a historical perspective that shows states failing to impose constraints and 
these failures creating greater opportunities for a system of corruption at the state level 
(Rose-Ackerman 1978).  Wilson (1960) argues that state government is more vulnerable 
to public corruption than local or federal governments: “States may be more uniquely 
prone to corruption: State officials may be subject to less voter scrutiny because each 
voter is more poorly informed about the actions of state officials.  Further, many state 
capitals are located at some geographic distance from the states’ larger metropolitan 
areas, which further attenuates press coverage of misdeeds” (p. 3).  
  Lederman et al. (2004) suggested that political institutions play an important role in 
determining the magnitude of the impact of public corruption on government, services, 
and the financial stability of government operations.  Other researchers have proven that 
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corruption patterns are endogenous to political systems.  If laws are not enforced and 
rules are not imposed, then corruption persists; but a system of government that is 
democratic, open, and transparent is less likely to experience public corruption (Charap 
and Harm 1999).  Such findings led to the Justice Department’s allocation of the staff and 
resources necessary to fight the damage public corruption can create at all levels of 
government—federal, state, and local.  
     Previous researchers have examined a number of factors that contribute to 
corruption; however, none of these studies specifically addressed county government.  
While other researchers have studied the effects of corruption in areas such as income 
distribution, per capita growth, government size, economic stability, discretionary 
powers, fair wages, and strength of government, this study seeks to examine the state of 
public corruption, the factors contributing to public corruption, and the impact of public 
corruption on elected county officials and county government.  It will examine whether 
government instability, ineffective fiscal management and economic performance, 
community characteristics, and the moral characteristics of elected officials contribute to 
public corruption within county government.  These, along with other factors, deserve 
consideration of the impact they have on the decisions of elected county officials to 
engage in public corruption.  
Elected Officials’ Characteristics and Public Corruption 
 The literature review suggested that corruption in U.S. politics relates to a 
connection between the characteristics of politicians and the elements of corruption.  An 
analysis of the characteristics of officials and the impact those characteristics have on 
corruption was documented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
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attracted the interest of political scientists in later years.  Della Porta (1996) said that to 
“understand the emergence and diffusion of corruption it is necessary to look at the 
characteristics of the administrators who become involved in corrupt activities” (p. 350).  
Other literature surmises that deviant behavior is a byproduct of someone’s environment, 
attitude, and social background (Merton 1938; Suther-land 1940; Cloward and Ohlin 
1960; Cohen 1955; Piquero and Sealock 2000; Agnew and White 1992; Aseltine et al. 
2000; Broidy 2001).  GST also suggests that environment, attitude, and social 
background can influence behavior and result in an official's decision to engage in 
corruption.  On the other hand, Agnew (2001a) suggested that conventional success goals 
cannot be achieved through criminal activities and do not result in negative strains and 
criminal behavior, but this claim is unsubstantiated and does not take into consideration 
other important factors related to the demands and failures individuals face.  
 Some studies suggest that in order to gain a better understanding of the reasons 
public officials engage in corrupt behavior, consideration should be given to the 
motivation behind their decisions.  Money, power, and personal gain are the most 
common factors contributing to an official’s decision to engage in corruption, and to 
achieve and keep these material benefits, reelection or maintaining the position becomes 
the ultimate goal.  In essence, a public official's behavior can be motivated by private and 
material self-interest.  
 Previous research has suggested that under GST, an individual's inability to 
legitimately achieve success (including monetary success) can result in negative strain 
and a decision to engage in illegal activities.  Agnew (2001a) points out that there are 
different types of strain that may result in criminal activities, and that individuals may 
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attempt “to achieve core goals that are not the results of conventional socialization and 
that are easily achieved through crime.  Such goals include money, particularly the desire 
for much money in a short period of time” (p. 343).  The research indicates that offenders 
are generally preoccupied with the need for more money.  When money becomes the 
primary goal of officials, it can create an extreme desire; if money then becomes the core 
goal, it forms negative strain and results in deviant behavior.  
 Further research suggests that another reason public officials engage in corrupt 
activities is a perception that the potential benefit may exceed the potential cost (Rose-
Ackerman 1978).  In these situations, the perceived benefits and costs of corrupt 
activities relate to the values of the official and the expected outcome—and, most 
importantly, the probabilities that the outcome is attainable and being caught is unlikely. 
Klitgaard (1988) stated it best: “Officials will opt to become corrupt if the benefit of 
being corrupt minus the probability of being caught times the penalties for being caught 
is greater than the benefit of not being caught”(p. 70).  These factors are important 
elements associated with the characteristics of elected officials, and weigh in any 
decision on whether to engage in corruption. 
 In another research study, Rogow and Lasswell (1963) proposed that the quest for 
power does not necessarily result in public corruption; they hypothesized that 
characteristics, upbringing, and environment influence the decisions and behavior of 
officials who engage in corruption or acts of personal gain.  Wines and Napier (1992) 
suggested that cultural values are related to the characteristics of individuals and play 
some role in the behavior of individuals engaging in corrupt behavior.  
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 Rogow and Lasswell conducted an analysis of 30 officials and bosses in the United 
States to determine if power-seeking is an influence on corruption.  Their study suggested 
that a back-ground of deprivation in early life results in a negative strain that affects 
behavior and decisions.  For example, deprivation was a key factor in the background of 
corrupt bosses.  Their analysis concluded that environment, social background, and 
behavior shape value systems and integrity, producing two types of politicians with 
opposite characteristics: the “game politician” and the “gain politician” (Rogow and 
Lasswell 1963, p. 51).  The analysis also suggested that corruption relates to a number of 
variables in the personality system, as listed in Tables 2-2 and 2-3.  The deprivation 
factors listed in these tables can be viewed as strains and related to GST results regarding 
the negative behavior of officials. 
Table 2-2.  Game Politician Personality System 
Deprivation Demand Indulgence 
Parental acceptance Power Office, bossism 
 Respect Votes, election 
Parental recognition Rectitude Self-righteousness 
Parental approval  Moral superiority 
Source: Rogow  and Lasswell 1963, p. 52. 
Table 2-3.  Gain Politician Personality System  
Deprivation Demand Indulgence 
Comfort Well-being “Rich” living 
Income Wealth Payoff, graft, “commission” 
Opportunity Skill Deals, manipulations 
Source: Rogow  and Lasswell 1963, p. 52. 
 
 According to Rogow and Lasswell, the game politician’s characteristics come from 
an upper-class background and the development of skills learned early on.  These 
characteristics include a strong sense of family (though not necessarily an immediate 
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closeness), along with civic involvement, discipline, moral virtue and leadership, active 
participation in party politics, a college education, and political ambition.  They are also 
actively involved in the anointment of other political officials.  The game politician is a 
“man of independent means, who did not exploit politics for personal gain, although the 
game politician was privy to innumerable deals which involved the buying and selling of 
political favors” (Rogow and Lasswell 1963).  He receives glory from building political 
kingdoms, controlling power, and influencing his peers.  He enjoys the game.  The game 
politician maintains acquaintances but shares few personal friendships, and receives great 
satisfaction from political victories.  The game politician has high moral standards.  
Game politicians have no interest in corrupt activities for themselves, and do not 
compromise their moral standards and ethical rectitude for personal benefit.  However, 
the game politician has one negative characteristic: he “regarded the uses and abuses of 
money in politics as legitimate and he was always willing to arrange matters if at all 
possible to promote the financial interest of friends” (Rogow and Lasswell 1963, p. 47). 
 Rogow and Lasswell characterized the “gain politician” as vastly different from the 
“game politician.”  The gain politician comes from a poor family background and often 
worked as a teenager to help support the family, which was his primary responsibility.  
As a young man, he conferred with his mother on important decisions, including political 
ones.  If an immigrant, he strongly supports the neighborhood political machine.  He 
develops many friendships within the neighborhood, including some with political bosses 
and officials.  He gains trust within the organization, and later may create his own 
political machine.   According to Meier and Holbrook (1992), the prime use of political 
machines in urban environments is to benefit the people who support them.  
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 The gain politician uses his skills and political acumen for political favors to benefit 
his own financial interest; as Rogow and Lasswell (1963) observed, “the [gain politician] 
had become the most powerful political boss in the city’s history” and “had also become 
one of the wealthiest.  The gain politician’s opponents believed—and correctly—that in 
the city no contract was let, no tax collected, no post filled, and no facility established 
without his extracting a commission” (p. 49).  According to Rogow and Lasswell (1963), 
the gain politician sees political corruption as a means to compensate for a deprived 
upbringing.  His primary purpose is personal gain, and politics provides an opportunity to 
improve the lifestyle of his family.  The personal characteristics of the gain politician 
include loyalty to friends and family, generosity, and ambition.  The gain politician lacks 
high ethical standards and is willing to engage in corruption.  The gain politician is less 
educated, is not always honest, and lacks moral standards.  
 Based on a review of the literature, it appears that influence, political control, and 
power are the focus for the game politician.  This politician appears to be the subject of 
“cultural-flaw,” in which lower-class individuals and immigrants maintain enormous 
influence through government (Magleby 1984, p. 24).  Because of these factors, Rogow 
and Lasswell (1963) concluded that the characteristics of elected officials suggest that 
corruption is a result of the weakness of individuals (game politician) or a pattern of 
politics in which corruption is an acceptable behavior (gain politician). 
 In a different study, Rivlin (2003) stated that certain characteristics of officials in 
both the public and private sectors could pressure them to make inappropriate decisions: 
“Successful leaders in both sectors have similar personality traits.  They must be 
optimistic, competitive, willing to take risks, and able to communicate complex issues 
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understandably” (p. 348).  Rivlin goes on to say that the “pressure of complex decisions 
in the face of limited information, on the other hand, creates similar ethical dilemmas” (p. 
348) and, as a result, individuals can develop “the temptation to shade the truth” (p. 348).  
If this happens to public officials, “citizens lose faith in the integrity of public officials, 
and democracy becomes at risk” (p. 348).  In fact, Rivlin’s analysis focused on the 
leadership traits of officials and the general ethical problems they face in controlling the 
politics of greed and selfishness.  
 Meier and Holbrook (1992) proposed that there are historical and cultural 
explanations for corruption.  They concluded that culture, background, and a lack of 
educational attainment can contribute to the behavior of officials, including their 
likelihood to engage in corrupt behavior.  They also pointed out that corruption in urban 
political machines facilitated the rise to power of immigrant groups in the United States 
(Greenstein 1964), an element consistent with the characteristics of the gain politician. 
Meier and Holbrook (1992) acknowledged that “urban environment[s], in particular, 
loosen the social control of family and religion and at the same time concentrate 
government programs and resources.  In short, urbanism fosters conditions conducive to 
corruption” (p. 138). 
 Researchers have posited that in certain environments, political machines were used 
to benefit individuals who supported the machine and were, therefore, considered “part of 
the team.”  Corruption was the vehicle used to compensate these supporters.  Wilson 
(1966) supported Meier and Holbrook (1992), saying, “There is a particular political 
ethos or style which attaches a relatively low value to probity and impersonal efficiency 
and relatively high value to favor, personal loyalty, and private gain” (p. 20).  Meier and 
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Holbrook, as well as Wilson, held that the characteristics of elected officials influence 
their decisions, and those with certain characteristics would, if given the opportunity, 
engage in corruption. 
 A review of the literature found that “corruption is behavior which deviates from the 
formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967, p. 419).  The possibility exists that certain 
characteristics influence the behavior of officials who opt to engage in corruption. 
Government Characteristics and Public Corruption 
 Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Bardhan (1997), Theobald (1990), Leys (1965), and 
Anechiario and Jacobs (1996) all suggest that corruption can have a positive impact on 
government by improving efficiency and helping growth.  In fact, a common byproduct 
of corruption in certain governments is a reduction of burdensome red tape; in such cases, 
corruption may be seen as an efficiency measure used by government (Wilson 1989).  In 
these situations, and in certain countries, corruption is used to bypass burdensome 
regulations that slow governmental progress and hamper the function of government, and 
to speed up the delivery of services.  Corruption through bribery is sometimes called 
“speed money” (Azfar et al. 2001, p. 47) because it is viewed as a means of reducing 
government inefficiency and speeding up the implementation of policies and regulations.  
 The literature review suggested various motives to explain the presence of corruption 
in the United States.  Amundsen (1999) suggested that public corruption exists when 
officials systematically abuse laws and regulations and sidestep, ignore, or even tailor 
laws to fit their own interests.  Johnson (1982) and de Leon (1993) both suggested that 
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public officials with the power to make laws have incentives for corrupt exclusion: they 
use the rules and regulations they control to create delays and bottlenecks, and thus are 
able to increase the price of their services to bribers.  Warren (2004) postulated that the 
power elite have no hesitation in using their power and influence to penetrate government 
for their personal gain, access government contracts, and influence competition to their 
benefit, and in these situations public corruption is likely to occur. 
 In an environment in which government is inefficient, corrupt bureaucrats are often 
provided with “grease money” (Bardhan 1997, p. 1337; Amundsen 1999, p. 11), which 
Bardhan considered a benefit to government: “Corruption is the much-needed grease for 
the squeaking wheel of a rigid administration” (Bardhan 1997, p. 1322).  In many foreign 
countries, where government is inefficient and oppressive, bribery is a means to remove 
governmental impediments (i.e., red tape) and increase government efficiency (Leff 
1964).  Indeed, corruption in government was tolerated in many parts of the world until 
very recently; in some places, it was even considered the norm.  And although Americans 
reject corruption, there are countries where public corruption is common practice (e.g., 
South Korea) and does not negatively affect the economy.  In many developing nations, 
corruption was (and still is) a tolerated practice used to bypass administrative delays. 
However, public corruption is not tolerated in the U.S.  
 Some researchers have argued that corruption may be a good alternative for 
improving burdensome and overregulated bureaucratic systems.  In these instances, 
corruption is viewed as an alternative to an overregulated government and immoderate 
resources; however, in the end, corruption harms not only government, but also business 
profitability (Amundsen 1999). 
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 The U.S. tolerance of corruption virtually ended in the mid-1990s as state and federal 
prosecutors made the fight against it a high priority, devoting considerable resources to it. 
Although some may view corruption in the developing world as a positive alternative to 
overregulated governments, U.S. prosecutors wanted to ensure that corrupt activities did 
not become a widespread problem in their nation.4
 As government grows, so do the potential rewards of corruption.  According to 
Johnson (1982), the overall size of a government relates to the possibilities for official 
corruption: the larger the government, the greater its spending to support programs and 
services.  A direct relationship exists between an increase in population and the demands 
of citizens for more services, and more money in the system can translate into more 
opportunities for corruption.  
   
 Another possible factor in corruption is a lack of government accountability.  
Without accountability, bureaucrats and elected officials can seize opportunities to 
engage in corrupt activities without audits, reviews, or oversight.  Stringent accounting 
and auditing controls can reduce the potential for corrupt activities as governments use 
policies and procedures to ensure that no public officials have overwhelming control or 
monopolies over resources.  Such accountability measures are an important factor in 
fighting corruption within government.  Gardiner and Lyman (1978), Rose-Ackerman 
(1999), and Transparency International (2000) all suggest governments should provide 
assurances that officials will function within specific rules, regulations, and policies that 
minimize room for discretionary judgment.  
                                                 
4 Much attention to the cause of corruption gained it prominence among researchers, political 
scientists, government officials, economists, and law enforcement officials during this period. 
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 Implementing strong ethics laws and pursuing federal prosecutions are powerful 
methods for fighting, reducing, or eliminating political corruption within governments. 
Rose-Ackerman (1978) suggested that politics can be used to fight corruption if political 
actions increase the cost of corruption by increasing the probability that a corrupt 
individual will be punished.  In addition, officials who are likely to engage in corrupt 
activity may become less likely to commit corrupt acts if the threat of being caught is 
high (Wilson 1966).  In these cases, punishment or removal from office becomes a 
concern for officials and affects their decision to engage in corruption.  
 The review of literature concluded that over the past several years, American politics 
and government have seen significant changes that resulted in more opportunities for 
graft.  According to Williams (1981, p. 29), the “twentieth-century explosion in 
government licensing, zoning, regulation, employment and subsidy has provided 
unparalleled scope for patronage and graft.”  This study will determine the influence of 
different variables and the impact they have on the decisions of officials; for instance, 
whether a changing society and government structure create varied opportunities for 
corruption.  The size of government, political uncertainty, a lack of governmental 
accountability, increases in government revenues, a lack of public participation, 
ineffective ethics, and a lack of law enforcement policies are identified as some of the 
potential reasons officials opt to engage in corrupt activities.  This study has identified a 
number of factors that are influenced by GST and impact the decisions of officials, such 
as the tenure of elected officials and salary differentials—two additional variables that 
can be related to GST and can influence elected officials’ tendency toward public 
corruption.  This study will evaluate these factors and determine if there is a correlation 
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between them and public corruption.  The study suggests that a correlation exists, but a 
definitive decision will be made as this study progresses.   
 Research suggests that the level of corruption falls when the level of democracy 
rises.  The more a government provides a legitimate system of governance and functions 
within the rule of law, the less likely elected officials are to be involved in corrupt 
activities (Amundsen 1999). 
Government Economic Performance and Public Corruption 
 In his book The Effect of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government 
Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis, Mauro (1997) provided evidence that corruption 
can have considerable adverse impacts on economic performance and delivery of public 
services.  He further concluded that corruption negatively affects the accountability of 
government; therefore, government has a responsibility to address the impact of official 
corruption.  
 One perceived deterrent to corruption in American politics is the development and 
stabilization of a robust, economically stable government.  The literature review 
suggested that as governments and countries grow richer, corruption decreases 
(Amundsen 1999); it is reasonable to suggest these same elements apply to county 
government.  Empirical studies from the World Bank show a strong relationship between 
levels of income and corruption, i.e., the higher the income, the lower the level of 
corruption (Amundsen 1999; Azfar and Swanmy 2001; Banerjee 1997; Glaeser and Saks 
2004; Hunt 2005; Maxwell and Winters 2003; Meier and Holbrook 1992; Williams 
2006). 
52 
 Economic distress coupled with growing populations can create pressures on 
government.  Governments faced with economic uncertainty may become unable to 
provide the services and goods needed to keep the community functioning, such as a 
good transportation system, public housing, jails, funds for economic development, and 
social services.  As the population of communities grows, so does the need for 
government to provide additional goods and services.  The competitive process used to 
acquire these goods and services opens the door to corruption, particularly if a 
government lacks the resources to monitor the actions of officials in a decision-making 
position.  
 Research further concluded that the system of contracts for goods and services 
within government can offer opportunities for corruption.  Many of these contracts 
provide lucrative opportunities that tempt public officials to engage in corrupt behavior. 
Mauro (1997) found that the allocation of public procurement contracts through a corrupt 
system led to inferior public infrastructure and services.  Corruption in the procurement 
process can be very costly for government because it drains funding and reduces 
competition; the efficiency of public expenditures decreases as a government is exposed 
to corruption.  
 The research also suggested that corruption is perhaps the most problematic 
impediment to a thriving, financially secure government because when “corruption 
becomes endemic, it can threaten the basic rule of law, property rights, and enforcement 
of contracts” (Azfar et al. 2001, p. 46).  Furthermore, corruption is regressive, which 
means low-income households bear most of the burden of its costs.  Azfar et al. (2001) 
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further states: “This regressive nature of the corruption burden appears to be due to 
pervasive corruption in basic public services, education and health” (p. 48). 
 One of the most harmful consequences of corruption, according to researchers, is the 
ambiguity and unpredictability it introduces into business transactions.  Mauro (1995) 
provided empirical evidence that corruption lowers investment and economic growth; 
other researchers found it impedes development by distorting public expenditure 
priorities.  According to Mauro (1998), it can also lead to the underfunding of critical 
services and programs.  The premise is that financial stability and sound government may 
prevent corruption, which, if not addressed, can destroy county government.    
 According to Klitgaard (1998), “Corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion” (p. 
46).  Does a rapid growth in revenues, expenditures, and populations generate more 
opportunities for corruption among public officials? Rose-Ackerman (1978) suggested 
that it does, and that lax fiscal oversight in a government can prompt officials to engage 
in corrupt behavior, particularly if the officials have unlimited flexibility and 
discretionary authority to make decisions.  Officials who are not governed by a higher 
authority, or who have no checks and balances, are likely to engage in corrupt behavior, 
and the benefits of doing so become an incentive to only issue contracts to those who pay 
the highest bribes. 
 Officials who oversee the implementation of government regulations, standards, and 
programs benefit when standards are vague and unspecific.  Such situations provide 
prime opportunities for corruption, and can affect the economics of government agencies 
by redirecting revenues.  In her book Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, Rose-
Ackerman (1978) provides numerous examples of vague guidelines, policies, and 
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regulations, and demonstrates how these elements become factors in corruption 
opportunities.  Additional elements germane to public corruption are the size of a 
government's fiscal responsibilities and a government’s authority and ability to enforce 
prudent fiscal policies that protect the financial interests of the public.  
 The literature review showed that much work is needed for a government to 
eliminate corruption and achieve positive economic performance.  When this does not 
occur, the public often becomes concerned about the negative effect corruption has on 
economic performance.  Corrupt behavior by public officials for personal benefit destroys 
the success of government and its ability to function on behalf of the public.  In fact, 
according to a survey by Kaufmann (1997), “Elites from across the developing world and 
transition economies view public sector corruption as a serious obstacle to economic 
development” (p. 125).  Corruption, if allowed to persist with limited or no checks and 
balances, will divert government funds from needed programs, projects, and community 
services to benefit corrupt public officials (Kaufmann 1997). 
Community Characteristics and Public Corruption 
 This study will identify specific factors and pinpoint which indicators from a list of 
community characteristics might explain public corruption.  Eight indicators of public 
corruption will be used: crime rate, population growth, education level of the community, 
age of population, civic involvement, poverty, unemployment rate, ratio of county 
population to state population, and majority political party of the commission.  Which, if 
any, of these indicators influence an official to behave corruptly?  A series of studies 
completed by Johnson (1983), Nice (1983), and Peters and Welch (1980) analyze a 
number of factors that help to explain public corruption.  
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 Community characteristics, officials’ environment, and social class are not new ideas 
for explaining deviant behavior.  Theorists such as Agnew, Merton, Cohen, and Cloward 
and Ohlin have all studied characteristics they thought could lead to identifying possible 
causes of delinquent behavior.  These studies appear to be applicable to this research 
study, and may aid in identifying what characteristics influence corrupt officials.  Do 
such factors as social class and community environment influence an official’s behavior 
and the propensity to engage in corrupt activities? 
 The primary discussion for this section of the study will focus on the following 
questions: Do social and physical environment influence the behavior and decisions of 
public officials?  How would the moral character of officials influence their decision to 
engage in corruption?  Do certain community characteristics play a role in an official’s 
corruption? If so, what specific factors actually contribute to officials’ behavior?  Which 
of these factors, such as social control of family, religion, urbanism, and/or education, 
influence a person’s behavior?   
 Banfield and Wilson (1967) suggested that social class is a factor in the behavior of 
officials; middle-class individuals see local politics as a service to the community in 
which honesty, efficiency, and impartiality are important factors.  They proposed that 
social class would more than likely deter middle-class officials from engaging in acts of 
public corruption.  They also suggested that lower-class individuals would welcome a life 
in politics, but would be more likely to engage in public corruption if given the 
opportunity.  Meier and Holbrook (1992) stated: “Corruption exists because public 
service offers individuals a way to become rich that is not available to private citizens” 
(p. 146).  
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 The literature review suggested that weakness in individuals, if not countered by 
strength in the community, can be a factor in an official’s willingness to engage in 
corruption.  The article “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em” (Riordon 1963) 
succinctly points out that, if given an opportunity, officials will often engage in 
corruption, particularly if there are no costs associated with being caught—or if the 
benefits of corruption outweigh the cost of punishment.  
 In the book Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, Rogow and Lasswell (1963) 
discussed community characteristics, the environment of public officials, and their social 
class, then analyzed how these factors relate to game and gain politicians.  The 
characteristics of both types are based on environment and social class, the elements of 
their background that influenced the decision whether to engage in corrupt behavior.  It is 
fair to suggest that the characteristics outlined in Rogow and Lasswell (1963) can be 
considered an explanation of public corruption, so this section of the research study will 
review data to determine the influence community characteristics play in a public 
official's decision to engage in public corruption.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 
Historical Framework of Public Corruption  
 Public corruption has existed in the U.S. since the beginning of the republic, but the 
issue attained a new prominence in March 1976 when the Justice Department’s Criminal 
Division began a nationwide coordination of federal efforts against corruption at all 
levels of government.  At the same time, the department created the Public Integrity 
Section in the Criminal Division to oversee the prosecution of criminal abuses of the 
public trust.  The responsibilities of the Public Integrity Section are broad, and include 
coordinating the enforcement of all federal statutes related to public corruption.  
Congress later passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which requires the U.S. 
Attorney General to report annually to Congress on the activities and operations of the 
Public Integrity Section.  The Act also gave the Attorney General’s Office the 
responsibility of consolidating and coordinating the nationwide fight against public 
corruption at all levels, including state and local government.  
 The details of the report provided to Congress each year center on public corruption 
cases involving abuses of the public trust by public officials for personal gain.  Table 3-1 
identifies corruption rankings by state over the past decade, and Table 3-2 lists the top 10 
most corrupt states.  This data was tabulated by adding total convictions in each state from 
2000 to 2009, then identifying the 2009 population for each state to calculate a corruption 
rate for each.  The corruption rate is defined as the total number of public corruption 
convictions from 2000 to 2009 per 100,000 residents.  This data involves only federal 
public corruption convictions pertaining to federal, state, and local government.  
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Interestingly, a review of the data revealed that five of the ten most corrupt states are cited 
in this research study.  
Table 3-1.  Corruption Rate by State 




(convictions per 100,000 
residents) 
Alabama 270 4,708,708 5.73*        
Alaska 55 698,473 7.87 
Arizona 167 6,595,778 2.53 
Arkansas 78 2,889,450 2.69 
California 709 36,961,664 1.91 
Colorado 92 5,024,748 1.83 
Connecticut 104 3,518,288 2.95 
Delaware 46 885,122 5.19* 
District of Columbia1 342 599,657 57.03 
Florida 729 18,537,969 3.93 
Georgia 191 9,829,211 1.94 
Hawaii 46 1,295,178 3.55 
Idaho 28 1,545,801 1.81 
Illinois 489 12,910,409 3.78 
Indiana 169 6,423,113 2.63 
Iowa 42 3,007,858 1.39 
Kansas 38 2,818,747 1.34 
Kentucky 272 4,314,113 0.63 
Louisiana 352 4,492,076 7.83* 
Maine 38 1,318,301 2.88 
Maryland 207 5,699,478 3.63 
Massachusetts 187 6,593,587 2.83 
Michigan 226 9,969,727 2.26 
Minnesota 64 5,266,214 1.21 
Mississippi 177 2,951,996 5.99 
Missouri 171 5,987,580 2.85 
Montana 65 974,989 6.66 
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(convictions per 100,000 
residents) 
Nebraska 22 1,796,619 1.22 
Nevada 37 2,643,085 1.39 
New Hampshire 17 1,324,575 1.28 
New Jersey 410 8,707,739 0.47 
New Mexico 45 2,009,671 2.23 
New York 633 19,545,453 3.23 
North Carolina 175 9,380,884 1.86 
North Dakota 51 646,844 7.88 
Ohio 486 11,542,645 4.21 
Oklahoma 128 3,687,050 3.47 
Oregon 40 3,825,657 1.04 
Pennsylvania 539 12,604,767 4.27* 
Rhode Island 25 1,053,209 2.37 
South Carolina 64 4,561,242 0.14 
South Dakota 52 812,383 0.64 
Tennessee 248 6,296,254 3.93 
Texas 670 24,782,302 0.27 
Utah 39 2,784,572 0.14 
Vermont 15 621,760 2.41 
Virginia 380 7,882,590 4.82 
Washington 93 6,664,195 1.39 
West Virginia 69 1,819,777 3.79 
Wisconsin 122 5,654,774 2.15 
Wyoming 16 544,270 2.93 
1The District of Columbia is the seat of the federal government and there were more criminal prosecutions 
there for public corruption.. 





Table 3-2.  Top 10 Most Corrupt States 
State Corruption Rate 











District of Columbia 57.035 
 
 The Public Integrity Section shares its scope and responsibilities with the U.S. 
Attorney's offices, which prosecute local corruption cases against officials who abuse the 
public trust. U.S. Attorneys concentrate on specific violations of criminal laws under the 
Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951), the federal mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. 1341), and the 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statutes (18 U.S.C. 1961-
1968).  The 93 U.S. Attorney's offices successfully prosecuted more than 20,4206
                                                 
5 The District of Columbia is the seat of the federal government, so there were more federal criminal               
   corruption prosecutions there. 
 cases 
between 2000 and 2009; they convicted federal, state, and local officials, as well as 
private individuals engaged in corrupt activities.  Twenty-one percent were local 
officials.  These federal corruption cases involved bribery, money laundering, extortion, 
6Report from the Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice, 2000-2008. 
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conspiracy, tax evasion, mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, perjury, and 
depriving the public of honest services.  
Federal Criminal Laws Used in Public Corruption Cases 
 This study reviewed data from specific cases where elected officials engaged in acts of 
public corruption for personal gain.  It analyzed the profiles of public officials who 
engaged in various corrupt activities, including bribery, money laundering, extortion, 
conspiracy, tax evasion, intent to deprive the public of honest service, mail and wire fraud, 
obstruction of justice, embezzlement, and perjury.  This chapter provides an overview of 
the laws used by federal prosecutors to indict and convict those elected officials of public 
corruption.  Many of the definitions used can be found in federal criminal statues and in 
other publications, e.g., Malone (2007, p. 1-5), Kobrin (2006, p.779-795), and Dreyer 
(2007).  
 It has been more than forty years since the federal government designated public 
corruption as a priority and targeted state and local officials who engaged in it.  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Justice 
Department, and the Attorney General’s Office were all at some point responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting charges of public corruption.  The federal statutes used to 
prosecute many corruption cases were broad and comprehensive.  Over the years, some of 
the most effective laws used to fight public corruption have been those prohibiting false 
statements, perjury, mail fraud, and wire fraud, as well as RICO and the Hobbs Act (i.e., 
extortion).  
 The false statement and perjury statutes are used when public officials make false 
sworn and/or unsworn statements during the course of an investigation.  Federal 
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prosecutors have also been extremely successful using the “honest services” provision of 
the mail and wire fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. § 1346), which stipulates that it is illegal to 
deprive citizens, employers, and others, including the public, of their “right to honest 
services.”  This provision gave prosecutors a great deal of flexibility when charging public 
officials; its vagueness opened the door to a wide range of interpretations, and prosecutors 
were eager to use the law to charge officials who violated the public trust by accepting and 
engaging in deceptive and criminal behavior.  According to reporter Nixon (2006), 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Harrigan said it best: “The essence of public corruption is that 
public officials deprive people in the community of their honest efforts to represent them.  
That’s theft of honest services, and that’s what the statute covers”  
 Although federal statutes do not explicitly criminalize the theft of honest services, the 
mail fraud statute refers to this as a scheme designed to swindle people out of money and 
property.  Honest services crimes occur where officials owe a duty of honest service to the 
victim, typically the public.  In these cases, public officials are seen as having a fiduciary 
responsibility to the public that they breach. 
 Federal prosecutors have used the mail and wire fraud statutes in public corruption 
cases because they are so comprehensive that they include the devising of any scheme to 
defraud, as well as schemes to obtain money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses.  
To convict a defendent, prosecutors must only prove a single use of the U.S. mail or of 
wires (fax, telephone, mail, or e-mail) to “scheme to defraud” another of the intangible 
right to honest services.  The charges usually involve the failure to disclose a benefit of the 
scheme to a public official—for instance, the failure to disclose a payment.  
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 In cases like these, prosecutors are not required to prove that a victim was defrauded, 
only that the “schemer ponders the harm.”  The honest services provision can apply to 
any scheme to deprive the public of certain intangible property rights, including control 
over one’s own money or the responsibility to conduct the business of the public 
honestly, impartially, and free from corruption (Kobrin 2006; Maass 1987; Nixon 2006).  
The statute has been an invaluable tool for the federal government in fighting public 
corruption cases. 
 In 1970, Congress enacted RICO as a tool to fight public corruption.  RICO charges 
apply where at least two acts of illegal schemes to make a profit are involved; these acts 
include mail and wire fraud, bribery, money laundering, extortion, obstruction of justice, 
and/or state penal law violations.  Mail and wire fraud charges are substantive acts for 
RICO; when more than two of these charges are involved, the federal government will 
charge a public official with a RICO violation (Maass 1987).  The RICO statute makes it 
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in 
interstate commerce to conduct such enterprises through a pattern of illegal and criminal 
activity, so prosecutors must show a pattern of illegal activity to invoke the statute.  
 The Hobbs Act is the federal statute pertaining to extortion.  This act makes it a crime 
to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery or extortion.  Extortion is a common 
violation in cases of public corruption: officials expect financial compensation for their 
decisions, and a contract, decision, or change in regulation does not happen until payment 
is received, which is illegal.  An additional element of the Hobbs Act is that payment to an 
official constitutes extortion if it is accompanied by fear of economic loss.  
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 The federal government’s use of the extortion statute “under color of official right” 
occurs when a public official or private person who has political power receives money 
from a third party as a result of the exercise of that power.  To qualify as corruption, both 
the official and the third party must know or perceive that the official exerted such power 
and that the payments were a result of the exercise of official power.  Charges against 
public officials under the Hobbs Act for obtaining money or property to which they are not 
entitled, knowing that a payment was made in return for official acts, are comparable to the 
bribery statute.  
 In fact, the most common violation of public corruption is bribery.  A review of 
corruption cases indicates that bribery appears to have the highest rate of prosecution of 
any form of corruption.  It is the classic form of public corruption: individuals or 
organizations pay government officials who grant contracts on behalf of a governmental 
institution or make decisions on using public funds in order to influence the officials’ 
decisions on particular contracts or tasks.  There are several methods of payments that 
constitute a bribe, including kickbacks, payoffs, grease money, and gratuities.  Bribery in 
corruption cases involves officials who abuse the power entrusted to them by the public 
for monetary benefits.  
Defining Public Corruption 
 Government corruption has significant consequences if not reduced or eliminated.  To 
better explore the topic, this research study must first develop a working definition of it. 
Most definitions of public corruption center on the abuse of public office for personal 
benefit; this common definition covers the overall behavior of officials using their public 
office as a means for personal benefit, and is broad enough to include acts of nepotism and 
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graft.  Although the concept of corruption is broad, researchers agree that it generally 
refers to acts in which the power of a public office is used for personal gain.  Moodie 
(1980) said, “Corruption now refers to specific actions by specific individuals—those 
holding public positions, elected or appointed, and those who seek to influence them.  
Defining corruption becomes a process of spelling out classifications of behavior” (p. 209).  
 Many researchers have tried to define public corruption; however, the body of 
research has yet to produce a consensus on the subject.  Klitgaard (1988) says, “[A corrupt 
official] deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against 
the exercise of certain private-regarding behavior” (p. 23).  Ackerman (2001) defines 
public corruption as the abuse of one’s public office for personal gain.  According to 
Georges Bernanos, a French novelist and political writer, “The first sign of corruption in a 
society that is still alive is that the end justifies the means”.  Another commonly used 
definition is that of Nye (1967), who, like Klitgaard, used a definition popular among 
political scientists: “[C]orruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding personal, close family, private clique pecuniary 
status-gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence” (p. 417).  Some economists use a definition from the World Bank (1977): “An 
abuse of public office power for private gains.” All these definitions share one common 
theme: the misuse of public power for private gain (Senturia 1935, p. 449; Heidenheimer 
1989a, p. 9; Key 1936, p. 388; Johnson 1996, p. 331; Benson 1978, xiii; Williams 2006, p. 
127).  
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 Friedrich (1966) emphasized that a “pattern of corruption can be said to exist 
whenever a power holder who is in charge of doing certain things (i.e., who is a 
responsible functionary or officeholder) is by monetary or other rewards not legally 
provided for, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the rewards and 
thereby does damage to the public and its interest” (p. 74).  Amundsen (1999) suggested 
that political actors engage in corrupt activities to receive private benefits for themselves, 
family, and friends.  Bardhan (1997) provides a succinct definition: “Corruption refers to 
the use of public office for private gains, where an official (an agent) entrusted with 
carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for 
private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal” (p. 1321).  
 Huntington (1968) defines corruption as the “behavior of public officials which 
deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends” (p. 59).  Rogow and Lasswell 
(1993) refer to corruption as “behavior in office that is motivated by a desire for personal 
material gain” (p. 2).  The final definition considered in this research study is offered by 
Hutchorft (1996), in which corruption is viewed as a means of payment of bribes by firms 
to public officials who, in turn, “expedite a decision without changing it” or “change the 
decision and contravene formal government policy” (p. 14).  
 Each one of these definitions was incorporated into the research, since each relates 
corruption to the abuse of public power for personal benefit.  Together they contribute to 
an overall definition that is broad enough to encompass the overall behavior of officials 




The final definition comes from Merriam-Webster:  
a: impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle: depravity 
b: decay, decomposition c: inducement to wrong by improper or 
unlawful means (as bribery) d: a departure from the original or 
from what is pure or correct.  
 How researchers define corruption determines what data they use to model and 
measure it.7  After considering various definitions from the literature, as well as those 
offered by previous studies, this research study will use the following definition, slightly 
different from the Merriam-Webster one: “The impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral 
principle concluding with an inducement to do wrong by improper or unlawful means 
relating to governing, a government, or the conduct of government.”  With this working 
definition of public corruption, this study will delineate two different types: “grand 
corruption” and “petty corruption” (Jain 2002, p. 73-75).  Grand corruption occurs at the 
highest level of government and involves major government programs and projects 
(Moody-Stewart 1997).  Grand corruption also refers to the acts of political officials who 
abuse their position of power to make economic policies for personal use and/or to 
preserve their power and wealth (Jain 2001; Amundsen 1999).8
                                                 
7One sign of the difficulty of defining corruption is that almost everyone who writes about it uses a 
different definition.  For a brief summary of various definitions, see Jain (1998c, 13-19).  For a discussion 
of the importance of the definition of corruption, see Johnston (2000a), Lancaster and Montinola (1997), 
and Philil (1997). Collier (1999, p. 4) attributes the absence of a theory of corruption partly to the lack of an 
agreed-upon definition of corruption.  For an earlier attempt to define various types of corruption, see 
Johnson (1986). Johnson (1996) differentiates between “behavior-classifying” and “principal-agent-client” 
definitions of corruption. 
 
8“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations of promises, … for the 
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, [uses the mail or causes them to be 




 Petty corruption occurs at the bureaucratic level, where administrators and appointed 
bureaucrats are bribed to fast-track bureaucratic procedures or extort payments while 
carrying out tasks assigned to them (Jain 2001; Amundsen 1999).  It is most often used to 






















RESEARCH DESIGN AND SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS 
Research Design 
 The design was a vital component of the overall plan used to explore and analyze 
data.  The main purpose of a research design is to identify and establish a connection 
linking the research questions and the collected data, but another important function is to 
provide a road map outlining any prospective links between the researcher’s theoretical 
model and the collection and analysis of empirical data.  
 This research study design is a single-method design that will use a quantitative 
research approach to determine if there is a correlation, or cause and effect, between 
certain characteristics of elected county officials and their decision to engage in acts of 
public corruption.  The ladder section of this chapter outlines the research questions and 
research hypotheses used to explain the decisions of elected officials.  
Design Summary 
Model Approach: The research design used a quantitative research approach to 
develop and analyze its General Models of Public Corruption. 
Model Base: The research design developed assumptions about cause-and-effect 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables.  The research will seek to 
predict and explain relationships between these variables. 
Driving Theory: GST was the impetus for the selection of the variables and the 
methods of analysis.  
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Description: The research design will describe the data in the study and determine 
whether they show a relationship between particular attributes of elected county officials 
and public corruption.  
Explanatory Aspect: The research study attempts to explain public corruption among 
elected county officials who were federally indicted and convicted, as opposed to elected 
county officials who opted not to engage in acts of public corruption, using the variables 
in the study model.  In addition, the study will review data from both areas: those where 
there were convictions and those where there were no convictions.  
Data Analysis 
 The analysis will examine data pertaining to county governments with federally 
convicted elected officials and county governments with no convicted elected officials.  
The analysis will involve a two-stage process.  The first stage will be to explain public 
corruption in county government.  This process includes analyzing 18 variables within 
three domains: government characteristics, governmental fiscal characteristics, and 
community characteristics.  The second stage will be to identify which of the eight 
factors within the domain of elected officials' characteristics can best explain the behavior 
of elected county officials who engaged in public corruption. 
Quantitative Design 
 Hopkins (1998) states that quantitative research determines how one thing (an 
independent variable) affects another (dependent variable) in a population, i.e., it is about 
quantifying the relationships between variables.  However, the quantitative research 
approach is limited in ways that could have some bearing on this research study. 
Researchers generally use this approach to ensure that valid statistical methods are 
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applied in the review of data.  According to Massey (2003), quantitative design takes no 
account of an individual’s lifetime experiences, feelings, and observations.  Quantitative 
research design is “constructed around a theory, and the theory acts as a systematizing 
model for the development of the research questions, hypotheses, data collection 
procedure and analyses” (Tekniepe 2007, p. 129).  In essence, using a quantitative 
research approach is deductive, not only when designing the overall study, but also when 
testing the hypotheses and interpreting the results.  A quantitative research approach 
rejects any opportunity for individual subjectivity, since the results rely on objective 
interpretation of data and observations.  Therefore, despite its limitations, a quantitative 
research approach is the approach best suited for this research study because it removes 
any limitations that would affect the outcome of the research analysis.  
Unit of Analysis 
 County commissioners from large urban counties are the focus of this research study.  
The unit of analysis was elected county commissioners: those indicted and convicted, and 
those not convicted or serving in counties with no incidence of public corruption, in large 
urban counties.  This unit of analysis is the most appropriate for examining the specific 
research questions and hypotheses identified in this study. 
 Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show that, between 2000 and 2009, 27.74 percent of the 
respondents had been indicted or convicted of public corruption in federal court.  This 
information was used to establish the targeted population. 
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Table 4-1.  Summary of Large Urban Counties with a Population of 300,000 or 
More 
Summary of Responses Number Percentage 
Did not respond to questionnaire 56 26.54 
Responded to questionnaire; no convictions 91 53.08 
Responded to questionnaire; convictions & indictments 26* 20.38 
Total Questionnaire Respondents 173 100.0 
*8 counties had multiple cases of public corruption. 
 
Table 4-2.  Summary of County Officials from Large Urban Counties  
with a Population of 300,000 or More 
Summary of Responses Number Percentage 
Did not respond to questionnaire 25  
Responded to questionnaire; no convictions or indictments 112 72.26 
Responded to questionnaire; convictions & Indictments 43 27.74 
Total Questionnaire Respondents 155 100.0 
 
 Overall, responses were received from 67.63 percent of the target population, which 
are the ones included in the research study.  Some counties in which officials had been 
federally convicted were excluded from the research study because the criminal activities 
occurred outside the study period, the counties were not large urban counties, or the 
convictions were not related to public corruption and the official’s responsibilities.  The 
resulting population covers 117 large urban counties that have convicted and non-
convicted county commissioners.  
 The target population for this research study comprised 11 states with 26 urban 
counties that have populations of 300,000 or greater; it included federally indicted or 
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convicted elected county officials and those not convicted.  The preliminary analysis 
found 173 counties with populations of 300,000 or greater, 91 of which had no incidence 
of public corruption.  The review found nine states had no counties with populations of 
300,000 or greater: Alaska, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming (National Association of Counties 2006).  These 
states were excluded from the research study.  In fact, the literature revealed that less than 
six percent of the 3,066 counties in the U.S. had populations of 300,000 and greater 
(National Association of Counties 2006). 
Data Sample 
 The data and quantitative research observations (sampling) for this research study 
were restricted to 117 large urban counties where elected county officials had and had not 
been federally indicted and/or convicted of public corruption (based on U.S. District 
Court criminal records) between 2000 and 2009.  During the data collection process, it 
was discovered that 2000–2009 was the period with the most reliable information; earlier 
data were sparse, inaccurate, and often unverifiable.  
 Appendix II lists the large urban counties with public corruption convictions that 
were examined for this study, and Appendix III lists the large urban counties with no 
cases of public corruption considered.  Appendix IV contains the questionnaire used to 
obtain information from county governments.  
Research Model 
 Building the model was vital to this study’s overall success.  The focus of the study 
is the assessment and measurement of the cause-and-effect (predictability) relationship 
between the General Models and the domains of elected officials’ characteristics, 
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government characteristics, fiscal stability characteristics, and community characteristics 
to determine which attribute(s) induced public corruption among elected county officials.  
The research was conducted on elected county officials and county governments because 
of the availability of historical statistical information.  
 The dependent variable in the General Model is a dichotomous variable that 
indicates whether an elected official committed a crime of public corruption.  The domain 
and theory were used to accurately analyze and measure results to determine the reasons 
associated with the behavior of county officials who engaged in public corruption.  The 
measures analyzed included government characteristics, county government fiscal 
characteristics, community characteristics, and the characteristics of elected officials.  
These will be used to measure the domain attributes identified in the study.  
Table 4-3.  Overview of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Corruption 
Committed Corruption = 1 





Characteristics Fiscal Stability Community Characteristics 
Gender Office of Inspector General Per capita income Poverty rate 
Age Ethic laws Fiscal stability Age of the community  65 & older 
Race Structure of government Federal & state aid Crime rate 
Religious belief Open meeting laws Auditor Civic involvement 
Education Employment growth  Community education level 
Marital status   Labor force 
Tenure   Population growth 
Outside employment   County population to overall state population 
   Political party affiliation 
75 
Data Sampling Process 
 The independent variables set for individual-level data included eight covariates for 
the domain “profile characteristics of elected officials.”  Several important factors 
associated with this data set are relevant to study analyses.  The first is that 43 elected 
county officials are included in the research study from 26 large urban counties.  The 
study identified only those elected officials indicted or convicted on federal charges of 
public corruption between 2000 and 2009 who used their elected position for personal 
gain; this designation is the main factor for inclusion in the research study.  The study 
also incorporated 112 elected county officials who were not indicted or convicted of 
public corruption charges, but were the counterparts to officials who were corrupt.  They 
served as members of the county commission during the same period as the county 
officials who were indicted and/or convicted, and responded to requests for information.  
The process for gathering data from groups of elected county officials—those convicted 
or indicted, and their counterparts not involved in acts of corruption—involved  mailing 
or e-mailing a two-page questionnaire (Appendix IV) and, in some cases, conducting 
telephone interviews.  
 Much of the information for both groups of officials was obtained with the help of 
current county commissioners and county staff, state election and ethics department staff, 
Justice Department press releases, and the Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
service.  Collecting data about persons in prison included accessing records through 
public information requests at the federal, state, and local government level.  Additional 
information was gathered from newspaper articles and discussions with news reporters 
and staff.  
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 A number of former county commissioners no longer on elected boards were located 
with the help of county staff and other commissioners.  Some officials were still members 
of the board, or held another elected position, and responded to the request for 
information.  In other cases, information was available through county Web sites or 
gathered from public record documents.  Of the 219 elected county officials who served 
as county commissioners during the research period, 180 requests for information were 
mailed out to those officials who were located and not deceased.  Of the 180 mailed 
questionnaires, 155 were completed, returned, and included in the study.  The response 
rate, over 86 percent, required considerable time and effort in locating accurate 
information about the 43 officials indicted or convicted of public corruption, as well as 
information pertaining to those officials not convicted.  In a few instances, interviews 
were conducted with former commissioners convicted of public corruption.  
Relational Measures, Data Collection and Sources, and Coding Procedures 
 This section of the research study describes the functions and specific procedures 
used to identify data.  It outlines how the research study will address each attribute of the 
four domains and how to adequately measure each variable.  Exhibit III contains a 
concise description of the coding procedures and direction on the types of data gathered 
for the dependent and covariates used in the research study.  Data was collected from 
various sources, both primary and secondary, during a 21-month period that began in 
March 2008 and ended in December 2009.  Exhibit I provides a summary of the data 
sources used for each variable during the data collection process.  
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Quantitative Procedures 
 Quantitative research is a systematic and objective process that quantifies the 
relationship between variables, with the overall purpose of generalizing the information 
about the subjects to the overall population.  This section will provide an outline of the 
methods used in the research study model and a framework for the collection of data.  
The study itself incorporates descriptive statistics to summarize the samples and their 
measures that describe what the data show and analyze both the dependent variable and 
the covariates to determine the relationship between the two variables.  
 To analyze the cause-and-effect relationship of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable, this research study used a logit regression model.  The logit 
procedure is appropriate because the dependent variable is bivariate with only two 
possible outcomes, committed corruption or did not commit corruption, coded 
respectively as 1 and 0.  
 According to Miles and Huberman (2002), the main purpose of regression analysis is 
to perform three important functions: (1) prediction, (2) explanation, and (3) control.  
Firstly, the regression analysis is used to predict if (and how) the various covariates are 
related to the dependent variable—in this case, corruption.  Secondly, the logit regression 
model is used to explain why certain events happen based on that relationship, and 
finally, a regression analysis is used to control for other variables.  
 The use of a logit regression model in this study allowed testing of the outcomes 
from a set of variables that could be dichotomous, discrete, continuous, or a mixture of 
any of the three.  In the General Models, the dependent variable is dichotomous, while 
the independent variables include a mixture.  This study will attempt to determine what 
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relationships exist between the dependent and independent variables, if any, and explain 
why some elected county officials opted to engage in public corruption and others did 
not.  It is posited that logit regression analysis is the method best suited to accomplish the 
desired task for this research study and will adequately address statistical issues that may 
confront this study. 
Analytical Considerations  
 When developing research studies, serious analytical consideration ensures that the 
testing of hypotheses is appropriately addressed.  In this study, the analytical 
considerations for hypothesis testing included the treatment of missing data, research 
study limitations, and testing for multicollinearity.  The following sections specifically 
address these key issues. 
Treatment of Missing Data 
 Of the total number of county officials contacted for this research study, 23 current 
county officials did not respond to a request for information and 15 former county 
officials could not be located.  Overall, 18 counties failed to respond to the request for 
information.  Each one of these groups was therefore excluded from the research study.  
Key to the research process was obtaining accurate and reliable results of the tests 
associated with logit regression procedures.  During the data collection process, two 
values were unobtainable for five counties: per capita income for three counties for a one-
year period and crime rate for two counties for a one-year period.  Given that the majority 
of the information was available and the missing values were limited, the researcher 
extrapolated for the values of per capita income and crime rate.  In total, the research 
study was unable to gather information for the following counties.  
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Table 4-4. Counties with Missing Data 
Financial Stability Political Party Affiliation Employment Growth 
Lee County Baltimore County Jefferson Parish, Louisiana 
Bristol County Onondaga County  
Plymouth County Snohomish County  
Monroe County   
Tulsa County   
Lee County   
 
 Efforts to gather information were time-consuming and required repeated requests, 
but overall proved successful.  Data in this study was obtained from several sources, 
including county staff, current and former county officials, and public information reports 
released annually by counties.  The success of the data collection process culminated with 
responses from, and personal conversations with, several former county officials 
convicted of public corruption.  In the end, the data collection process was mostly 
successful, and missing data was not a significant issue.  
Multicollinearity 
     Researchers who utilize regression analysis are concerned with a number of factors, 
including the analytical considerations of multicollinearity.  Multicollinearity becomes a 
problem when the research has difficulty predicting one explanatory variable from one or 
more of the remaining explanatory variables (King, Keohane, and Sidney 1994). 
Specifically, the problem occurs when one independent variable cannot be distinguished 
from another and the two independent variables become highly correlated.  When 
researchers utilize regression analysis and the research cannot determine which of the two 
independent variables account for the variance in the dependent variable, collinearity 
becomes a problematic factor within the research design, creating multicollinearity. 
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 It is expected that some degree of multicollinearity may occur between covariates, 
but how the research resolves the problem speaks to the research design and how well the 
research adjusts for issues within the study.   After a careful review of covariates, it was 
concluded that multicollinearity did not pose a problem in this research.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The literature review provided a general overview of the impact of public corruption 
committed by elected officials, and a possible explanation of their decision to engage in 
corrupt activities.  Previous research has shown that the activities of officials who engage 
in criminal behavior have a negative effect on both private and public institutions; the 
literature even emphasizes the profound effects public corruption has had.  This is one 
reason political scientists and others continue to search for explanations of public 
corruption and its negative impact on government operations.  As part of that continuing 
effort, this study searched for evidence to explain public corruption among county 
officials within the past ten years; however, the research suggests that local, federal, and 
state governments have experienced explosive growth in corruption cases (United States 
Justice Department 2009) which warrants a review of the data.  
 This study undertakes the task of explaining public corruption committed by elected 
county officials, but more importantly, it attempts to shed light on public corruption  
 Empirical studies by Lederman et al. (2004) imply that political institutions (i.e., 
government) are important in determining the pervasiveness of corruption.  Thus, county 
characteristics are a vital factor in this research study, and the study will attempt to 
explain the impact, if any, that county characteristics have on public corruption.  The 
study will also attempt to determine if GST or any negative attributes are factors in the 
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behavior of public officials and their decisions to engage in criminal behavior and, if so, 
to what degree.  
 The cause and nature of public corruption among elected officials, particularly 
county officials, in contemporary America may be traced to a variety of factors; however, 
previous research in this area was unsuccessful in identifying a specific connection to one 
or more variables that would explain corruption among elected county officials.  The 
GST may provide that explanation.  
Elected Officials’ Profile Domain 
 As early as 1963, Rogow and Lasswell noted that an elected official’s profile 
characteristics were a determining factor in public corruption.  In their book Power, 
Corruption, and Rectitude, they identified “game” and “gain” politicians, and it is 
through this work that a connection to GST becomes applicable.  Rogow and Lasswell 
(1963) acknowledged that the personality system in Tables 2-2 and 2-3 delineates three 
factors proposed to influence the behavior of elected officials and their decision whether 
to engage in corrupt behavior: (1) deprivation, (2) demands, and (3) indulgence.  These 
three factors, they postulated, can influence elected officials’ decisions and behavior, 
shape their ideology and moral character to become corrupt or not.  Their study of 30 
political officials provided the supporting information used to develop measurable 
factors, specific research questions, and hypotheses for the General Models.  
 To gain a better understanding of the impact of corruption, this research study 
examines the characteristics of elected officials and seeks to determine which ones 
influence their behavior and decisions.  As noted in the literature review, studies by 
Langton and Piquero (2007) and other research criminologists, such as Coleman (1995), 
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Croall (2001), and Wheeler (1992), revealed several explanations for white-collar crimes, 
including economic pressure, unjust treatment, and personality traits.  Their research gave 
the confirmation needed to investigate the characteristics of county officials.  The goal 
was to determine which specific characteristics influenced the decisions of county 
officials, and whether the decisions of county officials were made on behalf of citizens or 
for personal rewards (della Porta 1996).  Mastropaolo (1990) stated, “Career politicians 
view politics as a means for achieving upward social mobility” (p. 58-59), leading to this 
question: Are the decisions of elected officials reflective of the sentiment of all officials, 
and if so, what specific character traits affect behavior?   
 The decisions of elected officials can be attributed to their upbringing, environment, 
failures, and successes.  Since GST may provide some explanation of their behavior, it is 
an appropriate theory for this study.  GST theorizes that behavior and decisions might be 
related to three aspects of an official’s environment and upbringing: “1) Their failure to 
achieve positively valued goals, 2) removal of positively valued stimuli, or 3) presents of 
negative stimuli.  Each of these factors, according to research, can influence the decisions 
of individuals, and in the case of this research study, is a factor in the behavior of elected 
county officials” (Agnew 1992, p. 50).  These three factors are measured through (a) 
outside employment, (b) age, (c) gender, (d) education, (e) religion, (f) marital status, (g) 
race, and (h) tenure.  The objective is to determine which of these profile characteristics 
are viewed as negative stimuli, which are associated with an official's environment and 
background, and whether any of these characteristics are factors in the behavior and 
decisions of elected officials.  The following subsections present the specific research 
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questions and related hypotheses for the domain of elected officials’ profile 
characteristics. 
Outside Employment  
  Research Question 1: What is the relationship between outside employment of 
 county commissioners and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 1: The more opportunities for outside employment that are available, the 
 more likely it is that county commissioners will engage in public corruption.  
 It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between outside income (measured as 
outside employment) and an elected official’s decision to accept bribes or engage in other 
forms of corruption.  Outside employment for elected officials includes income or 
consulting fees beyond their county commission salaries, i.e., supplemental income.  
 It is thought that outside employment of county commissioners creates opportunities 
in which conflict of interest may occur.  Additionally, various types of employment 
opportunities can create more chances for a potential conflict of interest and a higher 
propensity for public corruption.  Therefore, outside employment—specifically, certain 
industries or employment opportunities—opens the door to potential problems that 
include conflict of interest for elected county officials. 
 Outside employment is an alternative for improving the financial security of elected 
officials, but it is through this avenue that conflict can become an issue.  Because county 
governments are local in scope, those officials have a greater influence on many aspects 
of their communities, including businesses, contracts, zoning, and policies.  All of these 
elements can directly influence the lives of citizens as well as the business community, so 
elected officials of large urban counties generally wield significant power and influence.  
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 Consideration should be given to lack of money as one of the fundamental reasons 
outside employment is viewed as a precursor to public corruption.  A lack of personal 
wealth prior to achieving elected office can influence the behavior of county officials, 
and once elected, some officials take advantage of any opportunity to engage in corrupt 
behavior.  A lack of money and power, along with a desire for personal gain, is 
hypothesized to be the principal reason to seek outside employment opportunities that 
may ultimately lead to political corruption.  According to Berg, Hahn, and Schmidhauser 
(1976), “Money talks and those who desperately need money are prepared to listen” (p. 
41).  Their assessment is that lack of money, economic poverty, or a decline in financial 
status is a contributing factor of public corruption and a negative strain of GST; the 
results of the analysis show these officials perceive a lack of money as a failure to 
achieve a positively valued goal.  Robert J.  Williams’ (2006) assessment of Berg's 
analysis is valid: “Despite all the demographic, economic and political changes in this 
century, money remains, with apologies to Bagehot, the hyphen which joins, the buckle 
which fastens the disparate elements of the American political system” (p. 129).  
 County government officials are typically compensated, but salaries differ from state 
to state and are often inadequate for some officials to maintain a particular lifestyle. 
Elected county commissioners who engage in political corruption often have a desire to 
maintain a standard of living equal to their peers or business associates within their social 
circle, and developing alternative options for generating money becomes important.  
Outside employment facilitates the opportunity for officials to engage in corrupt 
activities.  This study will determine if a relationship exists between those two factors. 
GST postulates that outside employment is the venue to resolve the issue of a lack of 
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money, but presents a problem with a conflict of interest and creates situations in which 
financial failures stress public officials and result in public corruption.  The desire to 
generate additional income becomes a factor that can affect decisions (policy and non-
policy), resulting in officials’ decisions that serve to benefit themselves.  
 According to other studies, there is a relationship between level of income and 
corruption.  Corruption is low when income levels are high (Amundsen 1999; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 1997; Swamy et al. 1999; Treisman 1999a; Lipset 1960).  GST 
postulates that a lack of financial security results in negative strain, and is viewed as a 
failure financially and socially.  Outside employment opportunities, including 
opportunities that create a conflict of interest, provide the vehicle to secure financial 
resources and financial security, but have the propensity to result in public corruption.  
Age 
 Research Question 2: What is the relationship between the age of county 
 commissioners and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 2: The more advanced the age of county commissioners, the more likely 
 they are to participate in public corruption.  
 It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between county officials’ age 
(measured as the age of county officials) and public corruption.  The literature review 
found empirical studies that examined the relationship between age and public 
corruption.  The research determined that age is a factor in corruption and can affect the 
behavior and decisions of officials.  According to previous research, younger officials are 
trustworthy and less likely to engage in acts of corruption.  In a recent study, Mocan 
(2004) showed a correlation between age and corruption.  Mocan’s data indicated that 
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younger persons (aged 18 to 20) are less likely to participate in a corrupt act, whereas 
individuals between the ages of 20 and 54 are more likely to solicit a bribe.  Another 
study that suggests an age effect in criminal behavior is Torgler and Valev (2006), which 
demonstrated that age influences the criminal behavior of individuals and the decisions 
individuals make.  This study will examine the ages of officials and seek to determine at 
what age elected officials will become involved in corrupt activities, the relationship of 
age to corruption, and whether public corruption is associated with an age effect.  Under 
GST, one might hypothesize that younger public officials desire instant financial success 
and are not willing to devote the time to achieve financial and career advancement.  This 
study will determine if older public officials are typically more financially stable than 
younger officials, and if so, whether younger officials would be more likely to develop 
financial stress that results in acts of public corruption. 
Gender 
 Research Question 3: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s 
 gender and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 3: Male county commissioners are more likely than female county 
 commissioners to engage in public corruption. 
 It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between the gender of county officials 
(measured as the gender of officials) and public corruption.  The literature review 
discovered studies that examined public corruption and gender (e.g., Azfar et al. 2001).  
Where there is a propensity to engage in corruption, the literature showed that acts by 
women were less severe (Swamy et al. 1999; Dollar et al. 1999).  The hypothesis, 
therefore, is that men have a higher propensity to be involved in acts of corruption than 
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women.  Men are more likely to serve as elected officials, but even when women are 
elected, their priorities are issue-based.  In most cases, women seem more concerned with 
solving problems than obtaining power or money.  
 The literature review found that several countries used an unusual gender-related 
policy to confront corruption and reduce corrupt behavior in government: women were 
put in leadership and management positions as an anticorruption method (Moore 1999; 
McDermott 1999).  Studies have found that women and men approach corruption 
differently, and evidence suggests that women commit lower levels of criminal activities 
than men (Torgler and Vale 2007).  There is also evidence of gender differences on 
ethical decision-making (Ford et al. 1994; Glover et al. 1997; Reiss & Mitra 1998): 
studies suggest there are higher degrees of ethical standards governing women’s behavior 
than men’s, and that “in the short run, a greater presence of women in public life will 
reduce corruption” (Azfar et al. 2001, p. 53).  
 This research study will examine the data to determine if a valid explanation exists 
that can explain why more incidents of public corruption are committed by men than by 
women. 
Education 
 Research Question 4: What is the relationship between the education of county 
 commissioners and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of education among county commissioners, the 
 less likely it is a commissioner will engage in public corruption. 
 It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between county officials’ 
educational achievement (measured as county officials’ level of education) and public 
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corruption.  A review of the literature found no specific studies that have examined the 
relationship between the level of formal education and public corruption; however, it is 
hypothesized that elected county officials who have advanced degrees are less likely to 
participate in corrupt activities than their counterparts who do not.   According to Torgler 
and Dong (2008), one study prepared by Mocan (2004) suggested that “higher levels of 
education can lead to a higher probability of being targeted for bribes, stressing also that 
a more educated population is expected to be less tolerant of corruption” (p. 14). 
Although elected officials with a high level of education may be targets for those 
behaving illegally, it is posited that elected officials will be less apt to participate in such 
behavior if they have advanced degrees.  This research study will examine education and 
public corruption to determine if a correlation exists between public officials’ level of 
education and their willingness to engage in corrupt activities.  
 GST postulates that “educational attainment is referred to as a mark of social status 
and thus believed to indicate a greater stake in conformity; poor academic performance 
was likely to result in greater stress for a white-collar offender than for the common 
criminal” (Langton and Piquero 2007, p. 5).  It is theorized that county officials who 
failed to achieve educational success may view public corruption as an opportunity to 
advance to the status level of their peers.  This assessment would lead one to believe that 
a large number of highly educated elected officials would result in a lower level of 
corruption in government. 
Race 
 Research Question 5: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s 
 ethnicity and public corruption? 
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 Hypothesis 5: White county commissioners are less likely to engage in public 
 corruption than other commissioners.  
 It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between non-white commissioners 
(measured as the race of county officials) and public corruption.  The literature review 
found several studies that investigated the relationship between corruption and ethnic 
heterogeneity; in literature broadly concerned with ethnicity and corruption research, 
studies revealed a possible relationship between corruption and ethnic diversity (Mauro 
1995; Alesina, Bagir, and Williams 2002; La Porta et al. 1999).  In fact, according to one 
study by Mauro (1995), “The presence of many different ethnolinguistic groups is also 
significantly associated with worse corruption, as bureaucrats may favor members of 
their same group” (p . 693).  
 It is hypothesized that a county official’s race is a relevant factor in the discussion of 
public corruption in county government, and that race can influence an official’s behavior 
and decision-making ability.  Race is a negative element that creates social rejection for 
officials.   According to Jang and Johnson (2003), Hagan and Peterson (1995), Mirowsky 
and Ross (1989), Ross and Van Willingen (1996), and Schulz et al. (2000), race is a 
negative strain and could cause non-white officials “psychological distress due to their 
more frequent experiences of racism and economic disadvantage” (p. 83).  Empirical 
evidence confirms that GST can apply to people of color, particularly African-
Americans, who have experienced a greater level of strain due to racism, economic 
disadvantage, prejudice, and unfair treatment.  The literature review suggested that 
African-Americans may externalize adversity, which could be related to years of harsh 
treatment and in the end result in the development of racial consciousness (Neighbor et 
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al. 1996).9
 A review of Meier and Holbrook (1992) showed that a larger number of minority 
elected officials were investigated for corruption and targeted for prosecution, but there is 
a lack of supporting evidence for the conclusion that minorities engage in political 
corruption at a higher rate than non-minorities.  This study will examine the data to 
determine if corruption is greater among minorities.   It is also thought that the impact of 
corruption is affected by the race of officials because “ethnic fragmentation impacts 
corruption by reducing the popular will to oppose politicians.  If an area is torn apart by 
ethnic divisions, leaders tend to allocate resources towards backers of their own ethnicity, 
then members of one ethnic group might continue to support a leader of their own ethnic 
group, even if he is known to be corrupt” (Glaeser and Saks 2004, p. 5-6).  
  This research study will examine race to determine if levels of corruption are 
greater among minorities.  GST will be used to analyze data to determine if a correlation 
exists between the race of county officials and corrupt behavior.  
Religion 
 Research Question 6: What is the relationship between the religion of county 
 commissioners and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 6: County commissioners with religious beliefs are less likely to engage 
 in public corruption.  
 It is thought that a negative correlation exists between the degree of devotion to a 
religion among county commissioners (measured as county officials’ public display of 
faith) and public corruption.  According to Lambsdorff (1999), “A strong association 
between religion and corruption is obtained by Treisman [1999a]” (p. 11).  Additionally, 
                                                 
9 Neighbor et al. defined racial consciousness as “a set of beliefs about relative position of African-Americans in society. 
Specifically, consciousness is a collective interpretation of personal experience that includes power grievances about a group's relative 
disadvantaged status, which influences blacks to keep stress external rather than allowing it to become internalized” (171). 
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La Porta et al. (1997), Treisman (1999a), and Paldam (1999b) theorize that the role of 
religion in an official’s life contributes to the level of corruption.  The research conducted 
by La Porta et al. found “that such hierarchical form of religion is detrimental to civic 
engagement, a factor which should help reduce corruption” (Lambsdorff 1999, p. 11).  
Torgler (2006) suggests that engagement in illegal activities might be affected by 
people’s religious involvement, and that there may be a relationship between religion and 
the behavior of elected officials.  Other research suggests that religion has a positive 
effect on GST, and that religion is a social connection and strength for families and 
individuals.  According to Piquero and Sealock (2000) and Jang and Johnson (2003), 
spiritual or religious factors may shield the effects of negative emotions, reduce deviant 
coping, and decrease the effect of strain.  This study will review religion as a factor and 
determine its influence on corruption. 
Marital Status 
 Research Question 7: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s 
 marital status and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 7: County commissioners who are not married are more likely to engage 
 in public corruption. 
 It is thought that a positive correlation exists between the marital status of county 
commissioners (measured as the marital status of county officials) and public corruption.  
A review of the literature found some information indicating that marriage could have an 
effect on elected officials’ behavior.  Swamy et al. (2001) held that marriage can alter 
public behavior, while a criminal study by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) theorized the 
opposite—that marital status has no influence on the likelihood of crime.  GST postulates 
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that elected officials who are divorced can experience negative emotions, including 
anger, which reflect their social status and can influence their public life, i.e., failure in 
marriage can create a perception of failure in other aspects of public life.   A divorce 
while in public office can negatively reflect on the performance and abilities of public 
officials, and stressful tension in public life may affect the decisions of individuals.  This 
research study will explore the relationship to determine if a correlation exists between 
the marital status of county officials and public corruption. 
Tenure 
 Research Question 8: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s 
 tenure in public office and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 8: County commissioners with fewer years on the county commission are 
 more likely to engage in public corruption. 
 It is theorized that a positive relationship exists between a lengthy tenure of elected 
office (measured as the number of years in office as a county official) and public 
corruption.  The literature review found no studies that addressed a relationship between 
public corruption and tenure, and it is generally believed that tenure has no influence on 
the behavior and actions of public officials.  However, this study will review data to 
determine if there is a relationship between the length of time in public office and the 
decision of public officials to engage in corruption.  
 The length of time an official remains in office speaks to that official’s stability.  It is 
hypothesized that the tenure of elected officials can affect their ability to make sound 
decisions and value judgments.  It seems likely that county officials who seek to climb 
the political ladder rapidly would be more inclined to take every opportunity for political 
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advantage, including illicit ones.  It is posited that elected county officials may be 
inclined to grant special treatment to generous political donors who request favors and 
support the officials' eagerness to advance politically.  However, a long tenure can 
produce positive results and strengthen an official’s desire to remain in office, thereby 
discouraging corrupt behavior.  
 While GST may not apply to an official’s tenure, it is thought that tenure may 
influence the behavior and actions of elected county officials.  This study will test data to 
examine if a correlation exists between tenure and public corruption. 
Table 4-5. General Model: Elected Officials’ Profile Characteristics Domain 
Specific Research Question Related Hypothesis 
Q1: What is the relationship between the outside 
employment of county commissioners and public 
corruption? 
H1: (+) A positive relationship exists between 
commissioners with outside employment and public 
corruption. 
Q2: What is the relationship between the age of county 
commissioners and public corruption? 
H2: (+) A positive relationship exists between the age of  
commissioners and public corruption. 
Q3: What is the relationship between a county 
commissioner’s gender and public corruption?  
H3: (+) A positive relationship exists between male 
commissioners and public corruption. 
Q4: What is the relationship between a county 
commissioner’s formal education and public corruption? 
H4: (-) A negative relationship exists between a 
commissioner’s formal education and public corruption. 
Q5: What is the relationship between a county 
commissioner’s ethnicity and public corruption? 
H5: (-) A positive relationship exists between non-white 
commissioners and public corruption. 
Q6: What is the relationship between a county 
commissioner’s religion and public corruption? 
H6: (-) A negative relationship exists between 
commissioners with a limited degree of devotion to a 
religion and public corruption.  
Q7: What is the relationship between a county 
commissioner’s marital status and public corruption? 
H7: (+) A positive relationship exists between a 
commissioner’s marital status and public corruption. 
Q8: What is the relationship between a county 
commissioner’s tenure in office and public corruption? 
H8: (+) A positive relationship exists between a 
commissioner’s tenure and public corruption. 
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Community Characteristics Domain 
 Community characteristics are another set of factors thought to affect public 
corruption among elected officials.  It is posited that the demographics and environment 
of a community can influence county officials’ behavior.  Several research studies 
indicate that the characteristics of a community and the community’s environment for 
politicians could have a great deal to do with an official’s conduct, decisions, and 
behavior (della Porta 1996; Hunt 2004; Maxwell and Winters 2003; Meier and Holbrook 
1992; Menzel and Benton 1991).  In addition, an official's peers, community, friendships, 
teachers, religious influences, and families are all nurturing elements that can become 
factors in both actions and conduct. 
 This study analyzes community characteristics as an important determinant of the 
corruption of county officials.  It considers the relationship between a number of 
community factors, including poverty rate, level of college education, percentage of the 
community aged 65 years or older, level of civic involvement, and population of the 
county.  The study examines how community characteristics affect a politician’s 
decisions, as well as how they shape that person’s social class, values, moral character, 
and beliefs, and what influence these may have on a decision to engage in public 
corruption.  
 This research study will investigate whether community environment influences the 
decision-making processes of officials.  Do the negative attributes of a community 
influence the behavior of officials, and are these factors enough to result in negative 
strains on an official?  It has already been theorized, and previous research suggests, that 
individuals experiencing negative emotions, displeasures, stress, and a lack of social 
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acceptance/status may more readily engage in corrupt activities (Jang and Johnson 2003; 
Langton and Piquero 2007; Nas, Price, and Weber 1986; Warren 2004).  The 
corresponding question for this domain is: Can the negative attributes of a community 
also result in an official’s decision to engage in public corruption?  
 A review of the literature suggests that there is a relationship between community 
environment and the corruption of elected officials.  GST is a possible explanation of, 
and could be a contributing factor to, the behavior of elected officials who engage in 
corrupt activities.  In recent years, many citizens have become concerned about the 
negative influence of corruption on communities.  Since there is little research explaining 
why corruption exists and, more importantly, why it is more prevalent in some 
communities than others, this research study will examine possible differences in 
corruption based on the community and whether one’s social class may influence the 
decision to engage in public corruption.  The objective is to determine the circumstances 
in which community characteristics influence public corruption.  The study will try to 
determine if factors such as crime, poverty rate, and general age of the community in 
larger urban counties provide greater opportunities for corruption.  
 The research study  sets forth eight attributes to measure the domain of community 
characteristics: (a) poverty rate, (b) crime rate, (c) civic involvement, (d) secondary 
education level, (e) labor force, (f) age of the community, (g) county population growth, 
(h) ratio of county population to overall state population, and (i) political party affiliation.  
The objective is to identify community characteristics that might influence negative 




 Research Question 9: What is the relationship between the poverty rate of 
 communities and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 9: Impoverished communities are more likely to experience public 
 corruption. 
 It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between high poverty rates 
(measured as poverty rate for the county) and public corruption.  It is thought that a 
community with a high poverty rate indicates that citizens are not likely to scrutinize the 
decisions and behavior of elected officials because they lack the time and attention to 
serve as government watchdogs.  In some cases, these citizens also lack the education and 
sophistication to monitor and understand the mechanics and workings of government. 
Hunt (2004) suggests that poor citizens are less likely to engage in giving bribes and are 
more likely to be harmed and excluded from public services, while “the rich pay the most 
in bribes” (p. 3) and have a better understanding of the mechanics of government.  It is 
thus posited that the poverty rate can provide an indication of public corruption. 
Additionally, poverty rates among communities are a negative strain and are related to 
GST.  Public officials who have experienced, or reside in, an environment of poverty are 
more likely to experience negative strains, and many experience other failures throughout 
their lives.  The influence of poverty on communities can ultimately affect the behavior 
of officials; if officials reside in a community with a high rate of poverty, strains are 
likely to exist.  Two possible negative factors come from high poverty rates and GST: 
inadequate financial status and poor living conditions.   Both in this case are negative 
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strains.  The study seeks to determine if negative strains create an environment for 
corruption. 
Crime Rate  
 Research Question 10: What is the relationship between communities’ crime rate 
 and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 10: Communities with high crime rates will see more cases of public 
 corruption. 
 It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between the crime rate (measured 
as violent crime per 100,000 inhabitants in the county in any one-year period) and public 
corruption.  Nice (1983) suggests that “political corruption is merely the extension of 
private behavior in the public realm and that the crime rate should be a good surrogate for 
tolerance of corruption” (p. 509).  Further research suggested that crime creates a lack of 
trust, and lack of trust opens the door to an environment of criminal behavior by 
government officials (Hunt 2004, p. 22). Meier et al. (1992) and Hunt (2004) suggest that 
a high crime rate is an indicator of the political system’s inability to address the issue of 
crime, and that communities with high crime rates do little to reduce crime or implement 
policies and penalties stringent enough to deter crimes such as public corruption. 
Schlesinger and Meier (2002) found that public corruption and the crime rate within 
communities are linked, and “it is expected that corruption would be lower in states 
where a larger proportion of the population feels it is important to obey the law because 
of moral principles.  In addition to being an ethical issue, corruption is also considered a 
crime” (Morris 1991, p. 11).  Researchers, however, suggest that high crime rates in 
communities are an indication that the political system is unable to address the issue of 
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crime, implement effective law enforcement policies and penalties, and/or develop 
effective policies to reduce public corruption (Meier and Holbrook 1992).  Research also 
revealed that larger communities have more oversight by law enforcement agencies and 
more effective policies to address corruption in local government.  Larger communities 
also tend to have more resources to combat crime.  
Civic Involvement  
 Research Question 11: What is the relationship between the civic involvement of 
 communities and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 11: Communities with less civic involvement will have more cases of 
 public corruption. 
 It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between civic involvement (measured 
as voter turnout) and public corruption.  It is thought that citizens who show high levels 
of civic involvement in the political process by participating in elections are more 
engaged in the activities and decisions of government officials, and are more willing to 
attend meetings and demand transparency from government.  The research also suggests 
that the more citizens are politically involved, the less likely they are to tolerate the 
presence of corruption.  Hence, the decisions of officials become more judicious.  
Community Post-Secondary Education Level 
 Research Question 12: What is the relationship between a higher education level 
 of the community and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 12: The greater the post-secondary education level of a community,  the 
 fewer the opportunities for public corruption. 
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 It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between higher education (measured 
as the post-secondary education of the community) and the reduction of public 
corruption.  It is thought that citizens with higher levels of post-secondary education are 
less tolerant of public corruption by elected officials.  The more educated the citizenry is, 
the more likely it is that citizens are informed and will question the decisions of county 
officials.  While it may be argued that elected officials with advanced educational degrees 
are less corrupt, Lipset (1960) suggests that communities with higher levels of education 
are also less corrupt, a factor this research study proposes to explore.  It is thought that 
citizens with higher levels of education are more likely to analyze and review information 
before final acceptance of decisions by elected officials.  
Labor Force 
 Research Question 13: What is the relationship between the unemployment rates 
 of communities and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 13: The greater the unemployment rate is, more likely there is public 
 corruption.  
 It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between labor force (measured as 
the percentage of the unemployment rate in the county) and public corruption.  High 
unemployment rates in communities suggest that citizens are more concerned with 
seeking employment opportunities and providing for their families than with monitoring 
the activities of county officials.  It is thought that a high rate of unemployment results in 
an unstable community and a higher degree of transience.  Individuals may be more 
inclined to relocate to communities where employment opportunities are greater. 
Additionally, a high unemployment rate could be an indicator for high levels of crime in 
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communities.  It is posited that high unemployment in communities would result in 
public corruption.  Poor communities with a high degree of crime suggest citizens who 
are focused on survival, with limited time to watch the activities of government and 
elected officials.  This would likely result in more opportunities for public corruption.  
Age of Community (65 years and older) 
 Research Question 14: What is the relationship between the age of community 
 populations and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 14: Communities with a higher level of older people are less likely to 
 experience public corruption. 
 It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between the age of the community 
population (measured as the percentage of the county’s population 65 years and older) 
and public corruption.  It is thought that citizens who are retired have more leisure time, 
and thus opportunity, to monitor government activities through the behaviors and 
decisions of their elected officials.  In their study of corruption, Menzel and Benton 
(1991) theorized that retirees have more wisdom and moral maturation and demand a 
higher standard of ethics from officials, while Hunt (2004) found that older people are 
less likely to engage in illegal activities and acts of corruption.  The moral-development 
theory presented by Kohlberg (1976) may apply to older citizens, in that they have a 
different perspective and are more concerned with the ethical outlook of elected officials 
than younger and middle-age citizens.  Indeed, Menzel and Benton (1991) suggested that 
senior citizens are more inclined to stop public corruption and wrongdoing by tracking 
the actions of elected officials, the behavior of officials, and government spending 
patterns.  It is posited that, in communities with large populations of older citizens, there 
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is a greater chance that corruption in county government does not occur or occurs to a 
lesser degree. 
 Population Growth 
 Research Question 15: What is the relationship between a county’s population 
 growth and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 15: The greater the county’s population growth rate, the more likely it 
 is public corruption will occur. 
 It is posited that a positive correlation exists between population growth (measured 
as one-year change in total population) and public corruption.  An increase in population 
generates more revenues for county budgets, which results in more expenditures (e.g., for 
grants and contracts), hence more opportunities for misappropriation of funds.  No 
previous research studies have explored the relationship between the level of population 
growth and public corruption.  It is thought, however, that the more flexibility officials 
have to spend newly generated revenues from growth, the greater the opportunity for 
misappropriation of funds and, therefore, for elected county officials to engage in corrupt 
activities.  
Ratio of County Population to State Population 
 Research Question 16: What is the relationship between the ratio of the county 
 population to the state population and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 16: The greater the ratio of the population of the county to that of the 
 state, the more likely public corruption is to occur within the county. 
 It is thought that a positive correlation exists between counties where the majority of 
the state’s population resides (measured as the percentage of the county population 
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compared to the state population) and public corruption.  While no previous studies have 
examined the relationship between the ratio of the county population to the state 
population and public corruption, it is thought that corruption is more likely to occur in 
large urban counties because they tend to generate the majority of revenues for the state. 
Elected officials in large urban counties have greater responsibilities, power, and sense of 
privilege or entitlement, which present opportunities to violate the law or engage in acts 
of public corruption. 
Per Capita Income 
 Research Question 17: What is the relationship between per capita income and 
 public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 17: A high rate of per capita income results in less public corruption. 
 It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between a county’s per capita income 
(measured as the annual per capita income for the county population) and public 
corruption.  The overall wealth of a community is an indicator of whether it will tolerate 
public corruption.  Alam (1995) and Jain (2001) point out that income inequality or low-
level per capita income can promote higher levels of corruption.  
 It is thought that the higher the levels of wealth within a county’s population, the 
fewer the opportunities for officials to engage in undetected corrupt behavior.  It is 
theorized that citizens of communities with a higher level of income are more inclined to 
monitor the actions, behaviors, and political decision-making of elected officials.  The 
income of a community can also have a negative effect on the behavior of individuals, 
however, because they may feel a financial isolation that results in negative behavior, as 
outlined in GST.  
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Political Party Affiliation 
 Research Question 18: What is the relationship between the political party of 
 commissioners and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 18: Democratic county officials will more likely generate an increase 
 in public corruption. 
 It is thought that a positive correlation exists between a Democratic commission 
(measured as the number of counties with a Democratic majority on the county 
commission) and public corruption.  A few studies (Amundsen 1999; Meier and 
Holbrook 1992) have examined the relationship between party affiliation and public 
corruption, while others have analyzed whether one party is often the target of political 
corruption investigations by the governing majority.  It is thought that when corruption 
becomes the focus of voters’ attention, political games are used to create the perception 
of corruption in the opposing party, which then becomes the focus in many corruption 
cases or situations.  Research in this area has found no concrete evidence that party 
affiliation creates a greater degree of public corruption, but it is presumed that when a 
majority of county commissioners are affiliated with one party, public corruption among 
elected officials is more likely to happen.  There is no concrete evidence to support this 
factor, but this research study will analyze data to determine if such a relationship exists.  
This study proposes to evaluate the possibility that party affiliation is a contributing 
factor to the likelihood of public corruption in county government. 
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Table 4-6. General Model: Community Characteristics Domain 
Specific Research Question Related Hypothesis 
Q9: What is the relationship between poverty rate and 
public corruption? 
H9: (+) A positive relationship exists between more 
impoverished communities and public corruption. 
Q10: What is the relationship between communities’ 
crime rate and public corruption? 
H10: (+) A positive relationship exists between high 
crime rates in communities and public corruption. 
Q11: What is the relationship between the civic 
involvement of communities and public corruption? 
H11: (-) A negative relationship exists between 
communities with high social capital/civic involvement 
and public corruption. 
Q12: What is the relationship between secondary 
education in a community and public corruption? 
H12: : (-) A negative relationship exists between the 
educational level of the community and public 
corruption. 
Q13: What is the relationship between unemployment 
and public corruption? 
H13: (+) A positive relationship exists between 
communities with a high unemployment rate and public 
corruption. 
Q14: What is the relationship between the age of 
community populations and public corruption? 
H14. (-) A negative relationship exists between 
communities with a younger population and public 
corruption. 
Q15: What is the relationship between a county’s 
population growth and public corruption? 
H15: (+) A positive relationship exists between county 
population growth and public corruption. 
Q16: What is the relationship between the ratio of a 
county’s population to the state population and public 
corruption? 
H16: (+) A positive relationship exists between the ratio 
of the county’s population to the state population and 
public corruption. 
Q17: What is the relationship between the per capita 
income in a community and public corruption? 
H17: (-) A negative relationship exists between per capita 
income in a community and public corruption. 
Q18: What is the relationship between political party 
affiliation and public corruption? 
H18: (+) A positive relationship exists between political 
party affiliation and public corruption. 
Government Characteristics Domain 
 This section of the research study seeks to examine various governmental 
characteristics that may prevent corruption—an inspector general, ethics laws, 
management structure, transparency/open meeting laws—to determine if any have a 
correlation to public corruption.  It is thought that these factors contribute to the 
sustainability of good government.  
 It is theorized that government characteristics may have an influence on the 
decisions of elected county officials to engage in corrupt activities.  If this premise is 
proven valid, corruption most likely would be an unacceptable obstacle to a good 
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government, one which citizens believe in and trust.  Philp (1987) describes “a just 
society which preserves the liberty and security of each citizen,” a society in which 
citizens “under a wise system of laws and institutions, good customs and proper mores… 
are capable of identifying their own good and the common good.” (p. 7).  Banfield (1958) 
says, “Corruption on the other hand can lead to a breakdown in shared concerns and 
results in factional pursuit of special interests and a reliance on coercion over consensus.  
In these situations, coercion indicates a corrupt or corrupted state, perverted and rotten, 
where every person is on guard against everyone else in a society of amoral familism” (p. 
9). 
 It is through government that officials exercise influence over decisions, and often 
they are able to operate with a high degree of discretion.  Governments sometimes 
provide an environment wherein officials are able to conceal their behavior and use 
power and authority for self-benefit.  Elected officials face great temptations in a corrupt 
government environment, and enormous pressure to bend to special interests can 
supersede good judgment (Caiden 1988). 
 To explore the role of government characteristics, this study will use five factors 
thought to measure this domain: (1) ethics laws, (2) management structure, (3) an 
inspector general’s office, (4) transparency and open meeting laws, and (5) employment 






Ethics Laws  
 Research Question 19: What is the relationship between ethics laws and public 
 corruption? 
 Hypothesis 19: The more stringent the ethics laws, the less likely public 
 corruption is to occur. 
 It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between ethics laws (measured as 
highly effective or less effective ethics laws, based on penalties for violations) and public 
corruption.  The primary purpose of ethics legislation is the reduction of the influence of 
money, special interests, and private-sector businesses on public officials.  Over the 
years, studies have confirmed a possible link between the effectiveness of stringent ethics 
laws and the discouragement of unethical behavior by elected officials, but there is little 
research to link ethical decision-making by county officials to public corruption (Caiden 
1988; Tanzi 1998).  This study seeks to add to that body of knowledge and determine if 
ethic laws can influence an official’s decision to engage in unethical behavior.  
 Ethics measures are generally popular with constituents, particularly if the laws are 
effective in cleaning up government and reducing the influence of special interests 
(Mayer 2001).  The literature review supported the notion that ethics laws are effective 
and can reduce corruption within government.  The literature also suggested that public 
support for ethics laws, or any good-government legislation, comes mainly from wealthy 
and urban constituents (McFarland 1984; Skowronek 1982).  
 However, there are some contradictions on the effectiveness of ethic laws in 
reducing public corruption.  According to Menzel and Benton (1991), “There is scant 
evidence to suggest that the adoption of ethics codes by city and counties or even by 
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professional associations has made any real difference in the number of ethical 
transgressions committed by appointed and elected officials” (p. 419).  This contradiction 
is the justification for the study review.  
Management Structure of Government 
 Research Question 20: What is the relationship between the management 
 structure of government and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 20: Under a county manager form of government, there is less public 
 corruption. 
 It is posited that a negative correlation exists between government structures 
(measured as the percentage of corruption cases identified under a county manager form 
of government) and public corruption.  In the past, various structural reforms in 
American politics have been viewed as influencing public corruption; some were even 
thought to deter corruption.  Wilson (1966) suggests that a fragmented political system, 
with no central manager, opens doors for politicians and others to manipulate government 
for their own gain and is a stimulus to corruption.  Meier et al. (1992) found “fragmented 
political systems make public officials less visible and thus reduce the perceived 
probability that corrupt actions will be discovered” (p. 143).  However, it is thought that 
political systems under a county manager form of government can result in fewer 
opportunities for public corruption.  Under this type of system, the county manager 
controls expenditures, budget, contracts, and staff, while elected officials make policy.  
 The National Association of Counties identifies four active structures of government 
used today: (a) Commission-Administrator (county manager), (b) Commission, 
(c) Commission-County Executive, and (d) parishes and consolidated governments.  The 
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various forms of government employed by the study sample were included in the 
research study to determine if a correlation exists between a particular form of county 
government and public corruption.  
 Under a county manager form of government, the administrative staff oversees 
management, day-to-day operations, and the implementation of policies, contracts, and 
services as directed by the elected board.  It is believed that under this system of 
government, there is less opportunity for public corruption among elected officials 
(Wilson 1966).  Rose-Ackerman (1999) writes that “legislatures frequently delegate 
implementation to the executive; I have already argued that this is a desirable way to 
limit political corruption” (p. 146).  
Office of Inspector General  
 Research Question 21: What is the relationship between county governments that 
 employ an inspector general to monitor the ethical behavior of officials and 
 public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 21: County governments with an inspector general have fewer 
 opportunities for public corruption. 
 It is posited that a negative correlation exists between having an inspector general 
(measured as county governments with an Office of the Inspector General) and public 
corruption.  Corruption can destroy a government system and damage the public’s trust. 
According to Ketti (2006), “it may be impossible to eliminate corruption in the United 
States.  Regulations against corrupt practices and legislation to increase government 
transparency have reduced corruption by examining government closely to weed out 
waste, fraud, and abuse.”  
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 However, it is thought that using an inspector general as a method of reducing 
corruption can benefit local governments, since the primary goal of an inspector general 
is to restore public trust in government by enforcing honesty and integrity in business 
practices.  Research suggests that Congress enacted the Inspector General’s Act in the 
late 1970s to help restore public trust and eliminate government waste.  No supporting 
empirical studies have been found that determine what significance an inspector general’s 
office may play in reducing corruption in county government, but creation of such an 
office could reduce the level of public corruption in large urban counties.  It is theorized 
that an inspector general will reduce corruption and restore public trust. 
Open Meeting Laws / Transparency 
 Research Question 22: What is the relationship between county governments with 
 open meeting law provisions and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 22: County governments with strict open meeting laws provide 
 transparency and are less likely to result in public corruption. 
 It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between open meeting laws 
(measured as the level of transparency within the county government) and public 
corruption.  Integrity in governance can largely be associated with a great degree of 
transparency (Menzel 2005).  Governments whose policies stress openness, and which 
value open meeting laws, are less likely to encounter public corruption among elected 
officials.  Conversely, governments and elected officials that are less concerned about 
providing open government and conducting business transparently can create an 
environment prone to corruption.  Tanzi (1998) suggests, “The lack of transparency in 
rules, laws, and processes creates a fertile ground for corruption.  Rules are often 
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confusing; the documents specifying them are not publicly available; and, at times, the 
rules are changed without properly publicized announcements” (p. 575).  
 It is thought that an environment supporting open meeting law provisions can 
provide positive opportunities for elected officials and the political decision-making 
process.  An open government creates an environment for citizens to become more 
involved, closer to their government and its officials, so it reduces corrupt activities 
(Maxwell and Winters 2004).  It is believed that transparency within a government’s 
management structure allows citizens the opportunity to observe the decisions of elected 
officials.  Support of an open government from public officials suggests that their 
decisions, behavior, and transactions are open to review by citizens, the media, and 
watchdog groups.  The integrity of governance can be associated with its degree of 
transparency (Menzel 2005).      
Employment Growth 
 Research Question 23: What is the relationship between county government 
 employment growth and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 23: The greater the employment growth of county government, the 
 more likely public corruption is to exist in county government. 
 It is postulated that a positive correlation exists between employment growth in 
county government (measured as a one-year change in employment growth) and public 
corruption.  An increase in the number of employees indicates an increase in government 
revenue and a high rate of activity, both of which offer more opportunities for 
disbursement of funds and may, therefore, increase the rate of corruption.  Presumably, a 
healthier financial environment and positive economic conditions for county government 
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provide more opportunities for corruption to occur among county officials.  Although no 
studies have examined the relationship between the level of employment growth and 
public corruption, it is thought that governments experience more spending flexibility 
with higher levels of employment growth, resulting in greater opportunities for 
corruption.  
Table 4-7. General Model: Government Characteristics Domain 
Specific Research Question Related Hypothesis 
Q19: What is the relationship between ethics laws and 
public corruption? 
H19: (-) A negative relationship exists between a 
county government with stringent ethics laws and 
public corruption. 
Q 20: What is the relationship between the structure/ 
charter of county government and public corruption? 
H20: (-) A negative relationship exists between a 
county manager form of government and public 
corruption. 
Q21: What is the relationship between an inspector 
general’s office and public corruption? 
H21: (-) A negative relationship exists between a 
county government with an inspector general and 
public corruption. 
Q22: What is the relationship between a county 
government with open meeting law provisions and 
public corruption? 
H22: (-) A negative relationship exists between 
governments with weak open meeting law provisions 
and public corruption. 
Q23: What is the relationship between employment 
growth in county government and public corruption? 
H23: (+) A positive relationship exists between 
employment growth in county government and public 
corruption. 
 
Fiscal Stability of Government Domain 
 The explanatory factor of government fiscal stability in public corruption is not a 
new phenomenon, but merits a review of the research to determine if the fiscal stability of 
county government has an impact on elected county officials’ decisions to engage in 
public corruption and, if it does, what elements contribute to the decisions of elected 
officials one way or the other.  
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 Early on, scholars began to recognize that corruption has enormous economic and 
political consequences on government, creating economic inefficiencies.10
 Researchers have suggested that government audits, oversight procedures and 
committees, and effective financial policies can deter corruption (Wilson 1966; Walsh 
1978; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Fuchs 1986; Klitgaard 1988).  This study proposes to 
examine the effect that county government financial stability and financial policies have 
on public corruption. 
   The literature 
suggests a correlation between the level of economic prosperity and corruption: “As a 
country grows richer the level of corruption decreases” (Amundsen 1999, p. 15). 
Determining the impact of fiscal stability on local governments and public corruption 
thus becomes pertinent to explaining the presence of corruption within local county 
governments.  For instance, one can plausibly argue that the fiscal stability of 
government has the potential to reduce opportunities for corruption; the effectiveness of 
fiscal policies, stringent government oversight and regulations, and revenue growth are 
all positive factors that benefit governments and reduce the temptations of public 
corruption.  
 To understand the influence of government financial stability on public corruption, 
three attributes were proposed for inclusion in this study: (1) financial stability, 
(2) federal and state aid, and (3) audit capacity.  These factors provided an opportunity to 
measure key components of the fiscal characteristics of county government and were 
used to develop research questions and hypotheses.  The following subsections present 
                                                 
10 Early works that recognized the adverse political and economic consequences of corruption include 
Rose-Ackerman (1978 and 1999), Huntington (1968), and Heidenheimer et al. (1989). 
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the specific research questions and related hypotheses for the domain of government 
fiscal characteristics.  
Financial Stability 
 Research Question 24: What is the relationship between the financial stability of 
 county government and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 24: The greater the financial stability of county government, the more 
 likely public corruption is to occur.  
 It is thought that a positive correlation exists between the financial stability of county 
government (measured as the county’s bond rating and annual expenditures) and public 
corruption.  The bond rating (Exhibit II) of a county government indicates its financial 
stability: the higher the rating is, the more financially stable the county is and the more 
likely it is that funds are available.  It is believed that in financially healthier counties, 
more funds are available to finance and fund capital projects, creating more chances for 
public corruption to occur.  It is also thought that fiscal stability in government represents 
security, confidence, and consistent productivity.  Bond rating is a good indicator of 
fiscal stability. 
 The literature review showed that many scholars have concluded that when large 
sums of money are available for funding projects, including special projects, then access 
to government funds opens the door to temptation for corruption (Berg et al. 1976; 
Wilson 1966; Maxwell 2004).  Goel and Nelson (1998) believed that public spending by 
a local government with an excessive availability of funds and little oversight is an 
indicator for political rent-seeking and, hence, corruption; more available funds produce 
more opportunities for corruption.  This study examines these conclusions.  
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 Conversely, other researchers believe that a decrease in expenditures can lower 
opportunities for disbursing funds, but still open the door to public corruption (Tanzi 
1998).  Fewer funds bring about more competition for grants and contracts, and people 
are willing to pay bribes to receive a share of the limited contracts available.  However, 
this study theorizes that sound financial policies and procedures can be a preventative 
measure for illicit behavior by politicians and bureaucrats.  It is hypothesized that “for the 
governmental policies to be effective, however, the bureaucracies must actually 
implement them.  Hence it becomes crucial that officials not be influenced, through graft, 
to deviate from their appointed task” (Leff 1964).  
 Ackerman (1999) suggested that economic distress and unexpected population 
growth could increase the demand for government services, create situations of instability 
within a government, and lead to opportunities for corruption.  It is evident that the factor 
of financial stability produces two lines of opinion: more funds available can open the 
door to corruption, but a lack of dollars can also provide opportunities for corruption. 
Federal and State Aid  
 Research Question 25: What is the relationship between federal and state aid and 
 public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 25: Counties receiving greater federal and state aid are more likely to 
 experience public corruption. 
 It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between federal and state aid 
(measured as the amount of federal and state aid provided to the county during the year of 
conviction and as the amount of federal and state aid in proportion to the total 
expenditures of the county) and public corruption.  
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 Federal law enforcement agencies monitor local governments’ activities when 
substantial sums of aid are appropriated from the federal government.  It is thought that 
high levels of federal and state aid may result in public corruption because they afford 
county officials more flexibility in the spending of tax dollars, often with little direct 
oversight.  Federal officials usually conduct audits long after grants have been awarded 
and projects closed out.  These opportunities encourage county officials to grant contracts 
and allocate dollars to friends and political supporters, increasing the opportunity for 
personal gain.  Researchers have also suggested that the size of a government budget may 
be related to the level of corruption (La Palombara 1994).  As noted above, Goel and 
Nelson (1998) believed that public spending of local government is an indicator for rent-
seeking activities and corruption.  
Auditors 
 Research Question 26: What is the relationship between the audit capacity of 
 county  government and public corruption? 
 Hypothesis 26: Counties with an independent internal auditing capacity are less 
 likely to experience public corruption. 
 It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between independent auditing 
(measured as independent government audits) and public corruption.  Independent audits 
are a valuable tool in fighting public corruption; they can provide checks and balances in 
government to ensure that expenditures of public funds are appropriate and proper. 
Audits provide greater assurance that corruption can be limited, and can even deter its 
spread; matched with prudent financial policies and procedures, audits can be a powerful 
preventative measure against illicit political behavior.  Rose-Ackerman (1999) states, “In 
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a government with strong checks and balances, no public institution is all-powerful” (p. 
144).  The monitoring and enforcement functions of an independent audit can serve as 
effective anticorruption strategies and useful tools in the oversight of government budgets 
and expenditures, ensuring that government funds are properly appropriated and used for 
government projects.  
 Independent audit functions are more effective in the county manager form of 
government, where they are not under the control of elected officials.  An autonomous 
independent auditor can remove political influence and the pressures that can be created 
if the function is managed by elected county officials.  To ensure the effectiveness of an 
independent audit function, audits and financial reports should be published and made 
available for public review.  Openness and accountability are positive measures for 
elected officials and provide the public with a level of confidence and trust. 
 The literature review showed that “a great use of audits to enable legislatures to deter 
corruption is advocated by many researchers” (Wilson 1966, p. 31; Walsh 1978; Rose-
Ackerman 1978, p. 216; Fuchs 1986, p. 113; and Klitgaard 1988, p. 53).  It is thought that 
audits will likely detect corrupt actions and can therefore deter corruption (Gardiner and 
Lyman 1990).  
Prudent fiscal policies established under audit guidelines are positive alternatives to 
protect the expenditures of government funds and possibly reduce corruption 
opportunities.  This study reviews the impact of independent audits to determine if 




Table 4-8. General Model: Government Fiscal Oversight Domain 
Specific Research Question Related Hypothesis 
Q24: What is the relationship between the financial 
stability of a county government and public 
corruption?  
H24: (+) A positive relationship exists between the 
financial stability of a county government and public 
corruption. 
Q25: What is the relationship between federal and 
state aid to county government and public 
corruption? 
H25: (+) A positive relationship exists between a 
county government receiving federal and state aid 
and public corruption. 
Q26: What is the relationship between the audit 
capacity of county government and public 
corruption? 
H26: (-) A negative relationship exists between a 
county government with internal audit provisions and 
public corruption.  
General Model of Public Corruption 
 As previously discussed, the purpose of this research study is to examine and explain 
the factors believed to contribute to the public corruption of elected county officials.  
Figure 4-1 depicts the General Model of public corruption.  The top row symbolizes the 
general theme of public corruption; the second row indicates the four broad domains 
thought to influence it.  Listed below each domain are the corresponding covariates 





Figure 4-1. General Model of Public Corruption. 
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FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
County-Level Characteristics 
    This chapter of the research study presents the analyses, findings, and testing of the 
hypotheses for the General Models for both county-level and individual-level 
characteristics.  As explained in Chapter 1, there were four purposes of this research 
study:  
1. To explain what variables are likely to predict public corruption among elected 
county officials. 
2. To examine the predictive variables in which two groups of county officials took 
divergent roads in their political career, one group opting to engage in corrupt 
behavior and the other opting not to engage in corrupt behavior. 
3. To provide a plausible model that could explain the behavior of elected county 
officials who chose to engage in public corruption.  
4. To identify the characteristics that influence public corruption. 
 The initial process used in developing the General Models for this study included an 
outline of characteristics thought to be predictors or factors that influence the behavior of 
county officials and result in the negative behavior of public corruption.  As previously 
discussed, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, indicating whether an 
elected official did or did not commit public corruption.  The independent variables 
related to county-level data included 18 covariates for three domains: government 
characteristics, financial characteristics, and community characteristics (Chapter 4 
discusses these covariates in detail).  Data for these variables were gathered from 
counties with populations of 300,000 or more.  
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 These 18 variables are thought to influence the behavior of elected officials.  
Throughout the research effort, it was theorized that GST was a factor influencing an 
elected official's behavior.  Including all variables within the domains allowed a broad 
explanatory power for the General Model and enhanced the outcome of this study. 
Appendix V provides a detailed list of negative strains that influence behavior.  GST was 
incorporated when interpreting the results of the analysis and is a contributing factor that 
influences behavior.  
 The original data set included two data set categories, county level and individual 
level, and incorporated a two-step process that involved county-level data and individual-
level data.  The county-level data set consisted of 173 counties over 10 years, though the 
final analysis only incorporated 117 counties; as previously stated, 56 counties did not 
respond to the request for information.  
 The individual-level data set consisted of 180 elected officials within 26 counties 
over a 10-year span.  The analysis for the individual-level data set incorporated only 155 
individuals; 25 individuals were excluded from the study because they could not be 
located or were deceased.  
General Model: Corruption and County-Level Characteristics 
 The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure coded “1” for committing 
corruption and “0” for not committing corruption.  There are 18 independent variables for 
county-level predictors.  The variables for government characteristics were an inspector 
general’s office, ethics laws, structure of government, open meeting laws, and 
employment growth.  The variables for county financial characteristics were per capita 
income, financial stability, federal and state aid, and outside auditors.  The variables for 
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community characteristics were poverty, percentage of the community 65 years or older, 
crime rate, civic involvement, labor force, education level of the community, population 
growth, ratio of the county population to the overall state population, and party 
affiliation.  All these variables aimed to assess the effect county characteristics have on 
the decisions of elected officials to commit public corruption or not.  
Descriptive Data Analysis 
 Descriptive data analysis, which is a preliminary review of the results, is an 
important element of any research study.  Bivariate descriptive statistics provide a 
framework to describe and examine the characteristics of the dependent variables and 
covariates.  The information from bivariate data analysis provides a simple summary of 
the sample and the measures used.  Bivariate descriptive analysis also provides a 
powerful summary of data, e.g., measurements of central tendency, distribution, and 
dispersion.  It describes what is, or what the data in the research study shows, and it 
reduces data into simple summaries. 
 Table 5-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all county-level dependent 
variables.  In general, the preliminary analyses using the bivariate statistics concluded 
that 4 of the 18 predictors—auditors, community education, Democratic commission, and 
federal and state aid—were significant indicators.  Statistics showed that 71.8 percent of 
counties utilized auditors; in 54.7 percent of counties, fewer than 30 percent of residents 
had a college education; 46.2 percent of counties had majority Democratic boards; and 
ethics laws were not stringent enough to reduce corruption in 52.9 percent of counties. 
County government structures indicated that 59.8 percent did not have a professional 
manager overseeing the day-to-day operations of the county. 
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Table 5-1. County-Level Characteristics 




Auditor***   
No Auditor (0) 33 28.21 
Auditor (1) 84 71.79 
Total 117 100 
   
Inspector General   
No Inspector General (0) 108 92.31 
Inspector General (1) 9 7.69 
Total 117 100 
   
Ed. Community***   
Less than 30% college (0) 64 54.70 
More than 30% college (1) 53 45.30 
Total 117 100 
   
Open Meeting Law   
Not effective (0) 69 58.97 
Effective (1) 48 41.03 
Total 117 100 
   
Ethics Laws   
Not Stringent (0) 62 52.99 
Stringent (1) 55 47.01 
Total 117 100 
   
Structure of Govt.   
No Commiss./Manager (0) 70 59.83 
Commission (1) 47 40.17 
Total 117 100 
   
Democratic Commission***   
No Democratic Commissioners (0) 63 53.85 
Democratic Commissioners (1) 54 46.15 
Total 117 100 
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Table 5-2 presents descriptive statistics for those cases of the dependent variables that 
represented "no corruption."  While 76.9 percent of counties in which there was no 
corruption used auditors, the community education variable showed that in 49.4 percent 
of these counties, fewer than 30 percent of residents had a college education.  Counties 
with majority Democratic boards and no corruption came in at 38.4 percent and, at 53.8 
percent, the ethics laws variable indicated that such laws were stringent in counties with 
cases of no public corruption.  County government structures indicated that 63.7 percent 
did not have a professional manager overseeing day-to-day operations of the county 
where there were no cases of corruption. 
Table 5-2. County-Level Characteristics 
Bivariate Statistics  
County-level data (chi squared) 
Variable 
No Corruption (0) 
Freq % 
Auditor***   
No Auditor (0) 21 23.08 
Auditor (1) 70 76.92 
Total 91 100 
   
Inspector General   
No Inspector General (0) 86 94.51 
Inspector General (1) 5 5.49 
Total 91 100 
   
Ed. Community***   
Less than 30% college (0) 45 49.45 
More than 30% college (1) 46 50.55 
Total 91 100 
   
Open Meeting Law   
Not effective (0) 55 60.44 
Effective (1) 36 39.56 
Total 91 100 
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Variable 
No Corruption (0) 
Freq % 
   
Ethics Laws   
Not Stringent (0) 42 46.15 
Stringent (1) 49 53.85 
Total 91 100 
   
Structure of Govt.   
No Commiss./Manager (0) 58 63.74 
Commission (1) 33 36.26 
Total 91 100 
   
Democratic Commission***   
No Democratic Commissioners (0) 56 61.54 
Democratic Commissioners (1) 35 38.46 
Total 91 100 
 
 Table 5-3 presents descriptive statistics for those cases of the dependent variables 
that represented "corruption." Interestingly, 53.8 percent of counties in which there was 
corruption used auditors.  Fewer than 30 percent of residents had a college education in 
73.0 percent of the counties.  The party affiliation variable showed that 73.0 percent of 
counties with corruption had majority Democratic boards, and ethics laws were equally 
distributed (50%) between stringent and not stringent for counties with cases of public 
corruption.  County government structures indicated that 53.8 percent of counties with 
public corruption had a professional manager overseeing the day-to-day operations of 
county government.  
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Table 5-3. County-Level Characteristics 
Bivariate Statistics  




Auditor***   
No Auditor (0) 12 46.15 
Auditor (1) 14 53.85 
Total 26 100 
   
Inspector General   
No Inspector General (0) 22 84.63 
Inspector General (1) 4 15.38 
Total 26 100 
   
Ed. Community***   
Less than 30% college (0) 19 73.08 
More than 30% college (1) 7 26.92 
Total 26 100 
   
Open Meeting Law   
Not effective (0) 14 53.85 
Effective (1) 12 46.15 
Total 26 100 
   
Ethics Laws   
Not Stringent (0) 13 50 
Stringent (1) 13 50 
Total 26 100 
   
Structure of Govt.   
No Commiss./Manager (0) 12 46.15 
Commission (1) 14 53.85 
Total 26 100 
   
Democratic Commission***   
No Democratic Commissioners (0) 7 26.92 
Democratic Commissioners (1) 19 73.08 
Total 26 100 
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 Table 5-4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the remaining covariates in the 
county-level characteristics category of the General Model.  The variables are listed in 
order by domain: county government characteristics, government fiscal performance 





Table 5-4. Descriptive Statistics for General Model: County-Level Characteristics 
Variable Name 
No Corruption Corruption Total 
Description 
Mean Std N = Mean Std N = Mean Std N = 
Employment Growth 6.78 (18.11) 90 7.74 (18.48) 26 6.99 (18.12) 116 Ratio of county government growth in employment in a given year 
Financial Stability 2.244 (1.775) 86 4.038 (2.599) 26 2.660 (2.124) 112 General obligation bond rating : 1 = Aa1 through 17 = Caa1 
Federal & State 
Aid*** 20.329 (0.6759) 91 14.846 (1.971) 26 19.111 (.7117) 117 
Ratio of federal, state, and 
intergovernmental transfer to total 
revenues in a given year 
Poverty 10.210 (3.811) 91 15.357 (6.699) 26 11.354 (5.056) 117 Annualized total households living below the federal poverty level in any given year 
Age of Community 
65+ 11.362 (3.426) 91 12.069 (4.622) 26 11.519 (3.714) 117 
Annualized percentage of population 65 
and older to the total population 
Crime Rate 528.50 (212.50) 91 595.61 (233.66) 26 543.42 (218.14) 117 Annualized average federal crime rate in any given year 
Civic Involvement 51.94 (9.277) 91 46.46 (17.716) 26 50.72 (11.817) 117 
Annualized percentage of voter 
participation during a general election in 
any given year 
Population Growth 7.099 (6.082) 91 6.554 (7.379) 26 6.978 (6.363) 117 One-year percentage change in total population 
% County Pop. vs. 
State Pop. 9.903 (9.544) 91 16.038 (19.414) 26 11.266 (12.588) 117 
Ratio of total county population to total 
state population 
Labor Force 7.201 (1.757) 91 8.649 (2.688) 26 7.522 (2.078) 117 Annualized unemployment rate in any given year 









Annual average per capita income level of 
the total population in any given year 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Logit Regression Analysis - Corruption and County-Level Characteristics 
 The objective of this research is to identify county-level characteristics likely to 
predict the maximum probability of elected county officials committing public 
corruption.  A logit regression analysis will assist in identifying the predictors and can 
determine if any of the variables are related to negative strains that may also influence the 
behavior of public officials.   The analysis will identify variables that may be related to 
GST and provide a theoretical explanation of county-level characteristics likely to 
influence elected officials' decisions to commit acts of criminal public corruption.  
 The General Model category for county-level data included 18 independent variables 
used to predict the potential for public corruption.  Table 5-5 presents the results of the 
logit analysis for the general model.  The results of the analysis suggest that the 
likelihood ratio chi-square of 66.27 tells us the model as a whole fits and that the 
inclusion of the independent variable significantly improved the model’s explanatory 
power.  A review of the coefficients provide support for the role of five variables 
(Auditor, Per Capita Income, Financial Stability, Poverty and County Population) in 
explaining the likelihood of county government experiencing corruption.  Two other 
variables, Inspector General and Community Education, had coefficients in the 
hypothesized direction but fell short of statistical significance.  The remaining eleven 
variable were neither significant nor in the predicted direction.  The coefficients are 
important and the standard measure in conducting a logit analysis.  However, it is much 
easier to explain the results if coefficient which are the log odds converted into odds ratio 
and this has been done in Table 5-5.  
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 It should be noted that in interpreting odds ratio that a value of 1.00 indicated that the 
odds of a county experiencing corruption by their county officials is even: neither more 
nor less likely.  A value below 1.00 indicates that the event is less likely to occur while a 
value above 1.00 would indicate a greater proponent for the event to happen.  
Table 5-5. Logistic Regression for Public Official Corruption Using  
County Level Predictors 
General Model 
Independent Variable Coefficient  Estimate  Std. Err.  z p Odds Ratio 
Constant -23.40 6.71 -3.49 0.00  
Inspector General -3.45 1.99 -1.73 .083  
Auditor -2.09 .969 -2.16 .031 .164 
Employment Growth .039 .030 1.29 .198  
Per Capita Income .0005 .0001 3.05 .002 1.0004 
Financial Stability  .715 .284 2.52 .012 1.728 
Federal & State Aid -.038 .028 -1.32 .186  
Poverty .586 .190 3.08 .002 1.7507 
Age of the Community .175 .117 1.49 .135  
Crime Rate -.0004 .001 -0.27 .790  
Civic Involvement -.040 .034 -1.16 .247  
Community Education -1.89 1.14 -1.65 .098  
Labor Force .145 .267 0.54 .587  
Population Growth .010 .059 0.18 .856  
County Population VS 
State Population  .074 .031 2.34 .019 1.064 
Open Meeting Laws -.852 .861 -0.99 .322  
Ethic Laws with no 
Penalties -.342 .899 -0.38 .704  
Commission Control Govt. .519 .898 0.58 .563  
Democrat Commission .295 .787 0.37 .708  
     
Number of observations: 111 
LR chi-squared: X2(17) =66.27, p<0.1 
Log likelihood: -27.28 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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 The results indicate that the model's statistically significant variables produced 
strong substantive effects: when measured against corruption, these five predictors were 
statistically significant.  The model fits sufficiently well, based on the results of the log 
likelihood test comparing the general model with the null constant only test. 
    The data for the variable auditor is statistically significant at p-value=.031.  The odds 
ratio is .1237and suggests that counties with auditors are less likely to experience public 
corruption.  In fact, one can say that they are 12% less likely to experience corruption 
than counties with no auditors.  As hypothesized, results indicate that auditors can reduce 
public corruption, could be a valuable tool to limit public corruption in government.   
    The results for the predictor per capita income were statistically significant at p-value 
= .002 and suggest that counties with a higher per capita income are slightly more likely 
to experience corruption among their public officials.  While, the performance of this 
variable suggests that counties with lower per capita income are less likely to experience 
public corruption than counties with high per capita income, it should be noted that the 
odds ratio is very close to 1.0 indicating only a marginal impact.  Per capita income 
within communities appears to influence the behavior of public officials.  It was theorized 
that the overall wealth of a community is a indicator of its tolerance for corruption.  
Initially it was hypothesized that wealthy communities would be less tolerant of public 
corruption; however, the data does not support this.   In addition, there was a presumption 
with this variable that GST is applicable.  With the belief, Agnew (2001) suggests, 
“create some pressure or incentive to engage in criminal activities as a coping 
mechanism” (p. 320).  
 However, this was not occurring in the corruption of county elected officials. 
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 The predicted probability for financial stability suggests that the greater the financial 
stability of county government, the more likely public corruption is to occur.  Financial 
stability was statistically significant at p-value= .012.  This result suggest that counties 
with a high bond rating are more likely to have public officials engage in acts of public 
corruption because the higher the bond rating, the greater the county's financial strength.  
In fact, the odds of corruption occurring is two times more likely for every unit increase 
in the bond rating.  The results of the analysis are consistent with the stated hypothesis, 
which held that public corruption was more likely to occur in counties with greater fiscal 
stability.  It turned out that higher bond ratings result in lower interest rates to borrow 
funds that can be used for capital projects, which can lead to corruption.  
    The predicted probability for poverty rate suggests that poverty influences the behavior 
of public officials.  This finding is consistent with the stated hypothesis, in which 
impoverished communities are more likely to have public officials who engage in 
corruption.  The coefficient measuring poverty is statistically significant at p-value= .002.  
The odd ratio is 1.80 indicates that a one unit increase in poverty will increase the 
likelihood of corruption by 80%.  The poverty variable is indicative of negative strains, 
and the probability exists of a relationship between poverty and GST.  This value 
increases because as poverty grows, corruption tends to increase.  Communities with a 
high rate of poverty would suggest a high rate of corruption.  Interesting there seems to 
be a contradiction in the results.  But the per capita income variable indicates that higher 
per capita income results in slightly more corruption.  It might be that large cities do 
indeed have two economic factors at play.  High poverty might create an environment 
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where corruption is tolerated and there are opportunities because communities have the 
resources to spend on government.  Those resources create an opportunity for corruption.  
    Finally, the predicted probability for percent of county population compared to state 
population is statistically significant at p-value = .019.  The finding shows that serving in 
counties whose population is a majority of the state’s population can influence the 
behavior of public officials.  The results suggest that as the population of such counties 
increases, corruption is likely to increase as well.  In fact, public officials serving in 
counties with a larger percentage of the state population are more likely to be corrupt.  
The results suggest that for every one unit change in the county population compared to 
the state population there is an 8% change in the probability of public corruption.  
Conversely, the results also suggest that public officials in counties with a lower 
percentage of the state’s population are less likely to engage in acts of corruption.  
    In sum, a majority of the hypothesis were not significant.  However, five variables 
were significant and were found to increase our understanding of when corruption might 
occur in county government.  
    Chapter 6 presents final comments and conclusions regarding the General Model 
analyses. 
Individual-Level Characteristics 
General Model: Corruption and Individual-Level Characteristics 
     Thus far the analysis has focused on explaining the characteristics of the counties 
where corrupted has occurred.  It should be obvious that even through some counties are 
more likely to experience corruption; it is highly unlikely that in every one of those 
counties all of the elected officials were guilty of participating in corruption.  The 
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research now turns to understanding if there are some characteristics of elected officials 
that might make them more likely to engage in corruption than other officials.  The data 
for this research are all those officials elected in a county where at least one county 
official was found to commit a corrupt act as we have defined corruption.  The dependent 
variable in this phase of analysis was a dichotomous measure coded "1" for any elected 
official found to engage in corruption and "0" for those not involved.  The information 
presented includes the eight predictors used in assessing which profile characteristics are 
likely to result in elected officials committing public corruption or not.  The independent 
variables for individual-level predictors were gender, marital status, age race, education, 
religious belief, tenure and outside employment.  Age was broken out into a series of 
dummy variables 
Descriptive Data Analysis 
    The initial analysis proceeds in two phases.  First, six of the eight variables lend 
themselves to analysis using simple 2x2 categorical analyses and that analysis is provided 
in Table 5-6.  Two other variables, level of formal education and tenure in office are 
continuous data and the analysis is presented in Table 5-7 as difference of means.  Table 
5-6 provides the bivariate analysis of six variables with the dependent variable 
corruption.  Some very interesting results appear in the table.  Three of the four dummy 
variables for age were relatively similar with anywhere from 20% to 28% of the age 
group participating in corruption.  However, elected officials in the 50 to 59--age range 
were more likely to participate in some corruption.  It would also appear that Race and 
Gender variables operated as hypothesized.  Non-white were more likely to engage in 
corruption than their white counterparts.  Males were more likely, by a significant 
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percentage (34% to 16%), to have participated in a corruptible act than females elected 
officials.  The data in Table 5-6 provides evidence that elected officials who did not see 
themselves as religious were more likely to engage in an illegal act 42% of the non- 
religious officials compared to only 18% of those categorized as religious.  Interestingly 
married officials were more prone to engage in illegal acts.    
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Table 5-6. Elected Officials Participation in an Act of Corruption 
by Individual Characteristics 
 
Corrupt 
Age 30- 39 Age 40- 49 Age 50- 59 Age 60- 69   
Age Group Other Age Group Other Age Group Other Age Group Other   
No 80% 71% 72% 72% 63% 77% 74% 72%   
Yes 20% 29% 28% 28% 37% 23% 26% 28%   
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%   
N= 15 140 43 112 52 103 27 128   
Corrupt 









White Non- White Male Female 
No 82% 58% 69% 83% 75% 70% 76% 67% 66% 85% 
Yes 18% 42% 31% 18% 25% 30% 24% 33% 34% 15% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N= 93 62 115 40 76 79 91 64 104 51 
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 The data in Table 5-6 that initially appears to not have any real explanatory powers 
was the variable measuring elected officials proclivity to hold another job beyond their 
elected position. 
 Table 5-7 we provide the results of the difference of means tests and it would appear 
that both variables appear to operate as expected.  Specifically, the longer one serves in 
office the more likely one was to have committed a corruptible act.  Education appears to 
play a mitigating role with increased education reducing the potential to find an elected 
official guilty.  
Table 5-7. Descriptive Statistics for Individual-Level Data 
Descriptive Statistics  
Individual-Level Data (T-Test) 
Variable 
Name No Corruption Corruption Total Description 




16.26 (2.27) 112 14.84 (2.50) 43 15.86 (2.41) 155 
Level of formal education: 
12=High school through 
20=Doctorate degree 
Tenure 6.87 (6.03) 112 9.34 (6.34) 43 7.56 (6.19) 155 Length of time in office, or tenure, expressed as the number of years 
 
Logit Regression Analysis - Corruption and Individual-Level Characteristics 
 While the initial analysis presented in Table 5-6 and 5-7 provide some support for 
the original analysis, a multivariate analysis needs to be employed to parse out the role 
each variable plays, holding other variables constant, in explaining which elected 
officials engaged in illegal activities.  A logit regression analysis will assist in identifying 
the predictors likely to result in public officials committing corruption, and can determine 
if any of the variables are negative strains that may influence their behavior.  
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Additionally, a review of the results will determine if GST provides a theoretical 
explanation of elected officials' decisions to commit acts of criminal public corruption.  
 The Logit Model category for individual-level data included eight independent 
variables used to predict the likelihood an official would engage in public corruption.  
Following are the results of the analysis for the model using logit regression analysis.  
The general model incorporates the eight covariates in this research study.  However, the 
variable age has been modified for the analysis in order to more clearly examine the 
hypothesis with regard to age.  Thus, there are now four dummy variables for four 
different age categories.  Elected officials over 70 serve the response group.  As a result, 
the analysis now discusses the results in the context of eleven variables.  As explained 
previously; logit regression analysis can aid in determining the probability of elected 
public officials committing public corruption.  The logit model presented in Table 5-8 
was statistically significant at the .001 level.  This level of chi-square significance 
indicates that the general model fit well compared to null constant only model.  In fact, 
the variables produced strong substantive effects.  The logit regression analysis, which 
incorporates eleven covariates with six shown to have statistically significant effects on 
corruption: (3 of the 4) age, faith, education and tenure.  
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Table 5-8. Logistic Regression for Individual Characteristics Used to Identify 





Estimate Std. Err. z p Odds Ratio 
Constant .365 2.03 0.18 .857  
Gender -.991 .585 -1.69 .090  
Age 30-39 (dummy variable) 1.90 1.02 1.86 .063  
Age 40-49 (dummy variable) 2.53 .840 3.02 .003 12.5535 
Age 50-59 (dummy variable) 2.27 .748 3.04 .002 9.6794 
Age 60-69 (dummy variable) 1.61 .826 1.96 .051 5.0028 
Race .783 .455 1.72 .085  
Faith .923 .468 1.97 .049 2.5169 
Marital Status .714 .561 1.27 .204  
Education -.322 .101 -3.17 .002 .7247 
Tenure .107 .036 2.92 .003 1.129 
Outside employment -.467 .480 -0.97 .331  
 
Number of observations: 155 
Wald chi-squared: X2(11) = 53.66, p<.001 
Log likelihood: -69.895 
Note: There is a robust standard error to clustering to counties for individual-level data  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.010. 
 
 The model predicts 78% of the corruption cases using individual level predictors.  A 
review of the coefficients suggest that six of the eleven variables in Table 5-8 aid in 
understanding when individual elected officials specifically, three of the dummy 
variables associated with age, the faith variable, education and tenure in office were 
statistically significant.  Two variables, outside employment and marital status, must be 
rejected.   Two other variables, Gender and Race, did not meet the stringent criteria of 
significance, these results were in the hypothesized direction, but they were not 
significant at a p-value < 0.05.  Thus, while the sign for gender suggest that female 
officials were less likely than male officials to commit public corruption, the results were 
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not significant.  While two studies, Mauro (1993 and LaPorta et al. (1999) found a 
relationship between race and public corruption, we were not able to confirm this.  
 The data for faith (or religious belief) are also consistent with the earlier bivariate 
analysis and suggest that public officials who do not demonstrate a religious faith are 2.5 
times more likely to commit public corruption than officials who do proclaim some 
strong religious belief system (p-value=.049).  
 The study's intent was to determine is an empirical connection exists between 
religion and corruption and it appears to exist.  Some researchers link religion to social 
environment, including trust and ethics: "Religion provides a language of ethics and, 
often an actual 'list of rules to live by'" (Marquette 2010, p.3).  Others suggest that public 
servants derive their ethical framework in part from their religious beliefs.  
  The results for the various age predictors compare four different categories of elected 
officials to the referent group of elected public officials 70 years and older.  Officials who 
are 40–49 years of age are 12.5 times more likely to commit an act of corruption than 
others (significant at p-value=.003).  Public officials who are 50–59 years of age were 
slightly less likely to be involved in criminal activities than the 40-49 years of age group, 
but were still more than 9 times more likely than the general populations of elected 
officials especially are plus 70 age group.   This downward trend continued for the next 
age category 60-69.  This last age group is significant (at the p<.051 level) and more than 
5 times more likely to be found guilty that the reference group.  All of the evidence 
would seem to suggest that as elected officials get older they become less likely to 
engage in corruption.  These results are contrary to the original hypothesis.  It might well 
be that younger officials are more likely to engage in acts of corruption as they try to 
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make their mark while older officials are established and financially secure (they may 
perhaps even be retired) and do not see the necessity to engage in risky criminal acts. 
 The information for formal education is supportive of the original hypothesis that the 
higher ones education level the lower the probability of engaging in corruption.  The odds 
ratio is .7247 and indicate that a one unit change in education decrease the probability of 
being involved in an act of corruption by 73%.  It was theorized that officials with a high 
school education or less would feel the pressure to engage in public corruption to 
improve their social and economic status.  Since education is viewed as a mark of social 
status and an indicator of economic achievement, it was believed that a person with a 
college degree would not have as much pressure to engage in public corruption.  The lack 
of education is viewed as a negative strain and should be a negative factor for officials 
without a college education, resulting in a greater likelihood of their committing the 
crime of public corruption; however, the findings did not support this theory.  
 These results for tenure suggest that officials who have more years in public office 
are slightly more likely to participate in criminal acts than officials with fewer years in 
office.  The results for the predictor tenure were statistically significant at p-value=.003 
and suggest that for a one unit increase in the years of service the odds of committing 
public corruption increases by .11%.  In sum, the findings for the results for tenure 
suggest that it influences the behavior of elected officials and is a predictor of corruption.  
 Finally, it appears GST influenced only one of the eight predictors chosen to 
measure individual profile characteristics of public officials.  The results suggest that the 
predictor age can influence the decisions of public officials in cases where there are 
141 
indictments or convictions of public corruption.  The predictor age was the only variable 
that produced significant results of GST.   
 Age is also a negative strain it can be viewed in the context of older officials with 
failing health, or in the context of young officials who lack social and financial security.  
Either would result in negative strain.  The determination that one of the individual 
variables within the model for individual-level characteristics was a negative strain and  
suggest that GST is a factor in the decisions of officials who commit public corruption 
when age is a consideration.  
 Although the results of the eight individual profile characteristics and there 
connection to GST did not produce substantial results it does however suggest age is a 







SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion and Summary of Results 
  This research study is intended to add to the body of knowledge about, and improve 
our understanding of, public corruption in county government and among elected county 
officials.  It seeks to explain those factors identified as predictors of public corruption and 
develop recommendations to improve further research on the topic.  To accomplish this 
task, two models were explored and developed: the first General Model, which examined 
county-level characteristics, and the second General Model, which examined the profile 
characteristics of public officials, along with the influence these characteristics play in 
the behavior of county officials who commit public corruption.  Consistent with the 
theoretical model, it was found that age, religious faith, education, tenure, auditor, per 
capita income, financial stability, poverty, and the percentage of county population 
compared to state population were all highly relevant to the likelihood of elected officials 
engaging in criminal activities.  
 Secondly, the study sought to determine the influence GST played in the behavior 
and decisions of public officials. 
General Model: County-Level Characteristics 
 The General Model of county-level characteristics contained in this study proposed 
18 hypotheses within the three domains of interest, and statistical significance was found 
for five of the covariates (p-values < 0.05): auditor, per capita income, financial stability, 
poverty, and percentage of county population compared to state population.  No 
statistically significant evidence of a relationship to public corruption was found for the 
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remaining 13 covariates: inspector general, ethics laws, county government structure, 
open meeting laws, employment growth, federal and state aid, age of the community, 
crime rate, civic involvement, community education, unemployment rate, population 
growth, and political party affiliation.  However, the results of this study suggest GST 
produced a cause-and-effect influence on two covariates: per capita income, and poverty.  
 First, this research examined the effect the auditor variable has on committing 
corruption.  The study determined that county governments with audit functions results in 
less corruption consistent with the literature.  The literature review (Wilson 1966, p. 31; 
Walsh 1978; Rose-Ackerman 1978, p. 216; Fuchs 1986, p. 113; Klitgaard 1988, p. 53) 
discovered that auditors in government deter public corruption and consequently decrease 
its incidence.  The research results validate the hypothesis that public corruption can be 
reduced when county governments use internal auditors and implement policies to 
monitor the spending of public funds.  Some governments that want to reduce public 
corruption have established internal audit divisions that are independent of elected 
officials’ influence.  The effectiveness of auditors depends on their ability to remain 
independent with no barriers, and their ability to report waste and fraud.  The independent 
nature of this function can influence the outcome; for example, this study found that 
county governments with independent auditors are less likely to experience corruption.  
Two possible explanations of the effectiveness of this covariate are (1) the fear of being 
caught, and (2) the effectiveness of an independent office free to report fraud and waste.  
  Second, research results showed the covariate per capita income appears to influence 
public corruption.  The logit model examined this factor and determined there was a 
significant, but small indication that the wealth of a community can determine its 
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tolerance (or lack thereof) for public corruption.  The results show that the greater the 
wealth of a community, the more likely it is to find corruption.   Authors such as 
Amundsen (1999) and Maxwell and Winters (2004) suggest that citizens residing in 
communities with high per capita incomes, or civic-minded citizens, are more 
knowledgeable about the activities of their elected officials and more inclined to monitor 
those activities, and as a result, corruption decreases.  The results of the study suggest the 
opposite; communities with high per capita income, corruption is more likely to exist.  
The result of the analysis was inconsistent with the hypothesis.  
  Third, this research examined the relationship between the financial stability of 
county government and the likelihood of officials committing public corruption.  The 
analysis discovered that a relationship does exist: when county governments have 
substantial funding or other financial resources available to award contracts and fund 
projects, corruption is more likely to occur.  The variable is statistically significant, and 
the results suggest a strong relationship; the fiscal performance of counties appears to 
influence officials to engage in criminal activity.  The results are consistent with the 
proposed hypothesis.  This factor’s contribution to the likelihood of corruption may be 
due to the ability of a county government with an excellent bond rating to generate 
financing and funds for capital improvement projects, which in turn makes it possible to 
award projects and contracts using government dollars.  Previous research that explored 
the financial stability of government suggests that governments flush with money are 
more likely to experience corruption.  
 Fourth, the findings in this study show that poverty rate has a direct relationship on 
the decision of officials to commit public corruption.  This variable provided positive 
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statistical results, indicating that the hypothesis was consistent with the findings.  The 
results suggest that a high rate of poverty indicates citizens who are preoccupied with 
their personal obligations and lack the time to monitor the decisions and behavior of 
elected officials.  The analysis shows that impoverished communities are the least likely 
to monitor the behavior of public officials, and therefore experience a greater degree of 
public corruption.  The results also suggest that large urban counties with a high rate of 
poverty have more incidents of public corruption, and as the poverty rate increases, 
corruption is likely to increase.  Lastly, the research study suggests that citizens in poor 
communities are less likely to demand accountability; they are also generally less 
educated, lack the time to monitor the actions of public officials, and lack an 
understanding of the mechanics of government.  
  Lastly, the results of the covariate county population compared to state population 
appear to be a positive predictor of public corruption.  The logit analysis that examined 
this factor found that counties with populations that make up the majority of the state 
population provide positive results, which is consistent with the hypothesis.  Some 
potential explanations are that large urban counties generally experience more crime, 
have a high rate of poverty, have the financial resources to fund capital projects, wield 
power and influence, and are often the economic engine that supports the state 
financially.  These counties are also large government institutions with multiple agencies, 
and are usually involved in various aspects of government functions and responsibilities.  
The counties manage and control various aspects of government.  The elected officials 
governing these counties wield considerable power and influence, and often control huge 
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budgets.  The power and influence of these officials can open the door to public 
corruption.  
General Model: Individual-Level Characteristics 
  The results of the General Model that examined the profile characteristics of elected 
public officials revealed that of the eight covariates used, four were statistically 
significant (p-values < 0.05): age, religious faith, education, and tenure.  Of these four 
covariates, GST may have been a factor in and influenced one: education.  There was, 
however, no statistically significant evidence or cause-and-effect found for four 
covariates associated with profile characteristics, marital status, age (30-39), race and 
outside employment. 
  The results of the logit analysis examining the factor of age and its effect on the 
decision to commit corruption.  The results suggest that age influences the criminal 
behavior of public officials: as officials get older, they are less likely to engage in 
corruption.  One possible explanation is the “age effect,” in which older individuals are 
more mature, financially stable, and secure, so they do not look to politics as a means to 
justify an end.  Their judgment, values, and interest are not self-focused.  Some literature 
suggests that younger politicians may be more concerned with social status and power, so 
they look for opportunities to improve their social and financial status.  They seek 
opportunities to enrich themselves, engage in acts of self-gratification, and are often 
blinded by greed (Nas et al. 1986, p. 107-119) and power; some take every opportunity to 
engage in quid pro quo while overlooking what is ethical.  All this, research suggests, 
makes younger public officials more inclined to engage in criminal behavior than older 
ones.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis that an “age effect” influences the 
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decision of officials.  The logit analysis suggest officials between the ages of 40 to 69 
years of age were more  incline to engage in corruption but as officials got older the level 
of corruption declines.    
  Second, the logit model examined the factor of religious faith and its effect on the 
decision to commit corruption.  This study found that religious faith is a negative 
predictor of committing public corruption.  La Porta et al. (1997) suggested that the 
religion is a contributing factor to public corruption, and this study shows that individuals 
without religious beliefs are more corrupt than individuals with religious beliefs, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis.  A possible explanation is that individuals with religious 
faith have a greater concern with ethics than individuals without religious beliefs.  One 
reason may be that religion is linked to values and social environment, factors that are 
fundamental to the decisions of individuals.  Ethical standards are often rooted in 
religious beliefs, and ethical standards are often strongly upheld by individuals of 
religious faith.  Although the data produced statistically significant results, it is not clear 
why nonreligious officials are more inclined to engage in corruption.  One reason for this 
finding may be that religious officials desire to uphold ethical values and support civic 
involvement because of their religious teachings and a conscious desire to uphold the rule 
of law. 
 Third, this research examined the cause-and-effect relationship between public 
officials’ level of education and their likelihood to commit public corruption.  The 
analysis found that a relationship exists.  This variable is statistically significant: public 
officials with a college education are less likely to engage in public corruption.  Previous 
empirical studies provided supporting documentation that education could influence 
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corruption.  In fact, Maxwell and Winters (2004) stated: “Well-educated citizens, we 
believe, are less tolerant of corruption” (p. 12).  Moreover, if elected officials view 
educational attainment as a positive stimulus, then it results in positive behavior and less 
corruption.  One possible explanation is that college-educated officials have a better 
understanding of what is ethical and a broader understanding of the laws governing 
public officials and government.  Other theorists, such as Boylan and Long (2003), 
concur that level of education is a “predictor of low level of corruption” (p. 8).  These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis, and authors such as Benson and Berg believe 
that corruption can be eliminated through education.  The result of the analysis supports 
the notion that GST is applicable to the variable of education, thus education can be an 
influence on an official’s behavior.  From the perspective of GST, education is a factor in 
the behavior of public officials and their decision to engage in corruption.  Clearly, the 
analysis of the covariate measuring education suggests a cause-and-effect relationship: 
educated officials are less inclined not to engage in corruption. 
  Lastly, this research found the tenure variable was statistically significant and 
indicated a correlation between the length of time public officials are in office and their 
involvement in public corruption.  These results were inconsistent with the stated 
hypothesis, which was that public officials with less time in office were more likely to 
engage in corruption.  To the contrary, the results revealed that the longer officials 
remained in office, the more likely they were to participate in public corruption.  It was 
theorized that the tenure of officials would prove to be positive because tenured officials 
would seem to be financially stable, mature, and supportive of high ethical standards, but 
the results were contrary to the hypothesis: tenured public officials were more likely to 
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engage in corruption.  One possible explanation is that the longer officials are in office, 
the more knowledgeable they become regarding the inner workings of government.  
These individuals have also established relationships with key staff and understand the 
power structure.  Tenured officials have the ability and skills to navigate complex 
government systems, and would likely assist friends and individuals who had supported 
them over the years.  Interestingly, while these results may appear to be related to age, 
the possible correlation is not as applicable as expected because the tenure of officials 
does not show a relationship with their age.  
Contribution of the Research Study 
 Public corruption is identified as a widespread problem (Xin and Rudel 2004), and as 
previously noted, can have a profound and negative effect on the performance and 
effectiveness of government.  Previous research explored the influence public corruption 
can have on government in general, but those studies failed to address the impact public 
corruption might have specifically on county government.  In fact, a review of the 
literature found few studies that reviewed public corruption in county government and 
attempted to explain why elected county officials might opt to engage in corrupt 
activities.  Unlike previous research, which explored public corruption among counties 
and reviewed similar covariates, this study sought to identify specific covariates that 
influence the decisions of elected county officials to engage in corrupt activities.  As 
discussed earlier, other studies have not analytically applied similar hypotheses of public 
corruption in county government.  This research study is aimed at identifying and 
reducing the incidences of corrupt activities in county government, and attempts to 
analyze the factors that influence corruption among elected county officials.  
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 The contribution of this research study is significant because despite all previous 
research conducted, public corruption remains a serious problem at all levels of 
government.  This research study not only contributes to the body of knowledge, it also 
provides a good understanding of factors identified as contributors to corruption in 
county government.  It provides scholarly information for further studies and offers a 
better understanding of why some elected officials opt to engage in acts of public 
corruption and others do not.      
 Although this study compiled a great deal of information, all public officials cannot 
be expected to fit the mold of all the characteristics identified here as factors in public 
corruption.  In fact, personal experience attests that some officials are inherently prone to 
corrupt behavior.  While the study produced good results and will add to the body of 
knowledge on the subject, identifying those factors thought to contribute to public 
corruption is not an exact science.  However, the study does contribute to the scholarly 
literature theorizing why public corruption exists in county government.  
  In addition, the significance of the variables identified in this study is worthy of 
additional review and consideration; these variables, if implemented, could reduce the 
influence of public corruption on county government and elected officials.  The study 
identified a number of factors, such as transparency, public participation, an educated 
citizenry, media and public review, and effective disclosure laws and policies, that 
influence the behavior and decisions of elected officials.  Local governments that have 
suffered cases of public corruption can provide excellent examples of the ways it 




 This research study found both governmental and individual profile characteristics 
that predict public corruption in county government.  Efforts have also been made to 
ascertain the influence of GST on the corruption of county elected officials and county 
government.  This research study, along with GST, has provided a greater level of 
understanding of the behavioral actions of elected public officials who choose to engage 
in criminal activities, such as public corruption.  As shown in this study, GST appears to 
be a factor that induced elected officials to engage in public corruption, consistent with 
the theoretical model.  It is fair to conclude that the study found evidence that negative 
strains exist and are an indicator of public corruption among elected officials.  
  Academic literature provided supporting explanations and justifications of how a 
negative social environment, lack of educational attainment, and low financial 
achievement are negative factors that influence the behavior and decisions of individuals.  
The individuals in question here were elected county officials, who are no different from 
any other citizens experiencing less-than-positive achievements; in these cases; however, 
their behavior resulted in poor choices, such as engaging in corrupt behavior.  The results 
of the study suggest a positive correlation between public corruption and the environment 
of public officials that, in many cases, can influence decisions and behavior.  Not all the 
covariates used in this study produced significant results, but the overall results produced 
a substantial list of covariates that can be useful in predicting public corruption among 
elected officials in large urban counties.  
  Although this research study is persuasive, additional research could improve the 
overall model.  The data used in this study could also be refined; conducting additional 
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research on state or city governments would provide supporting data and substantiate the 
factors in this study identified as causes of public corruption.  The data collected for this 
study varied across states, but the results proved positive with a high rate of 
predictability.  Hence, the General Model for both county-level and individual-level 
characteristics was successful in identifying factors that can be used to predict public 
corruption.  
  If citizens demand an improved and honest government, reducing public corruption 
becomes an important factor.  The practical implication of this research study is primarily 
the identification of factors that contribute to public corruption in county government and 
among elected county officials in order to minimize corruption in county government.  
This study identified nine factors that predicted public corruption, information that can be 
used to deter corruption in county government.  Improving the ability to predict 
corruption can become a valuable tool in fighting it and restoring the public's trust in 
government.  The objective of this study was to identify possible factors that encourage 
public corruption in county government, with the intention of creating a government 
system that the public can trust and believe in.   Rose-Ackerman (1999) believed that 
“toleration of corruption in some areas of public life can facilitate a downward spiral in 
which the malfeasance of some encourages more and more people to engage in 
corruption over time” (p. 26).  
Study Limitations 
  A few limitations were identified in this research study.  First, the study did not 
include individual data from county commissioners in counties with no cases of public 
corruption.  This lack of information limited the ability to analyze the effect personal 
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characteristics might have on the decisions of public officials to engage in corruption.  
Including data from non-corrupt commissioners in non-corrupt counties could have been 
useful when interpreting the results for the domain of individual predictors, and could 
have provided a more diverse data set to understand the influence of individual predictors 
when identifying factors that predict public corruption.  The lack of this information also 
influenced the requirement of generalizability.  The General Model for individual-level 
predictors is 76.1 percent, which is slightly weak compared to the results for county-level 
data.  The low results for individual-level prediction may be a result of the limited sample 
size and the non-corruption limitation noted above.   A larger number of corruption cases 
could have greatly improved the overall model. 
  Second, several of the variables used in the study did not produce valid results for 
determining corruption and, in the end, were not useful for analyzing the data.  For 
example, outside employment was not a valid indication of corruption; the data did not 
produce meaningful results in which outside income could be used as a factor for 
determining the likelihood of public corruption.  Outside employment was originally 
thought to be a covariate that would result in a positive outcome for public corruption, 
but the data failed to produce the expected results.  The overall wealth of commissioners 
would have been more useful in determining public corruption.  Open meeting laws were 
another variable that did not pan out as a good indicator of public corruption.  The laws 
varied too widely among counties, making the information problematic to analyze. 
  Third, this study was limited to large urban counties with cases of public corruption, 
which turned out to be 43 cases.  A larger data set could have produced improved results, 
even if the explanatory variables were not applicable to counties of less than 300,000.  It 
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would be prudent to reevaluate some of the explanatory measurements to reflect 
government size, as well as to provide additional opportunities to gather information 
about the individual characteristics of elected officials in small counties.  
 Finally, much of the information about incarcerated elected officials was difficult to 
obtain.  The Justice Department’s process for obtaining information was not user-
friendly, which resulted in limited information even when public trials occurred. 
Eventually all the information was obtained, but alternative data-gathering methods were 
needed.  
 Further research in this area can address these shortcomings and develop a broad list 
of explanatory measurements that could prove useful for later studies.  While this study 
provided good information and can serve as the first step for further studies, several new 
predictive variables could help in identifying public corruption in county government.  
This research study produced some good results in explaining some of the reasons elected 
officials decided to engage in public corruption.  If future researchers could establish a 
relationship with the Justice Department or develop alternative methods for gathering 
data about incarcerated officials, they might be able to collect more data on public 
corruption in government.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
 This research study successfully identified explanatory measurements of public 
corruption, but there are opportunities for improvement that could benefit the field, 
enhance further research, and reinforce and strengthen results.  The findings described in 
this study are useful in expanding scholarly knowledge and literature, although there are 
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limitations, as outlined above.  However, changes to the study design might benefit 
further research on the topic of public corruption.  
 First, undertaking a research study on public corruption was an enormous task.  
Future research on the topic, with further identification of new explanatory measures, 
might provide improved understanding and explanations of the influences of public 
corruption on elected officials.  For example, measures such as “family income” could 
offer insight about the financial wealth of individuals and whether wealth is a valid 
predictor for committing public corruption.  A more in-depth analysis of anticorruption 
policies should be included in future studies to determine the effectiveness of 
enforcement policies and their impact on such components as conflict of interest policies, 
gift-giving, and patronage.  What impact could these policies have on curbing public 
corruption in local government?  The scope of review for this study on anticorruption 
laws, such as ethics and open meeting laws, was limited to the strictness of the laws and 
their influence on public corruption.  Further studies on the effectiveness of these laws 
and their role in curbing public corruption could be reviewed in future research.  Political 
campaign contributions and conflicts of interest are additional variables to include in 
future studies; these added variables might explain the influence of campaigns and 
political contributions on public corruption. 
 Second, a review of the findings suggests that adding domains to expand the scope of 
the study or the areas of focus might improve the theoretical model and generate a better 
understanding of public corruption.  Additional domains might include a review of 
private individuals involved in acts of public corruption, which could provide additional 
insight into the potential for gain, as well as other motivations for acts of corruption.  
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What is the connection between private individuals and corruption among public 
officials? What is the relationship between these two parties?   
 Third, further research on the media’s influence on public corruption could provide 
useful information and aid in reducing corruption in government.  Including the influence 
of the media would provide an opportunity to assess opinions on what more could be 
done from the media’s perspective when communicating to the public, reporting the 
news, and providing information about the decisions and behavior of elected officials. 
Expanding the study to include the domain of media would more accurately reflect its 
impact and importance in identifying, deterring, and reporting corruption.   
 Fourth, further research should include assessing citizen opinions, possibly through 
the use of a public opinion survey.  Public opinion would provide an assessment of 
government and its elected officials, along with critical information that could be useful 
in developing recommendations for reducing corruption.  Additionally, a public opinion 
survey could gather information about the problems created by government corruption.  
This information would be useful in gauging the objections and perceptions of the public 
about how corruption influences the decisions of their elected officials.  
 Fifth, the use of this model is the initial process in determining if it was a reliable 
tool in explaining public corruption.  Further work is needed to establish the reliability of 
the model—for instance, the study of public corruption in other government agencies.  
An analysis of public corruption in city and state government, police departments, and 
quasi-governmental agencies (e.g., water, sanitation, health, transportation) might be 
beneficial. 
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 Sixth, the research suggests that strain is perceived, but additional information would 
have benefited the study.  Personal interviews with elected officials would provide 
greater insight to improve this aspect of the research study.  Interviews would allow in-
depth questions to be asked of officials.  This modification would improve the overall 
study, since this change would allow the researcher to obtain specific information on 
negative emotions, anger, negative behavior, social support structure, and financial 
details.  
 Seventh, future research might further identify the influence term limits could have 
on public corruption in county government.  Recent voter-approved initiatives have 
imposed limits on the length of time public officials can serve in elected positions.  Some 
of the arguments for enacting term limits are that they provide a check on concentration 
of power, ensure long-term stability, and strengthen democracy.  Research in this area 
will broaden our knowledge and understanding of the influence term limits have on 
increasing or decreasing public corruption in county government.  It is recommended that 
further research be undertaken to better understand their influence.  Including this 
variable would also allow a review of contract awards, campaign contributions, and 
policy changes.   
 Finally, prior to any new research study, the General Models should be assessed and 
refined to determine whether they accomplished the goals of predicting and explaining 
public corruption.  Further research in this area should include the removal or 
modification of variables that did not produce valid results in order to improve the 
study’s reliability in explaining public corruption within any government, regardless of 
size or jurisdiction.  Hence, it is suggested that future research studies on public 
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corruption include characteristics on private individuals, administrators, police officials, 
city officials, state legislators, and federal officials.  Expanding the research of public 
corruption to include other elected officials will broaden our understanding of public 
corruption, with the intent of developing and identifying profiles of characteristics that 
can be used to identify individuals likely to engage in corrupt activities.  Expanding the 
research will provide opportunities to explore cause-and-effect relationships between 
additional covariates and public corruption among a broader base of officials. 
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EXHIBIT I 






Variable Data Sources 
Public 
Corruption 
Primary: Public Access to Court Electronic Records service, U.S. Department of Justice 
press releases, personal correspondence with county officials and county staff. 
Secondary: LexisNexis, local print media, television broadcasts, newspaper articles. 
No Public 
Corruption Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials and county staff. 
Covariates 
Domains Variable Data Sources 
Elected Officials 
Characteristics 
1.  Outside employment  Primary: Personal correspondence received from county officials. 
2. Age of officials Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials. 
3. Gender of officials 
Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials. 
Secondary: Published county documents, print media, and 
biographies. 
4.  Formal education of 
officials 
Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials. 
Secondary: Published county documents, print media, 
biographies, district newsletters. 
5. Display of religious 
beliefs  Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials. 
6. Marital status of 
elected officials 
Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials. 
Secondary: Published county documents, print media, and 
biographies. 
7. Race of elected 
officials 
Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials. 
Secondary: Officials’ documents/Web site. 
8.Tenure of elected 
officials 
Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials. 
Secondary: County and state election records. 
Government 
Characteristics 
1.  Office of inspector 
general 
Primary: Government documents, print, Web, personal 
conversations with department staff, government reports. 
2. Ethics Laws 
Primary: County and state documents, print, Web. 
Secondary: National legislative and county associations’ online 
documents. 
3. Structure of 
government 
Primary: Government documents, print, Web, personal 
conversations with county staff.  
4. Percentage of 
employment growth 
Primary: Government documents containing demographic 
(county and federal), print and online. 
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EXHIBIT I 
MODEL VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA (cont.) 
Covariates 
Domain Variable Data Source(s) 
Government 
Fiscal Oversight 
1. Annual per capita 
income 
Primary: County and federal government documents containing 
financial data, annual budget documents, comprehensive annual 
financial reports (online and print). 
2. Secured (revenue 
pledged)  general 
obligation bond rating 
Primary: Comprehensive annual financial reports, government 
budget documents, personal correspondence with county staff, bond 
rating services (print and online). 
Secondary: Annually published bond-rating publications. 
3.  One year of annual 
state and federal aid 
Primary: County and federal government documents containing 
census and financial data (print and online). 
4. Auditors 
Primary: Government documents and annual audit reports (print 






poverty level   
Primary: County and federal government documents (print and 
online) containing census data, 
2. Percentage of the 
population 65 years of 
age or older 
Primary: Government documents containing census data (online). 
3. Annual crime rate 
Primary: Government documents containing crime rate data, county 
and federal documents (online), personal correspondence from law 
enforcement officials. 
4. Percentage of voter 
turnout 
Primary: County and state government documents (print and 
online). 
5. Percentage of the 
population with 
secondary education 
Primary: Government documents containing census data (online). 
6. Percentage of total 
workforce unemployed 
Primary: County and federal government documents containing 
census and labor force data (online).  
7. Percentage of the 
county population 
growth 
Primary: Government documents containing census data (online), 
county and federal data. 
8. Percentage of the 
county population to the 
state population 
Primary: Government documents containing census data (online); 
county, state, and federal data. 
9. Percentage of political 
party affiliation 
Primary: Government documents from county government, 










(Explanation of corporate 
municipal bond ratings) 













Medium grade, lower 
quality 
Predominantly speculative 










Poor to default 
Highest speculation 





















 An independent assessment of the relative credit worthiness of municipal securities 
is provided by three rating agencies: Moody's Investors Service, Standard and Poor's 
Corporation, and Fitch Ratings.  Each of these furnishes letter grades that convey an 
assessment of the ability and willingness of a borrower to repay its debt in full and on 
time.  Credit ratings issued by these agencies are a major function in determining the cost 




MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA CODING 
 
1. GENERAL MODEL: Dependent variable is categorical (dichotomous) measure of public corruption. 
0 = Did not commit public corruption 
1 = Committed public corruption 
 
Matrix of Covariates 
Domain Attributes Variable Method and Level of Measurement 
Characteristics of 
Elected Officials 
Gender Gender Female=1, male=0 
Age Age Age of official  
Race Race White=1, non-white=0 
Religious belief Attendance at religious institution No=1, yes=0 
Education Formal education HS=12 through PhD=20 
Marital status Marital status Married=1, not married=0 
Tenure Commission tenure Number of years on commission  
Outside employment Outside employment No outside=0, yes outside=1 
    
Government 
Characteristics 
Office of Inspector General Inspector General office No inspector=0, yes inspector=1 
Ethic laws Seriousness of ethic violation No penalty/moderate penalty=1, stringent penalty=2 
Structure of government Management of government structure Professional manager=1, commission=2 
Open meeting laws Seriousness of violation No penalty=0, moderate=1, stringent=2 
Employment growth 1 year change in employment hiring Percentage change in employment hiring  
    
Fiscal Stability 
Per capita income 1 year change per capita income Percentage change in per capita income  
Fiscal stability Bond rating; general obligation debt Financial services rating  
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Domain Attributes Variable Method and Level of Measurement 
Federal & state aid Allocation of aid from federal & state revenues Percentage of federal & state transfers to the total revenue  
Auditor Auditor function No auditor=0, yes auditor=1 
    
Community 
Characteristics 
Poverty Poverty rate for county Percentage of households below the federal poverty level  
Percentage of community 
65 & older Senior citizens 65 and older Percentage of the senior population to the county population  
Crime rate Rate of crime Rate per  100,000 inhabitants  
Civic involvement Voter turnout Percentage of voter turnout in general election  
Community education 
level College degree Percentage of community with college education  
Labor force Unemployment rate Percentage of total workforce  
Population growth 1 year change in population Percentage change  
% county population to 
overall state population County population and state population Percentage of county population to overall state population  





Indictments and Convictions 
Gender State County Year Convicted/Indicted 
1. Male Alabama Jefferson 2008 
2. Male Alabama Jefferson 2007 
3. Male Alabama Jefferson 2006 
4. Male Alabama Jefferson 2006 
5.  Female Alabama Jefferson 2008 
6. Male Alabama Mobile 2003 
7. Male California San Bernardino 2001 
8. Male** California San Francisco 2007 
9. Male California San Joaquin 2002 
10. Male Delaware New Castle 2002 
11. Male Delaware New Castle 2005 
12. Male* Florida Broward 2009 
13. Male Florida Miami Dade 2000 
14. Male* Florida Miami Dade 2005 
15. Male Florida Palm Beach 2007 
16. Male Florida Palm Beach 2007 
17.  Female Florida Palm Beach 2003 
18. Male Georgia Fulton 2001 
19. Male Georgia Fulton 2001 
20. Male** Hawaii Honolulu 2000 
21. Male Indiana Lake 2006 
22. Male Indiana Lake 2002 
23. Male Indiana Lake 2006 
24. Male Louisiana New Orleans 2002 
25.Male** Massachusetts Boston 2008 
26. Male Michigan Wayne 2002 
27.  Female* Missouri Jackson 2006 
28. Male Missouri St. Louis 2002 
29. Male Nevada Clark 2003 
30. Male Nevada Clark 2003 
31.  Female Nevada Clark 2003 
32.  Female Nevada Clark 2003 
33. Male New Jersey Essex 2001 
34.  Female New Jersey Hudson 2002 
35. Male New Jersey Hudson 2002 
36. Male New Jersey Hudson 2002 
37. Male** New Jersey Monmouth 2005 
38. Male** Philadelphia Philadelphia 2005 
39. Male Tennessee Hamilton 2005 
40. Male Tennessee Shelby 2004 
41. Male Tennessee Shelby 2004 
42.  Female Texas El Paso 2007 





 Large U.S. Counties with Some Form of Public Corruption 
Rank County State 2000 Pop. Estimate 
1 Miami-Dade FL 2,253,662 
2 Wayne MI 2,061,162 
3 San Bernardino CA 1,709,434 
4 Broward FL 1,623,018 
5 Philadelphia PA 1,517,550 
6 Clark NV 1,375,765 
7 Palm Beach FL 1,131,184 
8 St. Louis MO 1,016,315 
9 Shelby TN 897,472 
10 Honolulu HI 876,156 
11 Fulton GA 816,006 
12 Essex NJ 793,633 
13 San Francisco CA 776,733 
14 El Paso TX 692,493 
15 Boston MA 689,807 
16 Jackson MO 654,880 
17 Monmouth NJ 615,301 
18 Hudson NJ 608,975 
19 Hidalgo TX 569,463 
20 San Joaquin CA 563,598 
21 New Castle DE 512,370 
22 Orleans LA 484,674 
23 Lake IN 484,564 
24 Jefferson AL 455,466 
25 Mobile AL 399,843 
26 Hamilton TN 323,162 











91 Large U.S. Counties with No Cases of Public Corruption 
Rank County State 2000 Population Estimate 
1 Los Angeles CA 9,630,575 
2 Cook IL 5,283,888 
3 Harris TX 3,515,210 
4 Maricopa AZ 3,259,093 
5 Orange CA 2,896,130 
6 San Diego CA 2,813,678 
7 Dallas TX 2,249,981 
8 King WA 1,720,682 
9 Santa Clara CA 1,653,545 
10 Tarrant TX 1,504,081 
11 Alameda CA 1,444,656 
12 Bexar TX 1,409,834 
13 Cuyahoga OH 1,323,033 
15 Alleghena PA 1,229,569 
16 Oakland MI 1,188,898 
17 Hennepin MN 1,094,447 
18 Hillsborough FL 1,035,294 
19 Fairfax VA 990,830 
20 Contra Costa CA 981,043 
21 Orange FL 927,463 
22 Erie NY 913,554 
23 Milwaukee WI 913,090 
24 DuPage IL 909,476 
25 Salt Lake  UT 905,259 
26 Pinellas FL 903,895 
27 Montgomery MD 900,706 
28 Bergen NJ 883,742 
29 Pima AZ 859,187 
30 Travis TX 830,649 
31 Prince George MD 815,417 
32 Hamilton OH 814,747 
33 Macomb MI 799,686 
34 Ventura CA 770,658 
35 Middlesex NJ 754,729 
36 Baltimore MD 752,266 
37 Montgomery PA 743,177 
38 Mecklenburg NC 722,367 
39 Monroe NY 711,649 
40 Pierce WA 710,419 
41 San Mateo CA 692,752 
42 Jefferson KY 685,285 
43 Oklahoma OK 665,333 
44 DeKalb GA 663,118 
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Rank County State 2000 Population Estimate 
45 Kern CA 663,106 
46 Multnomah OR 660,938 
47 Wake NC 656,781 
48 Lake IL 654,067 
49 Gwinnett GA 644,386 
50 Cobb GA 644,186 
51 Snohomish WA 624,729 
52 Bucks PA 601,357 
53 Kent MI 575,097 
54 Collin TX 563,463 
55 Tulsa OK 563,299 
56 Bernalillo NM 563,002 
57 Denver CO 547,696 
58 Montgomery OH 538,867 
59 Summit OH 537,238 
60 Delaware PA 531,048 
61 Bristol MA 530,526 
62 Ocean NJ 529,187 
63 Jefferson CO 523,993 
64 Union NJ 522,958 
65 Arapahoe CO 505,289 
66 Ramsey MN 493,283 
67 Anne Arundel MD 487,243 
68 Polk FL 486,876 
69 Brevard FL 485,936 
70 Denton TX 479,425 
71 Stanislaus CA 474,939 
72 Plymouth MA 474,240 
73 Johnson KS 471,558 
74 Lee FL 470,002 
75 Morris NJ 469,544 
76 Washington OR 469,162 
77 Lancaster PA 464,352 
78 Douglas NE 460,972 
79 Sedgwick KS 455,659 
80 Jefferson Parish LA 448,436 
81 Onondaga NY 447,124 
82 Volusia FL 444,718 
83 Lucas OH 444,610 
84 Genesee MI 436,129 
85 Guilford NC 416,987 
86 Spokane WA 412,360 
87 Greenville SC 380,333 
88 Adams CO 370,685 
89 Washoe NV 356,915 
90 Clackamas OR 348,937 
91 Washtenaw MI 312,702 
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APPENDIX IV 
DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE- INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1.  What was your age when you were a County Commissioner in (year)? 
  Please circle one 
 
 20-29      30-39 40-49     50-59 60-69 70-above 
 
2.  What is your gender?  Please circle one 
 Male or Female 
 




4. Are you religious, display religious beliefs or attend church frequently?   
Please circle one 
Yes or No 
 
5.  What was your level of education as a County Commissioner in (year)?  
Please circle one 
High School 
Associate Degree 
Bachelors Degree  
Masters Degree 
Professional Degree i.e., JD Degree 
Ph.D. Degree 
 
6.  What was your marital status when you were on the County Commission in (year)?                    
Please circle one 
Married or Not Married 
 
7.  While serving as a County Commissioner, did you maintain outside employment. 
Yes or No 
 
8. List the number of years (tenure) as a County Commissioner from the time elected                    
until (year). 
 
9.  What is your political party affiliation while serving on the County Commission?  
Please circle one 




DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE- COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS 
1.  In (year) what was the political party affiliation of County Commissioners?  How many                
of the Commissioners were? 
 
 Democrats___________ Republicans__________ Independents__________ 
 Others___________ 
 
2.  What was the bond rating for (General Obligation bonds) for your County in (year) or a 
recent bond rating? 
 
    Moody's______ Standard & Poor's_________ Year_________ 
 
3.  What was the voter turnout rate for your county in (year)?   General election only 
    Voter Turnout Rate______________ Date_____________ 
 
4. Does the county have an independent internal audit function?   
  Yes_______  No_________ 
 
Definition of the internal audit function: The Audit department promotes economical, 
efficient, and effective operations and combats fraud, waste and abuse by providing 
management with independent and objective evaluations of operations.  The Department 
examines and reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of County activities and programs.  
In addition, the Department reviews financial statements that present the results of County 
financial operations.  The Department also helps keep the public informed about the quality 
of county management through audit reports. 
 
5. Does the County have an office of Inspector General?    
 Yes_________ No___________ 
 
Definition of the office of Inspector General: Was created and approved by the Board of 
County Commissioners to implement clean government.  The Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) is authorized to detect, investigate and prevent fraud, waste, mismanagement and 
abuse of power in county projects, programs or contracts.  The OIG is independent and 
insulated from political influences.  The Office has the jurisdiction to investigate officials at 
any level, including elected officials.  The goal of the office is to prevent misconduct and 
abuse, expose it publicly, and seek appropriate remedies to recover public monies. Above 
all, the OIG's principal objective is to promote ethics, honest and efficiency in government 




STRAINS- (Stressors)  
Jang and Johnson (2003) 
1. Negative emotions 
2. Poor of declining financial status, fewer assets than liabilities, loss of assets,   
        problem with car or other material good, excluding housing 
 
3. Poor academic performance, negative school related events, admission       
  problems, failed grades, and bad and negative things happened at school 
 
4. Unemployment, problems finding a job, quit or laid off, business problems, job 
  demotion, trouble with supervisor/ boss/ or co-workers, negative events at work, 
  work related tension and poor working conditions 
 
5. Failed marriage, lost custody of children, legal actions involving court action, 
  lawsuit/arrest/ conviction of crime/violation of law  
 
6. Poor neighborhood, live or moved into poor housing, theft or destruction of 
  housing 
 
7. High rate of crime in neighborhood 
8. Lack of personal achievement 
9. Trouble with family/spouse/child(ren)/parents, relative and friend(s), (unwanted 
  pregnancy or child(ren), marital separation, divorce, break-up 
 
10.  Death of someone close, family, friend 
11.  Poor health or sickness, physical health issues, disability, chronic and other  
  health related problems 
 
12.  Victim of violence or a crime, accident or injury 
 
13.  Declining age coupled with a decline in health  
 
 Agnew (1992) defines strains as "negative or aversive relations with others" 
 (p.61), which has three types: strain as the actual or anticipated failure to achieve 
 positively valued goals, strain as the actual or anticipated removal of positively 
 valued stimuli, and strain as the actual or anticipated presentation of negative 
 stimuli" (p.59).  In summary, GST is deduced as strains that result in generating 
 negative emotions that provide in situations the motivation for  deviance as a coping 
 strategy because such emotional forces can create pressure for corrective action.  
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